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RECONSIDERING FEDERALISM AND THE FARM:
TOWARD INCLUDING LOCAL, STATE AND
REGIONAL VOICES IN AMERICA'S FOOD SYSTEM
Margaret Sova McCabe*
... the supervision of agriculture and other concerns of a similar nature, all
those things in short which are proper to be provided for by local legislation,
can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction."
- The Federalist No. 17'
Why is the relationship between our food system and federal-
ism important to American law and health? It is important simply
because federal law controls the American food system. This essay
considers how federal law came to structure our food system, and
suggests that though food is an essential part of our national econ-
omy, the dominating role of the federal government alienates citi-
zens from their food system. It does so by characterizing food as a
primarily economic issue, rather than one that has ethical, health,
and cultural components. However, state and local governments
have much to offer in terms of broadening the scope of food system
considerations. This essay first provides a simplified overview of
American food system influences.! It also touches on the major legal
principals affecting the system. Finally, it highlights three examples
of how to include local, state, and regional voices in food system
reforms. These examples are: the food system indicator tool, farm
to school programs, and food policy councils. These solutions illus-
* Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center, Concord, NH.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. If nothing else, the American food system is complicated. Excellent re-
sources for developing a deeper understanding of the American food system are
available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org.
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trate that the best food system reforms require the exercise of fed-
eral, state, and local powers in ways that maximize the individual's
ability to influence and participate in the food system.
In our modern history, the federal government's exercise of the
commerce clause is the primary influence on the American food
system. While historically the United States has seen great shifts be-
tween a powerful federal government and states' rights, state and
local governments play a lesser role in the food system, despite hav-
ing important police powers related to it.' The state and local role is
shaped largely by efforts to participate in, or comply with, federal
programs such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP) or the National School Lunch Program, on behalf of its citi-
zens.
There can be no doubt that the federal government controls
the American food system.' Nor is there any doubt that significant
federal control is appropriate. In fact, this dominant federal control
made sense in our history, as this essay later explains. However,
unless reforms to the food system include local, state, and regional
contributions and control, chances at curbing food-related diseases,
improving poor nutrition, and reconnecting with the natural envi-
ronment will diminish. This essay argues that New Deal federalism
and its progeny created distance between Americans and their food,
contributing to the sense that Americans do not shape the food sys-
tem, but allow it to shape us.
3. See generally JULIE SAMIA MAIR ET AL., THE USE OF ZONING TO RESTRICT FAST
FOOD OUTLETS: A POTENTIAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT OBESITY (2005); see also A. Bryan
Endres & Jody M. Endres, Homeland Security Planning: What Victory Gardens and
Fidel Castro Can Teach Us in Preparing for Food Crises in the United States, 64 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 405, 407 (2009) ("The federal government has not considered the role of
regional and local food networks in its national homeland security planning. In-
stead, federal homeland security, as it relates to agriculture and food, assumes the
status quo of conventional agriculture one that heavily relies on petro-chemical
inputs that continue to skyrocket in price and negatively impact the environment,
concentrated production and processing markets, and transportation to service
distant customers.").
4. See, e.g., Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246,
122 Stat. 1651 (2008); 7 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
5. See Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (noting Madison, in The Federalist 45 and 46, recognized that
"the states' ultimate security lies in the confidence of the people. That confidence
expresses itself through the political process . . . but ultimately turns upon the con-
tinuing relevance of state government institutions to the day-to-day lives of the citi-
zenry. The greatest danger to federalism, therefore, is that the expanding regula-
tory concerns of the national government will leave the states with nothing to do.").
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Much American food system criticism is leveled at federal pro-
grams. The primary complaint is that citizens are at the mercy of big
agribusiness, which is backed by big government policy. The most
well known example of this big government policy is the Farm Bill,
which provides for crop subsidies and other federal crop production
policies.' There are other significant federal influences such as anti-
trust regulation' and marketing orders,' but these are not as debated
in popular culture. However, all three have significant influence on
the size of agribusiness and what it produces. The popular percep-
tion is that big agribusiness is bad for the American food system.
Regardless of the truth behind this perception, the reality is that
many food system reformers believe that big agribusiness bad. As a
result, it is important to examine the extent to which the federal
government plays a role in promoting a national and monolithic
food system.
Today, reformers working on projects as diverse as the farm-to-
school programs and fast food zoning bans share a common goal:
giving individual citizens a voice in the food system. However, the
historical roots of food and federal government programs have
muted the individual's voice, and even the states' influence, because
they rested on the notion that states could not be trusted to effec-
tively regulate agricultural markets or provide food to their popula-
tions.'
Food law and health issues have become so big - with eco-
nomic, public health, and cultural components - that it is easy to
find the situation hopeless. These issues include food related dis-
eases, weak food security, food deserts, animal welfare, immigration
policy, and agricultural production methods. Specific examples in-
clude: (1) a Farm Bill that promotes production of industrialized
crops for shelf-stable foods that contribute to increased food-related
disease rates (such as obesity, heart disease, and diabetes) rather
6. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, supra note 4.
7. Modern anti-trust issues are also a growing concern for the federal govern-
ment. See Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement Issus in Our 21" Century Econ-
omy, 74 Fed. Reg. 43,725 (Aug. 27, 2009); see also Geoffrey Manne, The Seeds of an
Anti-Trust Disaster in Iowa, FORBEs STREET TALK BLOG (Mar. 11, 2010, 7:56 PM)
http://blogs.forbes.com/streettalk/2010/03/1 1/the-seeds-of-an-antitrust-disaster-
in-iowa/(commenting on the federal government's inquiry into consolidation in the
seed industry).
8. Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-674 (2006); Marketing Agree-
ments and Orders; Fruits Vegetables, Nuts, 7 C.F.R. § 900 (2009).
9. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
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than a wide variety of fruits, vegetables, and grains; (2) a conflicted
National School Lunch program that has a dual policy of commodity
crop consumption and child nutrition; and (3) food security pro-
grams that do not cover the cost of a healthy diet. These issues
touch every American in some way and these issues are symptoms of
a food system lacking political balance and long-term sustainability.
Today, a person has little legal power to shape the food system,
other than voting wisely for government representatives or with her
pocketbook at grocery stores, restaurants, and markets. Analyzing
our food system's roots in federalism will help us shape solutions in
a way that will not only allow greater contributions from local and
state governments, but also a better system of checks and balances
on federal food policy. Leveraging various government powers in
new ways in the food system will also give the individual more power
in making food policy choices.
Simply put, federal agricultural policy has a direct effect on
public health. However, federal food system policy views food pri-
marily as an economic issue - and this makes sense given that Con-
gressional food policy is empowered primarily by the commerce
clause. Additionally, the federal power over the food system has its
roots in stabilizing market prices and rural economies, not in con-
sidering health and the environment. However, as concerns over
food-related disease and nutrition mount it should be obvious that
we must no longer view food as a purely economic issue.'o
On the positive side, there are many talented people from di-
verse disciplines proposing powerful solutions and approaches to
food system issues. Law is the mechanism that can give life to these
solutions and approaches.
FEDERALISM ON THE FARM IN THE NEW DEAL: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
In 1933, Americans were shocked when the government inten-
tionally slaughtered pigs and plowed up cotton crops in the name of
economic stability." The plan, executed by the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Administration (AAA), was one in a series of steps intended to
10. See Susan A. Schneider, A Reconsideration of Agricultural Law: A Call for the
Law of Food, Farming and Sustainability. 34 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 935,
959 (2010) (noting there is no "forum for consideration of ethical issues in food"
and suggesting a more holistic approach for the future).
11. KENNETH S. DAvis, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS 1933 - 1937, 270-71 (1986).
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raise food prices." While this may seem strange given the immedi-
ate hunger of Americans suffering during the Great Depression, the
greater need was economic recovery - and that started on the
farm.'" Henry Wallace, the first head of the AAA, described agricul-
ture as a business, stating, "[a]griculture cannot survive in a Capital-
ist society as a philanthropic exercise."" Wallace, and the Roosevelt
administration, knew that the agricultural markets were broken and
needed structure to function properly.
However, the New Deal's economic approach to the food sys-
tem's structure could be viewed as taxpayers' philanthropy in sup-
port of farmers and promotion of agricultural production that was
not reflective of our nation's nutritional, environmental, or eco-
nomic realities. The most fundamental aspect of New Deal agricul-
tural policy was that it was about the economy - not nutritional pol-
icy (though this was seen as a possible beneficial side effect). That
legacy remains today, as government policy views food foremost as
an economic issue. Reviewing the New Deal agricultural policy il-
luminates, in part, how federal controls of our modern food system
began.
The original scheme, embodied in the AAA,' was ruled uncon-
stitutional in 1936.16 However, subsequent amendments, embodied
in the Agricultural Marketing Adjustment Act of 1937 (AMAA), re-
tained its core principles, which, seventy-two years later, have
changed little. One of these principles was stabilizing agricultural
market pricing. 7 At the time, surpluses drove prices down, resulting
in farmers faltering. President Roosevelt believed that recovery from
the Depression started on the farm and that the government had to
take "emergency steps" to control the markets."
12. Id. at 269. Another part of the plan included establishing the Commodity
Credit Corporation. Id. at 282.
13. Id. at 270.
14. DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN
DEPRESSION AND WAR 1929-1945 206 (1999).
15. See Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933), amended
by Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935, ch. 641, 49 Stat. 750 (1935).
16. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
17. See United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
18. However, later historians have argued that the AAA was viewed as not only
an emergency measure, but rather the long-term solution to agricultural market
control. JIM POWELL, FDR's FOLLY: How ROOSEVELT AND HIS NEW DEAL PROLONGED
THE GREAT DEPRESSION 215 (2003). Readers should also consider the usefulness of
the AMAA during USDA Secretary Earl Butz's administration, when the federal
goal was to reduce food costs.
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Accordingly, Congress declared the AAA's purpose to be
avoidance of "the disruption of the orderly exchange of commodi-
ties in interstate commerce."" Congress's further purpose was to
avoid market disruption that could harm "the purchasing power of
farmers' thus destroying the value of agricultural assets to the det-
riment of the national public interest."" These purposes remain
codified today. Ironically - though this sentiment was rejected thor-
oughly by Wickard v. Filburn - in 1936, the Supreme Court noted
that the original act "invades the reserved rights of the states. It is a
statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a
matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government."2 1
Later, in Filburn, the Court found that a Farmer Filburn could no
longer save wheat for his family, or his own use, because such use of
his crop could disrupt the national economy. Perhaps this moment
was the true start of American acceptance of globalization.
Today, the AMAA shapes American food availability by regulat-
ing the quality and quantity of over twenty-five commodity crops.
The original purpose of the act remains the same today - to protect
farmers and consumers from price fluctuations by creating stable
markets. However, the type of crops, and their relationship to public
health, appears to be of little federal concern (perhaps due to Con-
stitutional limitations on Congressional authority to regulate for the
public health).
Ultimately, the Supreme Court invalidated much of the New
Deal legislation on the ground of improper delegation.22 However,
the Court finally accepted that the government's efforts to regulate
food markets were constitutionally acceptable under the commerce
clause, and desirable for the public good, so long as they did not
reach into matters of local commerce. Indeed, by 1997 the Su-
19. Rock Royal, 307 U.S. at 543-45.
20. Id. at 544.
21. Butler, 297 U.S. at 68.
22. 7 U.S.C.§ 608c(6)(I) (2006); see Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,
521 U.S. 457, 494 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("First, the Act authorizes paid
advertising programs in marketing orders for over 25 listed fruit, nuts, vegetables,
and eggs, but not for any other agricultural commodity. The list includes onion but
not garlic, tomatoes but not cucumbers, Tokay grapes but not for any other grapes
and so on. The selection is puzzling.") (citations omitted).
23. E.g. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
24. Rock Royal, 307 U.S. at 570 ("The people of the great cities depend largely on
an adequate supply of pure fresh milk. So essential it is for health that the con-
sumer has been willing to forego unrestricted competition from low cost territory
to be assured of the producer's compliance with sanitary requirements, as enforced
by municipal health authorities.").
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preme Court had wholly accepted that the AMAA constitutionally
and properly replaces free market competition in certain commod-
ity crops with collective production controlled through federal mar-
keting orders."
Congress's exercise of its commerce clause power under the
AMAA to stabilize markets is problematic because it reduces much
of domestic food production to a closed system between the federal
government and producers, leaving individual consumers with the
limited role of choosing to buy what is grown (or not). Add to the
marketing-orders system the influence of the Farm Bill's commodity
crop provisions (such as subsidies) and there is little room for public
health considerations or individual preference in the American food
system.
FOOD AND MONEY: POST WORLD WAR II AND THE
SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS
President Roosevelt articulated the connection between the
economy, food, and food security in 1944. He proposed a "Second
Bill of Rights," which fundamentally recognized that having a job
was the most important component to an individual's right to food.
Specifically, Roosevelt's January 11, 1944 State of the Union Address
declared:
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual free-
dom cannot exist without economic security and independence. "Neces-
sitous men are not free men." People who are hungry and out of a job
are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.
In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident.
We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a
new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all-regardless
of station, race, or creed.
Among these are:...
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and
recreation;
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which
will give him and his family a decent living;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and
enjoy good health;
25. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 461 (holding USDA regulations requiring California
fruit producers to contribute to generic advertising for California fruit commodity
crops did not violate the First Amendment rights of producers).
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The right to a good education.
All of these rights spell security. And after this war is won we must be
prepared to move forward, in the implementation of these rights, to
26,
new goals of human happiness and well-being.
The right to food in the Second Bill of Rights is an economic
one. This is a crucial point - Roosevelt did not call for a right to
food - he called for a right to earn wages that would in turn allow
purchase of food. Roosevelt's policies sought to realize the right to
wages through economic growth, which further reinforced the need
for crop price supports. Without supports, farmers risked plunging
prices in times of surplus, resulting in economic slowdown. There-
fore, the federal control exerted over commodity crops became a
hallmark of American agricultural policy.
Here, we should pause to consider the effect of the New Deal
on Farmer Filburn. Before the New Deal, Filburn was able to feed
himself and his family from his farm. Afterward, he was not - at
least without risking federal penalty. This was a monumental shift.
The court justified the penalty on Filburn for growing excess wheat
in this way:
It can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as
home-consumed wheat would have a substantial impact on price and
market conditions. This may arise because being in marketable condi-
tion such wheat overhangs the market and if induced by rising prices
tends to flow into the market and check price increases. But if we as-
sume that it is never marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it
which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market.
Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce ...
Congress ... properly ... considered that wheat consumed on the farm
where grown if wholly outside the scheme of regulation would have a
substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate
trade therein at increased prices.
Thus, in 1942 the commerce clause began to reframe the way
farmers thought of production - it was now for interstate and inter-
national markets, and not necessarily the local community and fam-
ily. This policy now symbolizes a major way that our food system
does not represent our health and nutrition needs, but rather an
outdated economic need. Coupled with this outdated view of food
systems, is an outdated view of how local and state governments can
contribute to its strength.
26. THE PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1944-45
VOLUME, at 40-42, 41 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed. 1950).
27. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).
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FOOD, MONEY, AND POWER: THE RISE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The New Deal also reflected a new vision of the administrative
state." Its design vested power in federal administrators to "exer-
cise... control over the varying phases of our economic life."" The
concept of insulating decision makers from "factional power" by
relying on those administrators' technical expertise was enticing to
reformers seeking to avoid powerful political pressures." However,
the approach is problematic in two respects. First, in practice our
federal agencies are not insulated from factional power. In fact,
many have argued that the food industry's influence over the USDA
and FDA is a prime example of ineffective federal regulation." Sec-
ond, the New Deal reformers "believed that the presidency and
regulatory agencies provided better opportunities than state and
local government for democratic self-determination.""
This lack of trust in state and local government is important to
food law today in essential ways. First, it overlooks the fact that
states hold the police power to regulate for public health. Even
more fundamentally, it overlooks the fact that democratic self-
determination is an individual right, not a federal responsibility.
Combined, these factors necessitate the reconsideration of how local
and state government can effectively contribute to a better food sys-
tem, and special consideration of how the individual fits in the ru-
bric.
Even though individuals hold international human rights to
food, American courts do not find these rights enforceable against
the federal government unless some other constitutional issue, such
as equal protection or due process is at issue." As health problems
related to our food system become more serious for individuals,
28. See Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421
(1987).
29. Id. at 443 (citingJAMEs LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEsS 16 (1938)).
30. Id. at 457.
31. E.g., MICHELE SIMON, APPETITE FOR PROFIT 146-65 (2006); KELLY D.
BROWNELL, FOOD FIGHT 243 (2004); MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS 95-111 (2003).
32. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 501.
33. See Boehm v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721 (App. 5th Dist. 1986)
("We conclude that the [general assistance] grant fixed by the County must include
an appropriate allowance for each of the basic necessities of life: food, clothing,
housing (including utilities), transportation and medical care."); Emily H. Wood,
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Right to Education in American jurispru-
dence: Barriers and Approaches to Implementation, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 303, 311
(2008).
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economic and public health goals must become consistent to im-
prove the human condition at an individual level. Achieving consis-
tency between economic and public health policy is not as easy as
simply passing a National Food System law, or national school lunch
program' because, as alluded to above, the fundamental legal au-
thority necessary to address economic and public health aspects of
the food system differ. Rather, a consistent policy harmonized to
maximize economic and public health in the food system should
leverage the unique legal powers of the federal, state, and local gov-
ernments.
Such leveraging will provide greater opportunity for citizen in-
volvement in the food system. Recall that while Americans may
have a moral right to food, they have no individual legal right. In
the absence of a legal right to food, citizens are not in control of the
food system - the Constitution vests that control in government.
Two examples illustrate this principle.
A poor child in south central Los Angeles will likely receive
breakfast and lunch from her school through the National School
Lunch Program (NSLP). To receive those meals, the child depends
on local and state administrators' compliance with the federal NSLP
regulations. Established in 1946, the NSLP's dual purpose is to
"safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's children and to
encourage the domestic consumption of nutritious agricultural
commodities and other foods."" The NSLP is now viewed by some
as a means of turning children into a dumping ground for our agri-
cultural surpluses, which are highly processed and distributed na-
tionwide." Today, children who are served by traditional NSLP
cafeterias must rely on the "technical expertise" of the federal gov-
ernment to determine what their food system looks like. The child
and her parents play little role, but shouldn't they?
Remaining in south central Los Angeles, let us suppose the
same child's dinner comes from Burger King because it is cheap,
calorie dense, and convenient. If the child's favorite Burger King
closes, it will not be replaced with another fast food outlet because
the city has a moratorium on such establishments. Widely publi-
cized as the first example of using zoning as a public health tool, the
moratorium is the exercise of the police power in response to higher
34. E.g., J. Amy Dillard, Sloppy joe, Slop, SloppyJoe: How USDA Commodities Dump-
ing Ruined the National School Lunch Program, 87 OR. L. REV. 221, 223 (2009).
35. KATHERINE RALSTON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc., THE NATIONAL SCHOOL
LUNCH PROGRAM: BACKGROUND, TRENDS, AND ISSUES 1 (July 2008).
36. See, e.g., Dillard, supra note 34, at 223-25.
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than national obesity rates in the area it covers. Critics complain
that it is a paternalistic and likely ineffective way to address obesity
rates. Proponents see it as one way "local communities can use zon-
ing laws to create a retail market that offers healthier foods."" If
nothing else, the moratorium is provocative. But the question re-
mains: does exercising the local police power to prohibit fast food
restaurants really change the local food system?
Another timely example comes from California's Santa Clara
County. There, in 2010, the county adopted an ordinance that pro-
hibits restaurants from giving toys with any meal sold, if that meal
does not meet certain nutritional standards." The county ordinance
specified the nutritional standards with limits for calorie, sodium,
fat, and sugar content in the meals." The county justified this ordi-
nance with data from an obesity report, showing that one in four of
the county's 7th, 9th, and 11th graders was overweight or obese, and
one in three toddlers was also overweight or obese."o The Los Ange-
les and Santa Clara County regulations illustrate that local govern-
ment possesses powerful tools to curb eating habits that data suggest
are related to fast food.
We could view the Los Angeles moratorium or the Santa Clara
regulation as local government agitating against the results of fed-
eral agricultural policy (a policy that has provided abundant, cheap,
and processed food). If we accept the proponents' view that it is
warranted exercise of the police power, then closely dissecting this
statement reveals an essential truth: when it comes to food, public
health and the economy are inextricably linked. Thus, food system
regulation requires a complex, delicately balanced exercise of gov-
ernment powers, as well as the exercise of that power in ways that
empower the individual's role in the food system.
THE FUTURE OF FOOD IS Now
An essential element of a more effective food system is individ-
ual empowerment to shape it. In two of his compelling works, The
Future of Food and Appetite for Change, food system scholar Warren
Belasco chronicles how food reflects social policy and norms - or
developing norms in the case of the 1960s "counter culture."
Whether it was Malthusian population theory or Chef Alice Waters'
37. MAIR, supra note 3, at 1.
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introduction of slow food to American culture, food "movements"
have a powerful influence on food systems. These grass roots
movements are important, but so too are formal efforts to engage
local, state, and regional voices in food system reform." These for-
mal efforts, in large part, bring grass roots efforts to government.
They share common components: a recognition of federal influ-
ence, a connection to local and regional concerns, and the integra-
tion of social justice goals.
At the base of food system reform are fundamental questions:
how is the current structure ineffective and what do solutions offer?
In order to answer these questions, government relies on open de-
bate and data analysis, but Washington is over-run with special-
interest lobbyists that influence the process far too much.
However, the University of New Hampshire is developing a so-
lution, known as the Food System Indicator Tool. The Food System
Indicator Tool allows the charting of current food system practices
that are not sustainable." Examples of "business as usual" trends
include farmland loss, food insecurity, and food-related disease
rates. The tool then allows users to chart policy solutions against the
trend, visually showing how the proposed solution might change the
trend. The tool's solution wedges are based on data gathered from
public sources such as the USDA's National Agricultural Statistics
System (NASS) and U.S. census data. The tool allows objective and
transparent policy analysis based on specific data sets, which has a
powerful potential to neutralize lobbying influences.
Importantly, it also allows users to examine regional and state
impacts of wedge solutions. This allows a refined understanding of
the interaction between local, state, and regional policies. As a re-
sult, all levels of government can examine and plan what solutions
are most appropriate and effective for the region, based on objec-
tive, transparent data. An added bonus is that by viewing how a pol-
icy can positively influence a region, states will be encouraged to
leverage resources regionally, reducing the possibility that the New
Deal-era federalism concerns about state anti-competitive behavior
will recur. The Food System Indicator Tool is in its infancy. Yet, its
innovative approach has great potential to contribute to food system
41. E.g. Illinois Food, Farms, andJobs Act, Pub. Act 095-0145 (2007) (creating a
"Local and Organic Food and Farm Task Force" to establish a plan for policy and
funding recommendations to expand and support the State food system).
42. The Food System Indicator Tool is not yet available publically. However, it is
modeled on the Carbon Solutions New England "Decarbonizer," http://
www.carbonsolutionsne.org/projects/decarbonizer/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
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reforms by allowing objective analysis of local, state, and regional
policy solutions.
Return to south central Los Angeles for a moment. The child
eating in the NSLP there has a vastly different experience than a
child attending the Berkeley, California schools. That is because
Berkeley is a farm-to-school district. Farm to school programs are
"based on the premise that students will choose to eat more healthy
foods, such as fruits and vegetables, if the foods are fresh, locally
grown, picked at the peak of their flavor, and supplemented by edu-
cational activities that link them with the food cycle from seed to
table."" What is important about these programs is that each one is
unique, allowing communities to tailor school lunch programs to
local agriculture, educational system, and community preferences."
Though not officially supported by the federal government,
most farm-to-school programs are funded through the NSLP, just as
traditional "hot lunch" programs are funded. Farm-to-school em-
phasizes good agricultural stewardship as well as economic innova-
tion, by bringing students into the food system not just as consum-
ers, but also as producers and planners. If students are engaged in
the food system and understand that they have the ability to change
it, then they are more likely to advocate for their basic human right
to quality food. They are also more likely to make the economics of
a modern food system workable. However, the pressing task today
is reformation of NSLP to provide greater funding and flexibility for
districts to adopt or improve upon the farm to school approach.
Reform like this will likely require rethinking the relationship be-
tween NSLP and commodity crops - a major step for the NSLP, but
one that is necessary for empowering children to learn that all citi-
zens have responsibility for the food system.
The food system indicator tool and farm to school programs
will have the most impact if they are part of a larger plan adopted by
a state Food Policy Council. Professor Neil Hamilton of Drake Uni-
43. ANUPAMA JOSHI & ANDREA M. AZuMA, NAT'L FARM TO SCH. NETWORK,
BEARING FRUIT: FARM TO SCHOOL PROGRAM EVALUATION RESOURCES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 533 (2009); see also Farm to School, USDA (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/F2S/about.htm#nvolvement (noting developments
such as the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program in 2002 and 2010 pilot program for
community garden pilot program).
44. Though Farm to School programs are not workable year round in all cli-
mates or environments there are other ways that local initiatives can improve school
lunch programs, which the federal government is recognizing. See Healthy, Hunger-
Free Kids Act of 2010, S. 3307, 111th Cong. § 204 (2010) (local school wellness
policy implementation); Id. at § 243 (access to local foods and school gardens).
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versity Law School captured the power of food policy councils in his
2002 article, Putting a Face on Our Food: How State and Local Food
Policies can Promote the New Agriculture." Hamilton fully recognizes
that state government should play an important role in supporting
agriculture through direct marketing, support of institutional buying
such as farm to school, and eco-labeling." Hamilton also identifies
that the food systems approach embraced by food policy councils is
not in use because the federal system, and its powerful political fac-
tions, currently dominate the dialogue."
Further, food policy councils present powerful opportunities
for everyday citizens to be involved in the food system. They pre-
sent opportunities for different voices in the system to meet, coop-
erate, and create sustainable, profitable relationships. Further, state
councils have the potential to form regional relationships, using in-
novations like the food system indicator tool to monitor and im-
prove food systems. Additionally, state and regional food councils
together represent power from the bottom up. This power can in-
fluence change in federal policy by gathering national support for
what works at the state and local level. Using information from state
food policy councils the federal government could select projects to
fund, or adopt more effective rules in response to food policy coun-
cil input. Finally, food policy councils could be a reliable source of
information for lawmakers about what is truly happening in the
food system at the community level, rather than relying on federal
government reports and lobbyists.
Food law and health is one of the most important topics facing
America today." Food system health relates directly to public and
economic health. To the extent that the federal government has
played a large role in creating what many believe is an unhealthy,
unsustainable food system, the federal influence on the food system
should be reduced. I do not suggest that the federal government
plays no role, only that food system reform will require mechanisms
that maximize all government powers, while recognizing their dis-
tinct differences. If we ignore the federalism dynamic when consid-
45. 7 DRAKEJ. AGRIC. L. 408 (2002).
46. Id. at 419-20.
47. Id. at 408-09, 445.
48. E.g. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON CHILDHOOD OBEsITY, SOLVING THE
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ering food system reforms, we will continue to deny citizens a food
system that is healthy, sustainable, and profitable.

THE QUEST TO END HUNGER IN OUR TIME:
CAN POLITICAL WILL CATCH UP
WITH OUR CORE VALUES?
Remarks by David P. Lambert*
Clinton School of Public Service
Speaker Series
Sturgis Hall
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
Thank you, Becca [Swearingen] for your kind introduction.
Thank you, Dean Rutherford for inviting me, and congratulations
on your strong leadership and the valuable programs you have de-
veloped at the Clinton School of Public Service. And thanks to Ni-
kolai DiPippa for your capable assistance. There are so many
friends here today, I do not want to call the roll, but just to say
thank you to all.
I cannot be in Sturgis Hall without acknowledging my dear
friend and mentor, Lee Williams. It was a special occasion four
years ago here when President Clinton, Dean Rutherford, Dean
Pryor, and Dean Bobbitt joined in the inaugural presentation of the
Lee Williams Fellowship in Public Service, presented to Mollie
Merry. The President warmly recalled what a treasured mentor Lee
has been to him and to so many of us. I am delighted that the cur-
rent recipient, Mark Lienhart, is here. Lee Williams sends his warm
wishes to you and your fellow students.
This is a special moment for me for a several reasons. My
brother Bev Lambert, who is with us today, and I have always had
great pride in our roots and heritage. Our family settled in Arkan-
sas in 1839, and we have called it home for 171 years. Although I
have been away quite a while, this will always be home to me.
Another reason I am honored to be here, of course, is that it
was President Clinton who appointed me to serve as Counselor to
the U.S. Mission in Rome. The U.S. Mission in Rome serves as a link
between the United States and the United Nations organizations
dedicated to food and agriculture, the Food and Agriculture Or-
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ganization (FAO), the World Food Program (WFP), and the Interna-
tional Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) - known collec-
tively as the Rome Hunger Agencies. The Mission's purpose is to
advance America's bipartisan commitment to alleviate hunger and
build hope in the world.'
Soon after I arrived in Rome, U.S. Senator David Pryor called
me. He said, "you know, I've been thinking about this, and I believe
you have the best job in our government." I replied, "Senator, when
you consider the developing world beneficiaries I am privileged to
serve; the issues I deal with; and, the opportunity to work in Rome
with great hunger champions like George McGovern, Tony Hall,
and WFP's Catherine Bertini, I think you are right. I have been
blessed." Soon after I arrived in Rome I also got a very quick educa-
tion on who makes US policy on the "right to food."
ARKANSAS' LEGACY IN GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY
There is a third reason why it is so inspiring to be in Arkansas
having a conversation with you about this topic of hunger. It is be-
cause I believe that by any critical analysis no other place in America
has left a more enduring mark in our shared commitment to end
hunger in the world.
I may get some pushback from my friends in Seattle, home to
the Gates Foundation and the great work they are doing, especially
with the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa. And, I may get
some resistance from Des Moines, home of the World Food Prize,
and its nearby partner, Iowa State University, where I have the privi-
lege of serving as a Distinguished Fellow at the Seed Science Center.
They too have a marvelous record, with programs in more than 30
African countries.
However, when you consider its far-reaching influence around
the world, the leaders and institutions identified with Arkansas have
done as much as anyone in our nation toward our quest for food
security. How can I say this? You know those answers very well,
* David Lambert is a nationally recognized advocate to end hunger. He served
as Foreign Agricultural Counselor to the US Mission to the UN Agencies in Rome
during the Clinton Administration. He currently provides strategic policy advice to
the US private sector, land-grant universities and UN agencies on issues related
global food security, child nutrition, food safety and agricultural biotechnology.
1. See UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UN IN ROME, http://
usunrome.usmission.gov/main/ (last visited Nov.1, 2010).
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but let me be specific with my own reasons, and save Heifer Interna-
tional for last.
The Presidential Legacy and Post-Presidential Work of Bill Clinton
First and foremost to what Arkansas has contributed to make
our world more food secure is President Clinton's prolific record in
international development as President, as well as in his tireless Post-
Presidential work. As you know so well, the William J. Clinton
Presidential Library & Museum next door is brimming with evi-
dence of this glorious presidential legacy.
The more recent work of the Clinton Foundation has had an
especially profound impact on global food security. I would note
particularly its work in the areas of child nutrition and obesity, crop
improvement, HIV/AIDS, and climate change.
And, of course, there is the University of Arkansas Clinton
School of Public Service and all the ways you already have begun to
change the world with your vision, energy and passion.
Winrock International: "From Arkansas Roots, a Global Mission"'
Two weeks ago at Winrock's 2 5 " Anniversary celebration in the
Clinton Library we heard President Clinton's powerful testimonial
that not only is this legacy of Governor Rockefeller transforming
lives around the world, but is serving as a model to other non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) on delivering long-term, sus-
tainable results. In addition to its fine work here at home, Winrock
has implemented more than $1 billion in development projects in
more than 60 countries.'
Its work is not the most exciting - it is simply the most valuable.
They go to the most forsaken places on this planet and give hope
those the most disadvantaged - by empowering women, by improv-
ing crop yields, by preserving nature. By any measure Winrock is a
global gold standard for NGOs.
2. WILLIAM J. CLINTON FOUNDATION, http://www.clintonfoundation.org/what-
we-do/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
3. WINROCK INT'L, WINROCK INTERNATIONAL: FROM ARKANSAS ROOTS, A GLOBAL
MISSION (2005), available at http://www.winrock.org/common/files/publications/
winrock magAR roots.pdf.
4. KARK 4 News, Milestone for Arkansas's Winrock International, ARKANSAS
MATTERS (Sept. 8, 2010), http-//arkansasmatters.com/fulltext/?nxdid=348785.
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Governor Beebe's Leadership
Governor Beebe's leadership on the hunger issue has been ex-
ceptional, including his collaboration with the Arkansas Hunger
Relief Alliance, the Arkansas Foodbank Network, and other part-
ners. I would also note the fine work of the Rice Depot.
The Work and Legacy of our Congressional Delegations
U.S. Senator Blanche Lincoln is the founder of the U.S. Senate
Hunger Caucus, and in her role as Chair of the Senate Agriculture
Committee, she has been nationally recognized for her leadership in
child nutrition and obesity issues.' U.S. Senator Mark Pryor is a
strong partner on these nutrition issues, and particularly to increase
appropriations for agriculture and rural development.'
Let's remember also that Senator David Pryor - in his 18 years
on the Senate Agriculture Committee - played a critical role in
modernizing and reforming our School Lunch, Food Stamp, and
WIC programs.! And Senator Bumpers' steadfast efforts to insure
food aid appropriations.'
And, our own J. William Fulbright. At the time of his death in
1995 there had been 250,000 Fulbright Scholars over a span of 50
years; imagine what that has meant to the quality of international
policy development in parliaments around the world.! Moreover, it
5. See e.g., Jane Black, Senator Proposes $4.5 billion for Child Nutrition, WASH.
POST, Mar. 17, 2010, available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/all-we-can-
eat/food-politics/senate-proposes-45-billion-for.htrnl (reporting on Senator Lin-
coln's efforts to pass child nutrition reauthorization).
6. See e.g., Led by Lincoln, Chambliss, Bipartisan Senate Majority Urges Child Nutri-
tion Act Reauthorization, AGRI-PULSE (May 27, 2010), available at http-://www.agri-
pulse.com/20100527H1_ChildNutrition.asp (describing bi-partisan effort, includ-
ing Arkansas Senators Lincoln and Pryor, to reauthorize child nutrition programs).
7. For example, Senator David Pryor co-sponsored the Child Nutrition and
WIC Reauthorization Act of 1989, S. 2310, 101" Cong. (1989) and the Hunger Pre-
vention Act of 1990, S. 2310, 101" Cong. (1990).
8. Senator Bumpers served on the Senate Appropriations Committee from Jan.
27, 1978-Jan. 6, 1999. Committee on Appropriations, 138' Anniversary, 1867-2005,
United States Senate, 109' Cong., 1" Sess., Doc. No. 5, available at www.
senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/committeehistories.pdf (last visited Nov. 1,
2010).
9. Today, the Fulbright Program reports that "294,000 'Fulbrighters,' 111,000
from the United States and 183,000 from other countries, have participated in the
Program since its inception more than sixty years ago.... Currently, the Fulbright
Program operates in over 155 countries worldwide." COUNCIL FOR THE
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was Fulbright's legislation that led to U.S. participation in the
United Nations, which in turn spawned the World Food Program,
the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the International Fund
for Agricultural Development.o
Other Arkansas Contributors and Contributions
Our Secretary of State, Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton
makes it clear to all that global food security is at the top of her
agenda; it is the Administration's initiative called Feed the Future."
The Arkansas connection? Those in our audience have heard her
say that her inspiration in part came from her work with poor and
hungry children in Arkansas when she was First Lady.
And, Carl Whillock - beloved Arkansan, Counselor to President
Clinton. Some of you know about the 2000 Clinton initiative, called
the McGovern/Dole International Food for Education and Child
Nutrition Act. If not, just imagine a global version of our own Na-
tional School Lunch Program, with all the same benefits - higher
attendance, better academic performance, empowerment for girls,
healthier societies, more stable work force, and so on.
President Clinton will be the first to tell you that this great leg-
acy of his Administration would not have happened without the tire-
less efforts of Carl Whillock. And what is its significance today?
McGovern/Dole has provided meals to 22 million children in 44
countries. 2 WFP Head Josette Sheeran calls it: "the most effective
human rights program for girls I have ever seen." And, George
McGovern told me just last week that if history were fair, it would be
remembered as the McGovern/Dole/Whillock program.
Governor [Jim Guy] Tucker's presence here reminds me that
his sister, another Arkansan, Carol Tucker Foreman, has done more
than anyone I can recall to insure that our nation's food is safe for
INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SCHOLARS, http://www.cies.org/Fulbright/ (last vis-
ited Nov. 1, 2010).
10. Fulbright Resolution, Resolution 25, 78" Cong., 1" Sess., Sept. 21, 1943,
CONG. REc. 89, Pt 6, pp. 7728, 7729.
11. FEED THE FUTURE, http://www.feedthefuture.gov/ (last updated Nov. 22,
2010).
12. Fact Sheet: McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition
Program, USDA FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE (Feb. 2009), available at
http://www.fas.usda.gov/excredits/foodaid/ffe/mcdfactsheet.pdf; McGovern-Dole
Food for Education Success Stories, USDA FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE (Feb. 26,
2010), available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/scriptsw/PressRelease/pressrel
dout.asp?Entry=valid&PrNum=0031-10.
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consumers. She is widely recognized and respected for her land-
mark work as a senior official at USDA and as head of Consumer
Federation of America's Food Policy Institute.
The University of Arkansas provides leadership through a num-
ber of programs. The Dale Bumpers College of Agricultural, Food
and Life Sciences has played an important role in agricultural devel-
opment and farming systems projects in a number of critical coun-
tries over the years, including Haiti, Rwanda, Burundi, and Egypt."
Moreover, the Division of Agriculture's Center for Agricultural and
Rural Sustainability has provided critical leadership in developing
innovations for sustainable production, as well as developing stan-
dard metrics for global agricultural production. And, Congress
recognized the Agricultural Law Program at the University of Ar-
kansas School of Law for "its unique expertise in the area of agricul-
tural law" when it funded the National Agricultural Law Center.
Arkansas corporations and cooperatives - Wal-Mart, Tyson,
Riceland, and others - have been invaluable in providing relief sup-
plies for the devastating losses in Haiti and the Gulf Coast. They
also have been exceptionally generous with their financial and food
resources, partnering with NGOs like Share Our Strength. I would
like to particularly acknowledge Wal-Mart's recent $2 billion com-
mitment to end hunger in the US."
Arkansas agriculture is prolific as an annual $7.5 billion indus-
try, producing almost half of our nation's rice," and ranking 2 nd
nationally in broiler production, 3rd in upland cotton, and 3"' in cat-
fish.2" But even more relevant to my point is that Arkansas has been
13. Food and Agriculture: The Food Policy Institute, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF
AMERICA, http://www.consumerfed.org/index.php/food-and-agriculture (last vis-
ited Nov. 13, 2010).
14. Dale Bumpers College of Agricultural Food &' Life Sciences, UNIv. OF ARK.,
http://bumperscollege.uark.edu/54.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
15. Center for Agricultural and Rural Sustainability, UNIV. OF ARK. Div. OF AGRIC.,
http://www.uark.edu/ua/cars/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
16. 133 CONG. REc. S17948-01 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1987) (statement of Senator
Burdick, N.D.).
17. Stephanie Strom, Wal-Mart Gives $2 billion to Fight Hunger, N.Y. TIMEs (May
12, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/us/13gift.html?
scp=1&sq=wal-mart%20gives%202%20billion%20to%20hunger&st-Search.
18. State Fact Sheets: Arkansas, Top Commodities, Exports, and Counties, USDA,
ECON. RES. SERv., http://www.ers.usda.gov/statefacts/ar.htm (last updated Dec. 9,
2010).
19. Id. (reporting that in 2009 Arkansas produced 40.5% of U.S. rice).
20. UNIV. OF ARKANSAS Div. OF AGRIC., EcoNOMIc IMPACT OF ARKANSAS AGRICULTURE,
2010 (2010), available at http://division.uaex.edu/news-publications/
EconlmpactAg_ 2010.pdf.
172 [VOL. 6:167
THE QUEST TO END HUNGER IN OUR TIME
a key supplier of grains and oilseeds to the global market, which was
particularly critical during the 2008 export bans by other major sup-
pliers.' Our wheat may play a similar role this year.
Heifer International
Nearly 70 years ago when someone had the glorious epiphany
to understand the critical need for the most desperately poor chil-
dren to have animal sourced protein as a regular part of their diets.
Heifer International gives families "a hand-up, not just a hand-out"
empowering them "to turn lives of hunger and poverty into self-
reliance and hope" by providing them with livestock and training in
how to care for them.2 2 The livestock helps the families to "improve
their nutrition and generate income in sustainable ways.""2 And now,
with Jo Luck's 2010 World Food Prize award, we know the rest is his-
tory. I do hope we all fully appreciate that this Prize is the U.S.
equivalent of the Nobel Peace Prize. It is a huge deal. She will share
it with the Rev. David Beckmann, who leads another great NGO,
Bread for the World.
The World Food Prize was started by Norman Borlaug - who,
incidentally, was a founding director of Winrock International - and
is awarded to those who have made the greatest contributions to-
ward alleviating global hunger, usually through agricultural science.
Their endeavors have saved hundreds of millions of lives. For exam-
ple, development of Quality Protein Maize and hybrid rice, Inte-
grated Pest Management and the Sterile Insect Technique, control
of Rinderpest and resistance to potato blight, Food for Education
and the Grameen Bank, and the Green Revolution in India. The
inspiring work of its Laureates is a sweeping chronicle of the perse-
verance of public servants determined to give children around the
world a brighter and healthier day.
21. For example, Arkansas was the leading state for rice export in 2009. See State
Fact Sheets: Arkansas, Top Commodities, Exports, and Counties, supra note 18.
22. HEIFER INTERNATIONAL, http://www.heifer.org/site/c.edJRKQNiFiG/b.201470/
(last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
23. Id.
24. The 2010 World Food Prize Laureate Award Ceremony to Honor Rev. David Beck-
mann & Ms. Jo Luck, WORLD FOOD PRIZE (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.worldfood
prize.org/en/events/laureate awardceremony/2010 ceremony/.
25. BREAD FOR THE WoRLD, http://www.bread.org/about-us/david-beck-
mann.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
26. WORLD FOOD PRIZE, http://www.worldfoodprize.org/en/dr-norman e_
borlaug/short biography/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
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So these are among the monumental - and I believe unparal-
leled - contributions of Arkansans and our institutions toward a
more well-fed and safer world. And while this work is so impressive
we know we still have much to do. But why should all of us be in-
volved?
ENDING HUNGER: WHO SHOULD BE AT THE TABLE?
All Americans have a direct stake in this issue of hunger. In
addition it being a moral issue and a faith issue, we learned well
from the 2008 food price crisis that it is a serious national security
issue. As Senator Lugar stated, "[a]chieving food security for all
people also would have profound implications for peace and US
national security. Hungry people are desperate people, and des-
peration often sows the seeds of conflict and extremism."
Moreover, it is a significant economic and trade issue. As Sec-
retary Clinton has said, "Food insecurity is not only a source of suf-
fering, it is a direct threat to economic growth and global stability."2 8
She joins President Obama in urging that we use the full range of
America's "smart power" tools - diplomacy, defense, and develop-
ment - to address the global challenges of the 21s Century."
In fact, the Feed the Future initiative is one of our government's
highest priorities. In response to 2009 G8 Summit, where donors
pledged $20 billion in agricultural development and new approach
to global food security, the US pledged $3.5 billion to strengthen
the world's food supply.30
What is particularly impressive about Feed the Future, beyond its
philosophy of investing in country-owned plans, is that it is such a
comprehensive, government-wide effort, with everyone in Washing-
ton at the table. State, because global food security is a foreign rela-
tions, development, trade and national security issue; USDA, for ag
markets; USAID, for development; Treasury, for financing; MCC,
for foreign assistance; USTR, ag trade; Commerce, for ag business,
and DOD and NSC for national security.
27. 111 CONG. REC. S1679 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
28. Secretary Clinton's Digital Town Hall Meeting in Santo Domingo, DIPNOTE, U.S.
DEPT OF STATE OFFICIAL BLOG (Apr. 17, 2009, 6:15PM), http://blogs.state.gov/
index.php/archive/entry/clinton-digital santo domingo.
29. Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks On the Obama Administra-
tion's National Security Strategy at the Brookings Institute (May 27, 2010), available
at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/05/142312.htm.
30. Feed the Future At a Glance, FEED THE FUTURE, http://www.
feedthefuture.gov/ghfactsheet.html (last updated May 20, 2010).
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A SNAPSHOT OF HUNGER
So, where do we find ourselves today? What is our food secu-
rity challenge? The statistics are disheartening - even numbing. But
let's take a look at the entire picture, a snapshot, starting locally and
going globally.
Even with the legacy of our own global leadership, we know
that we have a paradox here at home; we also have a promising op-
portunity to do something about it.
In Arkansas:
* We have the highest incidence of child hunger in nation and alarming
rate of child obesity;
* We have the third highest incidence overall of hunger and food inse-
curity in the nation;
* Over 400,000 Arkansans do not have enough to eat;
* The child poverty rate is nearly 25%, affecting 170,000 of our chil-
dren;
* Sixteen percent of our households are food insecure;
* Just under 240,000 students are eligible for free school lunch;
* Food banks serve 152,000 Arkansas children annually;
* Almost 400,000 Arkansans participate in the food stamp program
(SNAP). 3'
While we are hurting, according to the Food Research and Ac-
tion Center (FRAC), Arkansas is not dramatically different from
Nebraska or North Carolina or Indiana - to some extent they all
mirror our nation.
In the United States as a whole:
* Forty-nine million Americans are food insecure;
* Seventeen million children are food insecure, with 500,000 chroni-
cally hungry;
* Thirty-nine million Americans rely on SNAP;
* One in seven American households is food insecure.
And, according the recent Sodexho Report, an exhaustive eco-
nomic analysis by three universities, hunger in the US costs Ameri-
cans $90 billion a year - malnutrition, hospitalizations, lost job op-
portunities, diminished outcomes in education, and costs to chari-
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ties." Moreover, obesity is exploding - as are the "food deserts" that
exacerbate it.
Globally:
* One billion people are hungry, that is 1/6 of the planet;
* Twenty-five thousand die per day (the equivalent of 60 full jumbo jets
each day);
* One child dies every 5 seconds;
* One in three children in world is malnourished;
* Ninety percent of global child hunger is chronic;
* One hundred-eighty million children are stunted in their growth due
35
to hunger.
How Do WE RESPOND? SELECTED ISSUES
So, how do we respond? This is a very broad topic with all of its
issues interconnected. HIV/AIDS is linked to nutrition, which is
linked to food production which is linked to climate change, which
is linked to new technologies, and so on. Moreover, these issues
must be dealt with together. In fact one of my students observed
that to teach a course on hunger just for starters one should be an
agricultural economist, climatologist, nutritionist, plant geneticist,
seed scientist, and trade lawyer.
She makes a valuable point about the breadth of the subject.
Root causes range from government policies and poverty to trade
barriers and environmental degradation. And, there are many pol-
icy answers - democracy building, trade liberalization, debt relief,
food aid, and so on. Many disciplines are involved, and clearly we
do need greater understanding and collaboration toward the solu-
tions.
But today I would like to highlight just a few priority issues I be-
lieve deserve special attention if we are to bend this arc of history to
end hunger in our time. The issues I want to underline I raise ei-
ther because they are not getting the support needed, or because
they are so misunderstood.
Then when I close I would like to go back to our domestic pic-
ture and appeal to those of you coming out of the Clinton School -
and all of our students - to continue to be a force for change - not
34. The Economic Cost of Hunger, SODExHO FOUNDATION,Jun. 5, 2007, available at
http://www.sodexhofoundation.org/hunger-us/newsroom/studies/hungerstudies
/costofhunger.asp.
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only across the ocean - but also here at home. First, issues I believe
deserve special attention:
Population
Recently I mentioned to a long-time respected United States
diplomat that I wanted to discuss the population issue at the Clinton
School. He said you may not want to do that because it is too con-
troversial to raise. I said that is a reason we should be talking about
it, and remember I learned from Senator Fulbright that we should
think the unthinkable, and challenge all assumptions.
In fact, there is no issue more critical to the global food security
equation than population. We know this because speakers at every
hunger conference begin with something like the words: "We are six
billion going to nine billion by 2050."
Compounding that reality, the UN says we must double food
production by 2050, and that climate change will cause maize yields
in Africa to drop by 30% by 2030." So, "Population is a ticking time
bomb." Not my words, but those of the great agricultural scientist
from Purdue, Gibesa Ejeta, last year's World Food Prize winner,
standing at the podium where Jo Luck will stand next month." Jef-
frey Sachs concurs: "We are on an absolutely unsustainable popula-
tion path."" And, Norman Borlaug's warnings were even more
ominous when accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970."
36. Food Production Must Double by 2050 to Meet Demand from World's Growing
Population, Innovative Strategies Needed to Combat Hunger, Experts Tell Second Commit-
tee, UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY (Oct. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gaef3242.doc.htm.
37. Sara Schafer, World-Renowned Agronomist Calls Food Shortage "Ticking Time
Bomb," FARM JOURNAL AGWEB (Oct. 15, 2009), http-//www.agweb.com/
article/World-Renowned AgronomistCallsFoodShortage_%E2%80%9CTicking
TimeBomb_196303/.
38. See JEFFREY SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS FOR A CROWDED PLANET,
311 (The Penguin Group, 2008).
39. Nobel Prizes, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/
laureates/1970/borlaug-acceptance.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
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A few examples of why we should be concerned:
* In 1900 we were 1.6 billion people; in 2000 we were 6.1 billion;
* Population is increasing at 80 million per year. In the four years of
President Obama's current term, we will have grown 320 million, or
the population of the United States;
* Population Reference Bureau projects that East Africa's Uganda, now
32 million and the size of Oregon, will reach 96 million by 2050; its
population will triple in 40 years;
* Ethiopia, through hundreds of years of human history reached 10
million at the start of WWII; it is now 80 million; in other words, it
40
has grown 800% in three generations.
These examples raise a profound question: At what population
level is our planet no longer sustainable? We must deliver the best
policies. Let me be clear: it is not my purpose to get into concerns
of conscience, or religious or ethical aspects of this issue.
The reality is that the most effective policy options are not con-
troversial; it's just that they have not gotten the necessary attention
and support. I refer to development, especially agricultural devel-
opment which has dropped so precipitously in the last 25 years; and
to education, and to nutrition, including school lunch programs.
George McGovern widely cites UN data showing that girls who
have had the benefit of education with school lunch have an average
of 2.9 births, while those without that benefit have 6.1 births. In
fact, lots of studies show that primary education for girls does more
to ease population growth than anything else.
Governance
We know that levels of assistance, the work of the UN and
NGOs, and food aid all are important. However, the most critical
piece in the food security equation is the quality of governance. As
one policy expert observed: "The root cause of hunger isn't a scar-
city of food or land; it is a scarcity of democracy.""
40. Interview with Carl Haub, Senior Demographer, Population Reference Bu-
reau (Aug. 31, 2010).
41. See generally, ROGER THUROw & Scorr KILMAN, ENOUGH: WHY THE WORLD'S
POOREST STARVE IN AN AGE OF PLENTY (2009).
42. See e.g., Steve Connor, Science Editor, Educate Girls to Stop Population Soaring,
THE INDEPENDENT (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
education/education-news/educate-girls-to-stop-population-soaring-1050580.html.
43. Frances Moore Lappe, Beyond Hunger - Extending Democracy, BIOSPHERE 2000:
PROTECTING OUR GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 187 (Donald G. Kaufman, Cecilia M. Franz
ed., 1993).
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So, when we examine those root causes, we inevitably return to
policies and political will of governments - they are at the core of
most other basic causes, including AIDS, famine, civil wars, trade
policies. Look no further than Zimbabwe, North Korea, Somalia,
and DRC - they are textbook cases of how policies of oppressive
regimes or lack of governance have disempowered their people,
with stunning implications for food security and health. One UN
estimate says that an eight year old child in North Korea is seven
inches shorter than a child the same age in South Korea."
In fact, this focus on governance is why our Millennium Chal-
lenge Corporation model is so important as a smart approach to
foreign assistance. We hold our developing country partners to
three standards: a) good governance, b) economic freedom, and c)
investment in their citizens."
The Empowerment Of Women And Opportunity For Girls
Although global forums abound with lip service about the need
to empower women, the reality is that our international institutions
- and member governments - are far behind the curve on this noble
goal. That more than 80% of the farmers of the world are women,
that they earn only 10% of the income, that they are allowed less
than 5% of technical assistance to agriculture, and own less than 1%
of land, should be unacceptable to every opinion leader in both
government and civil society." As UN Hunger Ambassador Ertharin
Cousin reminds us, this reality must be built in to the assumptions
of national agricultural policies.
In far too many places women have all of the responsibility for
everything important to family and children, including the produc-
ing of food, while men exclusively control the economic levers of
government policy, land tenure, education opportunity, and bank
credit. Empowerment of women, including their education when
young, is at the heart of the matter on global food security. Women
44. See Blaine Harden, Global Changes Skew Calculus Of Food Aid For N Korea,
WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/03/14/AR2008031404214.html.
45. MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, http://www.mcc.gov/pages/about
(last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
46. Women and Food Security, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.fao.org/FOCUS/E/Women/Sustin-e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
47. Interview with Ambassador Ertharin Cousin, Ambassador to the UN Agen-
cies in Rome (Apr. 12, 2010).
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are the key to our goals on child nutrition, as well as on agricultural
productivity.
Moreover, we know that when women are allowed to partici-
pate in the political arena, they are far more likely than men to take
care of the true needs of the community, including safe drinking
water, education and child safety. Yet, women are significantly out-
numbered in the political process, and democracy without the par-
ticipation of women is a paradox on its face.
Related, there is no demographic subset in humanity more dis-
criminated against than young girls in the developing world. Too
often they must stay home with the livestock, while their brothers
are given the privilege of going to school, and the nutrition advan-
tage that comes with that education. These girls are more malnour-
ished, have children earlier, are more vulnerable to disease, have
less control of their future, and are often forced into riskier profes-
sions.
Speaking of which, while it is not my purpose to focus on sex
trafficking, we should remember that of the nearly 7 million women
and girls now in forced prostitution and forced labor, to some ex-
tent this global tragedy is a consequence of food insecurity."
Early Child Nutrition
The most critical issue in our international development objec-
tives - and where leadership is most urgently needed - is in early
child nutrition. It is the linchpin for everything else we try to achieve
in international development policy, and supports all of the UN Mil-
lennium Development Goals. If we do not get this part right, we will
have learned nothing.
The recent Lancet report on Maternal and Child Undernutri-
tion is an alarm bell for the global community. It says that "our in-
ternational nutrition system is fragmented, dysfunctional, and des-
perately in need of reform, that undernutrition is the cause of 35%
of all child deaths", and - as I mentioned earlier - that 180 million
children are stunted - irreversibly - and will never have a normal
life." We know that a child's height for age is the greatest predictor
48. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (10h ed. June 2010).
49. Saul S Morris, Bruce Cogill, Ricardo Uauy, Effective International Action
Against Undernutrition: Why Has It Proven So D~[ficult And What Can Be Done To Ac-
celerate Progress? (Part of Maternal and Child Undernutrition Series), THE LANCET, Jan.
17, 2008) available at http://www.thelancet.com/series/maternal-and-child-under-
nutrition.
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of human capital. It is imperative that we get this issue on national
agendas.
Obesity
As a malnutrition issue in the US, obesity is by far the most ur-
gent, eclipsing undernutrition. It is our nation's #1 public health
problem, and will cost us $200 billion this year. Obesity is the #1
cause of heart disease and hypertension, and the principal risk fac-
tor in type II diabetes. It has tripled in our children in one genera-
tion, and - for the first time in American history our youngest gen-
eration will have a shorter lifespan than their parents.'
Who is to blame? Without question, all of our institutions -
parents, the medical fraternity, academia, governments, the food
industry, everyone shares the blame. However, rather than pointing
fingers, I would urge that we look forward, because it is these very
same institutions that will lead us out of this crisis.
Agricultural Research
Of all our policy responses to alleviate the condition of global
hunger, no set of interventions holds more promise than investment
in agricultural research. And yet it remains severely underfunded. In
fact, notwithstanding very strong efforts of our own delegations over
the last several decades, the U.S. budget for agricultural research is
only 1% to 2% of biomedical research."
More specifically, the entire budget for USDA's National Insti-
tute of Food and Agriculture is less than last year's NIH budget in-
crease. This is particularly paradoxical because the more we can
achieve through agricultural research the more pressure we take off
of biomedical research budgets. In other words, we have one billion
chronically hungry in the world and because they are so poorly
nourished they more readily suffer from disease.
Just consider USDA's research priorities: 1) global food secu-
rity, 2) bioenergy, 3) climate change - mitigation and adaptation, 4)
nutrition/obesity, and 5) food safety. So, in major ways this re-
search goes toward preventing those human conditions that bio-
medical research must deal with later.
50. See generally, Obesity and Overweight, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
51. Budget, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/
budget.htm (last updated May 18, 2010).
2010] 181
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
Part of our problem is that we must give science a human face.
We must do a more effective job of telling the great story of how
agricultural science benefits people. Take the example of "Golden
Rice." Many reports talk about a new genetic trait or the conquest
of science. That is not the message to get greater public support.
The message should be about the hundreds of thousands of children
whose lives might be spared from the agony of vitamin A deficiency.
As you know, so much of this invaluable research goes on in
our great land-grant university system, one of President Lincoln's
most enduring legacies. The exceptional contributions we get from
schools like Arkansas, Cornell, Iowa State, Texas A&M, U.C. Davis,
Auburn and many others. Their work is transforming lives in the
developing world, and yet their story has never been told as it
should be. Whether responding to a distressed farmer in Lee
County or a starving child in Sudan, agricultural science always must
have a human face. That is how we create political will to change
things.
Postharvest Loss
Related to the agricultural research issue, postharvest loss de-
serves special note because it is such an important part of sustain-
able agricultural development efforts meant to increase food avail-
ability. These are instances where the commodity is harvested but
never reaches the beneficiary. If this does not strike you as a critical
issue - think again; there are few areas where we can do more to
improve the food security picture than in postharvest loss.
While our losses in the US on perishables range from 20% to
25%, often product deterioration or plate waste, in the developing
world we lose 30% to 50% or more on fruits and vegetables." The
problem areas are temperature management, physical damage and
packaging.
Some selected examples from 2009 assessments by the Global
Cold Chain Alliance: Forty percent of tomatoes in India. Let's think
about this country with 25% of the world's hunger, 75 million chil-
dren hungry, and 4 out of 10 ripe tomatoes never reach the child.
52. WFLO Identifies Postharvest Technologies For Farmers In Sub-Saharan Africa and
India, COLD FACTS, GLOBAL COLD CHAIN ALLIANCE, 20 (Mar-Apr. 2010), available at
http-//www.gcca.org/hq/bulletins/cf/2010-02-Mar-Apr.pdf.
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Forty percent of eggplants in Ghana. Seventy percent of mangoes in
Benin. Eighty percent of bananas in Rwanda."
Here is the problem: In the last 30 years less than 5% of fund-
ing for horticulture development has gone toward postharvest loss,
while 95% has gone toward trying to increase production. What is
wrong with this picture? An even more stunning finding from the
work of GCCA, supported by a Gates Foundation grant, is that
more than one dozen simple, low cost postharvest technologies
tested have the potential to raise incomes among the poorest of the
poor by at least 30%."
In other words, more nutritious food makes it to market; farm-
ers (especially women horticulturalists) have higher incomes to pur-
chase more of a variety of foods; the nutritional status of women
and children is increased. That's the potential gain if we just stop
wasting what is already being produced.
Role Of Private Sector
When we look at all the institutions around the world that have
been involved in the global food security equation, who is most con-
spicuously missing? Who has the resources, experience and exper-
tise to make a major difference in this picture but has been relatively
unengaged with the UN and major NGOs in a collaborative way?
Answer: the private sector.
Former USDA Secretary Glickman addressing an FAO Confer-
ence in Rome called the private sector "the untapped frontier" in
our quest to end global hunger." A recent Independent External
Evaluation of FAO made this recommendation: "FAO should estab-
lish a clear corporate strategy and policy framework for working
with the private sector, including small and medium size firms.
Only through these strategic partnerships can FAO fulfill its man-
date as the global broker of essential agricultural knowledge."' It
53. Interview with Symantha A. Holben, International Programs Manager,
Global Cold Chain Alliance (Aug. 16, 2010).
54. WFLO Identifies Postharvest Technologies For Farmers In SubSaharan Africa and
India, COLD FACTS, GLOBAL COLD CHAIN ALLIANCE, 20 (Mar-Apr. 2010), available at
http://www.gcca.org/hq/bulletins/cf/2010-02_Mar-Apr.pdf.
55. Dan Glickman, U.S. Sec'y of Agric., Speech at the World Food Summit (Nov.
13-17, 1996), available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/XO736M/rep2/
usa.htm.
56. The Challenge of Renewal, An Independent External Evaluation of the Food and
Agriculture Organization, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION (Jul. 2007), avail-
able at http://www.fao.org/unfao/bodies/IEE-Working-Draft-Report/K0489E.pdf.
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further noted that FAO has "relatively little contact with the private
sector, and does not understand its role and importance. There
should be a high premium on strengthening these partnerships."5 7
Just consider what companies could do if the UN and NGOs
more effectively engaged them. What could Wal-Mart teach India
about inventory controls? What could FedEx teach Ethiopia about
food logistics? What could Coca-Cola teach Guatemala about water
quality and water safety? The possibilities are endless.
From our own experience we know that companies in Arkansas
are eager to engage on these issues. Just look at the promising
partnerships today of companies like Wal-Mart and Tyson Foods
with the Governor's Office, the Alliance for Hunger Relief, and
Share Our Strength."
Sustainability
No concept is more central to the current debate on food secu-
rity - domestic and global - than Sustainability, or Sustainable Agri-
culture. In fact, on Earth Day last year the new USDA Secretary Vil-
sack was asked to characterize his vision for the Department, and he
answered with one word - "sustainable.""
For more than a century the idea of sustainable agriculture has
been a relatively benign and appealing term: prosperous farmer,
happy family, good crops, vibrant market, protected environment.
Sustainability has three essential components: a) economic, b) social,
c) environmental. The UN's classic definition: "Meeting the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs."'
And yet, today there is no term more charged with controversy
or divisive rhetoric. Why is this? A number of reasons: agricultural
industry stakeholders do not know what is required of them; they do
not know who will be the winners and the losers; and, there is no
consensus on what "sustainability" really means.
57. Id.
58. Press Release, Earthtimes.org, Share Our Strength, Arkansas Hunger Relief
Alliance and State of Arkansas Launch No Kid Hungry Campaign, Oct. 1, 2010,
http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/press/no-kid-hungy-caign,1484832.html.
59. Jane Black, For Vilsack, the Proof is in the Planting, WASH. PosT, Apr. 22, 2009,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/
2 1/AR2009042100876.html.
60. Our Common Future, Chapter 2: Towards Sustainable Development, UN
DOCUMENTS, available at http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-02.htm, (last visited
Nov. 14, 2010).
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Marty Matlock, Director of the University of Arkansas's Center
for Agricultural and Rural Sustainability perhaps best captures the
difficulty of this term: "Everything is connected. Everything is chang-
ing. We are all in this together...The complexity of the tasks can be
quite overwhelming. The danger of unintended consequences is
also quite daunting. If you pull one thread you do not know what
will unravel." He adds, "Sustainable agricultural production is as
much about economic prosperity for producers and social prosper-
ity for rural communities as environmental protection. These are
important realizations.""
Just examples to highlight the complexity of this issue, and how
misperceptions can have serious consequences:
* The assumption that water used in growing Ethiopian Coffee depletes
aquifers;
* The rush to biofuels without appreciating the implications for climate
change or the global food supply;
* Activism against genetically modified drought-tolerant White Maize in
Sub-Saharan Africa;
* The implications if everyone, everywhere, insisted on locally grown
food.
The USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA)
Director Roger Beachy identifies the problem this way: our discus-
sion focuses on "practices" rather than "societal goals," and if sus-
tainability is a goal we should be looking at outcomes rather than
practices." When we look just at practices we come up with lots of
arbitrary rules: You must use organic." You cannot use GM." You
must only use locally grown." You cannot use pesticides.'
Bill Gates hits a similar note. He calls the debate on a techno-
logical approach to increase productivity versus an environmental
approach to promote sustainability a "false choice."" He warns that
with population going toward nine billion we must do both.'
The reality is that these agricultural systems - conventional,
GM, organic, and others to come - will co-exist. How can I say that
61. Center for Agricultural and Rural Sustainability, UNIV. OF AGRIc. Div. OF AGRIC.,
http://www.uark.edu/ua/cars/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
62. Science, Sustainabilityand Society, Dr. Roger Beachy, NIFA Director and Chief





67. Bill Gates, Keynote Address at 2009 World Food Prize (Oct. 15, 2009).
68. Id.
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with confidence? Because you already have decided. You create the
marketplace demand, and you already know where you will shop
and what you will accept.
WHY DON'T WEJUST TEACH THEM To FISH?
Let me please comment on something that has bothered me for
a long time. It is this attitude that we should not give them fish, but
teach them to fish. Otherwise we create dependency, and really do
not help anyone. Let me try to answer that.
In an ideal world there would be only development work; there
would be no emergency food aid. We prefer development, and
have had a glorious history: the Marshall Plan, the Peace Corps, our
foreign scholarships, the work of USAID and our development
partners, and all the rest.
However, that is not the world we find ourselves in today. For-
mer UN World Food Programme (WFP) Head Jim Morris cites a
World Bank report that in the last 30 years natural disasters on our
planet have quadrupled; that is why WFP is now about eighty-five
percent emergency food aid, and only fifteen percent development.
Would we like for this to be "flipped"? Of course we would.
But just as it is our priority in Arkansas is to first respond to
emergencies - natural disasters, drought and floods, the United
States has that same philosophy overseas. So whether it is a famine
in North Korea, earthquake in Haiti, hurricane in Honduras,
drought in Ethiopia, war in Kosovo, or flood in Mozambique, if
children are at risk the U.S. - directly or through its UN partners -
will respond if possible. That - in a bipartisan way - is how we have
defined ourselves. So these are our core values.
I can't resist adding a note about Tocqueville, and what he
thought of us. You know that when he returned to France nearly
200 years ago and wrote his epic Democracy in America, he said these
Americans are really strange people. They sometimes just knock on
doors and ask their neighbors: are you okay? Do you need anything
to eat? And, apparently they want nothing in return. Could Toc-
queville come to Arkansas today surely he would carefully record
Governor Beebe's words: "No child, senior citizen, man, or woman
deserves to go without food."
BENDING THE ARC OF HISTORY
Today I have talked a lot about global issues. Now I would like
to close by speaking directly to the University of Arkansas Clinton
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School of Public Service students about their challenge. Remember
what sets you apart from other Presidential graduate schools. The
others are schools of government or public affairs - their graduates
are trained to manage the world. You are different. You are public
service. You are trained to change the world. What an awesome
responsibility you have accepted.
Anywhere in the world that you work to end hunger is wonder-
ful and to be applauded. No doubt this journey will take you to
many far away places. But I do also want to encourage you to con-
tinue to spend some of your energy building on your already inspir-
ing efforts here at home. Because, just as Arkansas and its institu-
tions have contributed so much in our quest to end global hunger,
this state also needs you now - your energy, your voice, and most of
all - your passion. After all, Mother Theresa's own advice to us
from India was "Just do the thing that is in front of you."
In many essential respects the defining narrative of our own na-
tion's history has been about a race; it is a race in which our political
will has tried to catch up with our core values.
By core values I mean what you are willing to fight for, and how
you want to be remembered in the long sweep of history. The
change always comes in that moment of realization when what we
have been willing to accept does not match what we know to be
right - that is when we bend this historic arc of America's history.
Women here should especially remember that just ninety years
ago - more than fifty years after the Civil War amendments - you
were not trusted with the vote. We said this is not who we are! So,
we changed our Constitution.
A mere seventy years ago, just over two generations, we allowed
girls eleven years old to work in textile mills for seventy hours a
week, with bleeding hands, and no heat or health insurance. We
finally said, enough!
And, as unimaginable as it now seems, it was not very long ago
that the color of our skin determined which building we could go to
school in. As a society we said these are not our core values!
And a couple of examples directly related to our theme today,
down payments on our goal of ending hunger. In the 1930s some-
one came up with this idea that we should use our tax dollars and
print stamps that could be used by poor and hungry people to buy
food. Nearly everyone said that is a nutty idea - not with my tax
dollars. A radical notion.
Well, some seventy years later the food stamp program - now
known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP
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- is one of the most accepted federal programs in America's history,
with nearly 40 million beneficiaries and a $50 billion budget.
SNAP is I believe testimony to FDR's defining statement in
1937 of who we should be as a people: "The test of our progress is
not whether we have added to the abundance of those who have
much; it is whether we have provided enough for those who have
too little."
Have we accepted Roosevelt's words as our core values? Proof
may be that there has been not a single bill in a recent Congress to
repeal food stamps. In other words, an earlier generation decided to
dramatically change our core values in a way that will be remem-
bered in the long reach of history, and they sent a determined mes-
sage to Congress. So this is one of the ways our time will be identi-
fied by generations to come.
One other example. Not too many years ago we allowed our
own children, particularly those who were poor, to go to school list-
less and emaciated, with nothing to eat during the entire day. We
finally said that is not who we are! And that was two hundred and
nineteen billion meals ago for our National School Lunch Program.
It now serves about thirty-one million students, and operates in
101,000 institutions, at an annual cost of about $10 billion. But
those are just numbers; in a deeper sense it is a statement for history
that we regard basic child nutrition as a paramount goal of our soci-
ety. Although we still have much to do, it is now accepted as one of
our core values.
So you see where we are going in this arc of America's history
on food security. Just as earlier generations have made progress with
these down payments, yours can be the generation that ends hunger
in America once and for all. Your children can look back at you in
30 years, and say "Yes, they did it!" Their political will caught up
with their core values.
And you could not have a more inspiring challenge than the
words of Anne Frank, found right here in Sturgis Hall, accompany-
ing the gift of the Class of 2009: "How wonderful it is that nobody
need wait a single moment before starting to improve the world."
Thank you, and Godspeed!
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I. INTRODUCTIONC
In the modern global food system - marked by the trade flow
of a variety of food products and ingredients from multiple loca-
tions in the world - economically motivated adulteration has
emerged as a growing menace that threatens the health and well-
being of consumers, the economic livelihoods of honest purveyors
of food in the global marketplace, and the integrity and viability of
national food regulatory systems. Economic adulteration is a form
of cheating that includes the padding, diluting, and substituting of
food product.2  Although this cheating is rooted in past food sys-
tems, the new paradigm for economic adulteration - a vast interna-
tional food-trade system - increases the level of fraud, especially for
imported premium products that are susceptible to fakery, such as
olive oil, honey, supplements, and pomegranate juice.'
1. Michael T. Roberts is an Adjunct Professor of Law at the UCLA School of
Law, where he teaches Consumer Food Law and Policy and serves as the Director
of the newly formed Food Law and Policy Center. He is also Special Counsel for
Roll Law Group P.C., a law firm that exclusively represents Roll International Cor-
poration, a privately held corporation headquartered in Los Angeles, California,
with diverse interests including POM Wonderful, the world's largest producer of
"Wonderful" variety of pomegranates. He is a former research law professor and
director of the National Agricultural Law Center and has lectured and taught as a
visiting or guest law professor in various countries on international and agricultural
law issues. He has also has been a visiting scholar with the United Nation's Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome. The author thanks Ryan Ward,
a second-year law student at Harvard Law School, for his capable assistance.
2. See AT KEARNEY AND GROCERY MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, CONSUMER
PRODUCT FRAUD: DETERRENCE AND DETECTION, i (2010), available at http://www.
gmaonline.org/publications/consumerproductfraud.pdf
3. Observed Robert Brackett, former director of the FDA's Center for Food
Safety and Applied Nutrition, "[n]ever before in history have we had the sort of
system that we have now, meaning a globalization of the food supply." Andrew
Bridges, Imported Food Rarely Inspecte4 USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-04-16-imported-foodN.htm.
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The public-health hazards of economic adulteration are demon-
strated most poignantly by the recent melamine scandal in China
that rocked consumer confidence world-wide. Melamine is a widely
used chemical found in hard plastic dishes and the linings of food
containers.5 The chemical made international headlines when a
2007 investigation into Chinese pet food revealed that, in addition
to sickening and killing pets, melamine could also be harmful to
humans under certain circumstances. The investigation found that
the addition of melamine to infant formula by Chinese milk dealers
and suppliers, in an effort to increase protein content and profits,
resulted in 50,000 infant hospitalizations and six tragic infant deaths
in China. Following an initial denial, China accepted responsibility
for regulatory laxities and inconsistencies that led to the melamine
tragedy.! The Chinese government prosecuted, convicted, and im-
posed harsh sentences on those involved, including execution for
the director of the Food and Drug Agency, who was convicted of
accepting bribes to allow defective food product on the market.9
China also executed a dairy farmer and a milk salesman for their
roles in the sale of contaminated infant formula.'o
The dynamic that gave rise to such a horrific case of economic
adulteration and a slow response from the government, only to be
followed by the imposition of harsh penalties, reflects a food and
regulatory culture unique to China - a massive food industry with
small, scattered operations; a close relationship between local gov-
ernments and food operators that shields wrong-doers from pun-
ishment; a new national food safety law that still needs more time to
be fully implemented; and a national government that is able both
to conceal critical public-health information and, when it chooses,
4. Bridget M. Kuehn, Melamine Scandals Highlight Hazards of Increasingly Global-




8. Press Release, Government of China, China's Cabinet Lays Groundwork For
"Clean-up," Recovery of Dairy Industry (Oct. 6, 2008), http://english.gov.cn/2008-
10/06/content 1113305.htm.
9. See, e.g., Press Release, Government of China, Six More Detained Amid
Tainted Milk Scandal (Oct. 6, 2008), http://english.gov.cn/2008-10/06/content
11 12379.htm; see also Joseph Kahn, China Executes the Former Head of Its Food and
Drug Agency, N.Y. TIMEs, July 10, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
07/10/world/asia/10iht-china.1.6587520.html?_r-1&scp=1&sq=china%20executes%
20the%20former%20head&st=cse.
10. See Gillian Wong, Tainted Milk Shows China's Food Safety Challenges, ABC
NEWS, Feb. 4, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=9743449.
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punish responsible persons quickly and severely." Government en-
forcement against economic adulteration, whether in China or else-
where, has fluctuated through the centuries depending on the legal
system, the regulatory culture, and on the resources and priorities of
the regulatory bodies. 2 For example, the United States' resource-
strapped Food and Drug Administration (FDA) - the regulatory
body with jurisdiction over the safety and quality of imported food -
has not made economic adulteration a priority for several years. As
a consequence, economic adulteration within the national food sys-
tem now flourishes largely unchecked by regulatory enforcement."
Despite its entrenched regulatory inertia, the recent melamine
problems in China have caused the FDA to reconsider the public-
health consequences of non-action against economic adulteration.
A public hearing on economic adulteration held in mid-2009 re-
flected the FDA's specific concern for melamine-type incidents and a
general recognition that the global food system provides an even
larger and more effective platform for cheaters. " The FDA's en-
gagement raises two fundamental questions: first, whether the FDA
adequately appreciates the full range of costs associated with the
emerging problem of economic adulteration from food and ingre-
dient products; and second, whether the agency can and will move
beyond recognition of the problem and enforce against food fraud
in imported food products.
This article addresses these two issues through the prism of a
modern, premium beverage developed in the United States - 100%
pomegranate juice, made of concentrate with no added sugar, addi-
tives, or preservatives. There are several reasons for selecting 100%
pomegranate juice as the prism. First, the product represents a
unique, healthy, and nutritious food source - the sort of product
that governments should want to promote for consumers and pro-
tect against adulteration. Second, the economic adulteration of
100% pomegranate juice showcases the insidious problem of adul-
terated imported food product in the global food system. Third, the
specific question of enforcement against adulterated 100% pome-
11. See id.
12. See generally JESSICA VAPNECK & MELVIN SPREIJ, PERSPECTIVES AND GUIDELINES
ON FooD LEGISLATION, WITH A NEW MODEL FOOD LAW 67-109 (FAO 2005) (discuss-
ing the of myriad of factors that influence national food regulatory frameworks).
13. See Jeneen Interlandi, The Fake-Food Detectives, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 2010,
http-//www.newsweek.com/id/233253 (economic adulteration has not attracted
much regulatory attention).
14. See FDA Notice of Public Meeting on Economically Motivated Adulteration,
74 Fed. Reg. 15,497 (Apr. 6, 2009).
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granate juice effectively raises the general question of the ideal role
of the FDA's enforcement powers in a complex, international food
supply. The unacceptable life-threatening costs associated with adul-
terated pet food and infant formula in China make a compelling
case for government enforcement. There should be full account-
ability and vigorous enforcement against cheating that causes such
suffering, especially to innocent infants and their families. Fortu-
nately, while the adulteration of 100% pomegranate juice is exten-
sive, it does not present immediate safety risks like tainted milk did
in China. This article asserts that the lack of an immediate and dis-
cernable safety threat, however, should not relegate enforcement
against adulteration to a low priority for the FDA, as it is today.
Economic adulteration that compromises the value of otherwise
healthy and nutritious food and beverage products raises significant
costs that should be weighed by public-health agencies in grappling
with the outcomes of a complex, global food system.
Thus, it is through the prism of pomegranate juice that this ar-
ticle frames a three-part analysis of government enforcement against
economic adulteration as it has emerged in the modern global food
trading system. First, this article briefly introduces 100% pome-
granate juice and its impressive health benefits, largely due to the
polyphenol antioxidants found in the juice, and the economically-
motivated adulteration of pomegranate concentrate outside the
United States that is sold in the United States as 100% pomegranate
juice to unsuspecting consumers.15  Second, to provide a useful
backdrop for the regulatory inertia by the FDA towards this type of
food fraud, this article chronicles the history of government en-
forcement against economic adulteration, including an assessment
of the effect of globalization on economic adulteration and the
FDA's recent recognition of the product-safety challenges from eco-
nomic adulteration in the world-food-trade system. Third, this arti-
cle addresses what should be the appropriate enforcement role by
the FDA towards economic adulteration of imported food product.
This role will be evaluated in terms of available enforcement tools
and the far-reaching public-health, economic, institutional, and so-
cial costs of non-enforcement against economically-motivated adul-
teration of imported premium and otherwise healthy and nutritious
products like pomegranate concentrate. This article concludes that
15. See Yanjun Zhang, et al., International Multidimensional Authenticity Specifica-
tion (IMAS) Algorithm for Detection of Commercial Pomegranate Juice Adulteration, 57 J.
AGRIC. FOOD CHEM. 2550, 2550-2551 (2009).
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a more sound appreciation for the broader costs of economic adul-
teration would help elevate the priority of enforcement by the FDA
against this form of food fraud.
While this article benchmarks the costs of non-enforcement
against imported pomegranate concentrate, it also creates a context
in which to evaluate the role of regulation in the policing of a com-
plex global food system. It is within this broader context that im-
portant policy questions crystallize. What is the FDA's role in the
global food system? How does the FDA engage in a cost-analysis
that fully appreciates the implications of problems such as economic
adulteration, which raise immediate food safety concerns, but also
other problems that, if unaddressed, threaten the very viability of
the regulatory system whose mission it is to protect public health?
How will the FDA garner resources and commitment to solve so-
phisticated and institutional problems such as economic adultera-
tion? While this article may not fully answer these questions, dis-
cussing the issues themselves is an important step toward a full and
open analysis of the quality and safety of the global food supply.
II. ECONOMIC ADULTERATION OF POMEGRANATEJUICE
A. Pure Pomegranate juice: A Drink to Good Health
An introduction to pomegranate juice starts with the pome-
granate itself, a highly-valued, tantalizing fruit with a festive color
and delectable taste. Bearing the Latin name, Punica granatum, the
pomegranate grows on a fruit-bearing small tree that stands between
fifteen to twenty-feet tall.'6  The dimensions of the pomegranate
fruit are similar to that of a large orange." It has a smooth, leathery
skin that varies in color from brown or brownish yellow to shiny
red.'8 The inside of the fruit contains edible, juicy pulp and hun-
dreds of small, edible seeds.' 9
Cultivation of the pomegranate began in Persia approximately
5000 to 6000 years ago, but later spread to ancient Egypt, India, Af-
ghanistan, and China."o The pomegranate was grown in the famous
hanging gardens of Babylon and was introduced into Rome by way
16. THE CAMBRIDGE WORLD HISTORY OF FOOD 1837 (Kenneth F. Kiple & Kriem-
hild Conee Ornelas eds., 2000).





2010] CHEATERS SHOULDN'T PROSPER AND CONSUMERS SHOULDN'T SUFFER 195
of Carthage." From Rome, the pomegranate emerged in early
Christian Europe to become a celebrated religious decoration.2
Following the conquest of Mexico by Cortez in 1521, Jesuit mission-
aries introduced pomegranates into Mexico and then carried them
northward and planted the perdurable fruit in the California mis-
sion gardens.2 ' The pomegranate has now secured an important
and distinctive place in California, where the planting of pomegran-
ate trees has doubled in three years to 29,000 acres in 2009.
There are various edible uses of pomegranates. In addition to
being eaten fresh, the fruit has historically been made into sauces
and desserts. It is also commercially produced into grenadine syrup,
which is employed around the world to flavor milk, drinks, desserts,
soda, lemonade, and cocktails. The recent popularity of pome-
granates has proliferated commercial uses of the fruit. Pomegran-
ates and pomegranate extract are frequently included in food items
such as juices, ice cream, sorbet, candy, chocolate, coffee, tea, natu-
ral bars, and supplements, and non-food items such as skin-care lo-
tion, cosmetics, soap, sanitizers, and shampoo.2 6 Amongst the array
of commercial products, one particularly exceptional pomegranate
product stands out - 100% pomegranate juice.
The recent dramatic growth of consumer demand for pure
pomegranate juice is driven largely by the promise of health bene-
fits. Over eighty-one percent of consumers now consume pome-
granate juice because of its health benefits.2 ' Reader's Digest calls
21. ROBERT W. HODGSON, THE POMEGRANATE 165 (1917); see also FREDERICK J.
SIMMONS, FOOD IN CHINA: A CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY 245 (CRC Press,
Inc. 1991).
22. Patricia Langley, Why a Pomegranate?, 321 BRITISH MED.J. 1153, 1154 (2000).
For example, the pomegranate figures prominently in Christian paintings by San-
dro Botticelli and Leonardo da Vinci, often being placed in the hands of the Virgin
Mary or the infant Jesus. See, e.g., Madonna of the Pomegranate by Sandro Botticelli
(1487), available at http-//www.wga.hu/frames-e.html?/html/b/botticel/22/40
pomegr.html, and Madonna and Child by Leonardo da Vinci, available at
http-//www.hermitagemuseum.org/htmlEn/03/hm33 lb.html.
23. See HODGSON, supra note 21, at 163-165.
24. Pomegranate AcreageIncreases in California, WESTERN FARM PRESS, May 14,
2009, http://westernfarmpress.com/news/acreage-increases-0515/.
25. See Kiple & Ornelas, supra note 16, at 1838.
26. See, e.g., SHEER BLISS POMEGRANATE ICE CREAM, http://www.sheer-
blissicecream.com/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2010); Klorane Pomegranate Shampoo,
FOLICA.COM, http://www.folica.com/KloranePomegra dl804.html (last visited
Aug. 18, 2010).
27. See Presentation Materials Provided to FDA on Sept. 3, 2009, Pure PJ (Part-
nership for Unadulterated, Real, and Ethical Pomegranate Juice) (on file with au-
thor).
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pomegranate juice, "the closest thing to a miracle in a bottle we've
found yet,"2 8 because of pomegranates' high antioxidant levels -
more than any known fruit except the acai." Antioxidants are sub-
stances that neutralize free radicals - atoms or molecules lacking an
electron that "collide with other molecules in an attempt to steal an
electron" - by binding with them and inhibiting oxidation." Many
different substances can be considered antioxidants, but pomegran-
ate juice contains polyphenol antioxidants, which are among the
most powerful.3' In fact, the polyphenols found in pomegranate
juice have superior health benefits to whole pomegranate fruit be-
fore juicing. Medical and scientific research shows that pomegran-
ate juice can help combat cardiovascular disease," cancer, and erec-
28. See Press Release, Reader's Digest, POM Wonderful Pomegranate Juice
Named "Best of America" By Reader's Digest Magazine (Apr. 27, 2005), available at
http://pomwonderful.com/pdf/readers%20digest%20release%204-05updated.pdf.
29. See ROBERT A. NEWMAN & EPHRAIM P. LANSKY, POMEGRANATE THE MOST
MEDICINAL FRUIT 18 (2007).
30. Pom Wonderful Glossary, POMWONDERFUL.COM, http://www.pomwonder-
ful.com/glossary.html.
31. Id.
32. Zhang et al., supra note 15.
33. See Filomena de Nigris et al., Pomegranate juice Reduces Oxidized Low-
DensityLipoprotein Downregulation of Endothelial Nitric Oxide Synthase in HumanCoro-
naryEndothelial Cells, 15 NrrRIC OXIDE 259 (2006) (noting that 100% pomegranate
juice prevents the build up of plaque in the arteries); Michael D. Sumner et al.,
Effect of Pomegranate juice Consumption on Myocardial Perfusion in Patients with Coro-
nary Heart Disease, 96 AM. J. OF CARDIOLOGY 810-813 (2005) (noting that patients
drinking eight ounces of 100% pomegranate juice daily demonstrated a 17% im-
provement in blood flow to the heart after three months); Michael Aviram et al.,
Pomegranate juice Consumption for 3 Years by Patients with Carotid Artery Stenosis Re-
duces Common Carotid Intima-Media Thickness, Blood Pressure and LDL Oxidation, 23
CLINICAL NUTRITION, 423 (2004) (pilot study showed a 35% decrease in arterial
plaque in patients who drank 50 milliliters of 100% pomegranate juice every day for
one year, compared to a 9% increase in arterial plaque among patients drinking no
pomegranate juice and showed that consuming pomegranate juice daily for one
year can lower a hypertensive patient's systolic blood pressure by 12%); Michael
Aviram & Leslie Dornfeld, Pomegranate Juice Consumption Inhibits Serum Angiotensin
Converting Enzyme activity and Reduces Systolic Blood Pressure, 150 ATHEROSCLEROSIS
195 (2001) (noting that pomegranate juice can reduce atherosclerosis, the process
in which material build up causes artery walls to thicken).
34. See Alan J. Pantuck et al., Phase II Study of Pomegranate Juice for Men with Rising
Prostate-Specific Antigen following Surgery or Radiation for Prostate Cancer, 12 CLINICAL
CANCER RES. 4018 (2006) (noting that patients who consumed eight ounces of 100%
pomegranate juice daily for 33 months dramatically reduced their Prostate-Specific
Antigen doubling times - an indicator of disease progression - from 15 months to
54 months); Navindra P. Seeram et al., In Vitro Antiprohferative, Apoptotic and Antioxi-
dant Activities of Punicalagin, Ellagic Acid and a Total Pomegranate Tannin Extract are
Enhanced in Combination with Other Polyphenols as Found in Pomegranate juice, 16 J.
196 [VOL. 6:189
2010] CHEATERS SHOULDN'T PROSPER AND CONSUMERS SHOULDN'T SUFFER 197
tile dysfunction, and suggests possible benefits for people with dia-
betes and Alzheimer's disease. There is also a possibility that
pomegranate juice may reduce swelling in hemorrhoids or help cure
diarrhea.
B. The Problem of Cheating: Pom Wonderful v. Purely Juice, Inc.
The promotion of pomegranates' health benefits by a beverage
company using adulterated pomegranate juice concentrate originat-
ing from outside the United States led to a decision in 2007 by the
U.S. District Court in the Central District of California in favor of
POM Wonderful in its lawsuit against Purely Juice, Inc.39  POM
Wonderful is the largest grower and distributor of pomegranates
and pomegranate juice in the United States, growing and distribut-
ing the Wonderful variety of pomegranates and 100% pomegranate
juice containing no added sugars or preservatives. 40 The recorded
findings of the District Court confirm the unique development and
value of 100% pomegranate juice. First, the court found that "aware
of the nutritional and health benefits associated with pomegranates,
and sensing that an untapped market might exist, the founders of
POM Wonderful LLC embarked on a strategic plan to bring this
ancient fruit to the attention of the American consuming public."4 1
NUTRITIONAL BIOCHEMISTRY 360 (2005) (noting that pomegranate juice's purified
ellagitannins (antioxidants) may inhibit the proliferation of cancer cells and induce
cancer cells to undergo apoptosis); Nam Deuk Kim et al., Chemopreventive and Adju-
vant Therapeutic Potential of Pomegranate (Punica Granatum) for Human Breast Cancer,
71 BREAST CANCER RES. & TREATMENT 203 (2002) (noting that the anti-proliferative
effects of pomegranate juice inhibit breast cancer cell lines).
35. See CP Forest et al., Efficacy and Safety of Pomegranate juice on Improvement of
Erectile Dysfunction in Male Patients with Mild to Moderate Erectile Dysfunction: a Ran-
domized, Placebo-Controlled, Double-Blind, Crossover Study, 19 INT.'L J. OF IMPOTENCE
RES.564 (2007) (pilot study showed that men who consumed eight ounces of 100%
pomegranate juice for four weeks were 50% more likely to have an improved erec-
tion than men taking a placebo).
36. See NEWMAN, supra note 29, at 73 (by not increasing blood sugar levels in
adults, pomegranate juice may help people with diabetes).
37. See id. at 30 (demonstrating that pomegranate juice may lead to superior
performance in animals suffering from Alzheimer's disease by preventing the ac-
cumulation of harmful beta amyloid deposits on the neurons).
38. See id. at 31-32.
39. POM Wonderful LLC v. Purely Juice, Inc., No. 07-02633, 2008 WL 4222045
(C.D. Cal. July 17, 2008), aff'd, No. 08-56375, 2009 WL 5184233 (9th Cir. Dec. 28,
2009).
40. Id. at *2-3.
41. Id. at *1.
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Second, the court noted that POM Wonderful's strategy "included
the investment of millions of dollars on scientific research of the
health benefits of pomegranates and pure pomegranate juice."a
Third, the court found persuasive the scientific research that showed
100% pomegranate juice provides cardiovascular benefits and inhib-
its "prostate cancer, as well as numerous chronic diseases associated
with aging such as heart disease, Alzheimer's disease, and demen-
tia."40 Fourth, the court found that these health benefits are based
on the use of 100% pomegranate juice containing no added sugars
or preservatives and that the presence of indeterminate adulterants
undermines these benefits." Fifth, the court noted the media and
consumer recognition of POM Wonderful, including television
newscasts, cooking and lifestyle shows, and innovative marketing
campaigns.5 Sixth, the court determined that the investment of
millions of dollars to research and promote the nutritional qualities
and health benefits associated with pure pomegranate juice created
the burgeoning market for 100% pomegranate juice.46 Seventh, the
court concluded that "Pom Wonderful's pomegranate juice has, in
less than six years, eclipsed all other products in its market segment
of super premium juices to take the top spot nationwide in super-
"47market sales ....
In April 2006, Purely Juice, a competitor of POM Wonderful in
the bottled pomegranate juice market, began marketing and selling
a beverage labeled "100% pomegranate juice."" Unlike POM Won-
derful, who grows its own pomegranates, Purely Juice secured
pomegranate juice concentrate from foreign suppliers in Iran and
other Middle Eastern countries." In 2007, POM Wonderful filed a
federal lawsuit against Purely Juice claiming that the company was
deceiving consumers by selling adulterated pomegranate juice. The
court agreed with test results from seven different laboratories
which concluded that Purely Juice's juice could not have been 100%
pomegranate juice since it contained foreign sugars, colorants, and
filler juices.5 0 The court found that "it was widely known in the su-
per premium juice industry that there were serious issues of adul-
42. Id. at *2.
43. Id. at *1.
44. POM Wonderful LLC, 2008 WL 4222045, at *1.
45. Id. at *1.
46. Id.
47. Id. at *2.
48. Id. at *34.
49. POM Wonderful LLC, 2008 WL 4222045, at *5.
50. Id. at *4.
198 [VOL. 6:189
2010] CHEATERS SHOULDN'T PROSPER AND CONSUMERS SHOULDN'T SUFFER 199
teration with pomegranate juice concentrate originating from out-
side the United States."5 ' The court determined that Purely Juice
engaged in false advertising and misleading marketing and ordered
Purely Juice to pay approximately $1.5 million in damages."
The problem of cheating by manufacturers and suppliers in the
juice industry, addressed in Purely juice, is known as economic adul-
teration. Economic adulteration involves "substituting something of
lesser value for something of higher value and then passing off the
product as one of higher value - for example, adding color to trout
and falsely calling it salmon." 3 The substituted goods that are of a
lesser value are generally cheaper, inferior ingredients.
The incentives for economic adulteration of food and beverages
are predictably economically related. The first and most obvious
motivation for food manufacturers is to increase profits. "A manu-
facturer may use... cheap filler that is easily disguised... to increase
the volume sold thereby cutting the cost... and increasing the ulti-
mate profit margin." " Another incentive is competition. If a manu-
facturer cannot meet a customer's quality criteria it may adulterate
the product in an attempt to either meet a specification or to com-
pete by offering an inferior product at a lower price. 6 "Customers
who are not aware of the adulteration [may] wind up believing they
are getting a bargain."57 Economic adulteration may also be market
driven, resulting from pressure to cut costs." As customers squeeze
their suppliers to reduce costs, there comes a point when the sup-
plier may adulterate the product to lower the cost and maintain a
workable margin.59 Incentives for economic adulteration in the
world food and beverage market are especially appealing for higher-
value food products," such as 100% pomegranate juice. Pomegran-
ate juice concentrate is in high demand - due to its well docu-
51. Id. at *5.
52. Id. at *14-15.
53. NEAL D. FORTIN, FOOD REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 155
(2009).
54. Id.
55. AMERICAN SPICE TRADE ASSOCIATION, SPICE ADULTERATION WHITE PAPER 3,
available at http://www.astaspice.org/files/public/SpiceAdulteration.pdf.




60. See Gary F. Fairchild, John P. Nichols & Oral Capps, Jr., Observations on Eco-
nomic Adulteration of High-Value Food Products: The Honey Case, 34 J. FOOD DISTRIB.
RES. 38 (2003), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/27319/
1/34020038.pdf.
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mented health benefits and other special qualities - and in short
supply." The result is costly pomegranate concentrate, especially in
comparison to apple, orange, and grape juice. These incentives
tempt unprincipled foreign exporters to extend limited supplies by
adulteration.
The adulteration of foreign 100% pomegranate concentrate is
accomplished by using cheap ingredients that are manipulated ac-
cording to the goals of the cheater. The ingredients can be organ-
ized in four categories. First are sweeteners, including cane and
beet sugars, high fructose corn syrup, and filler fruit juices, such as
apple, white grape, and pear. The advantage of these fillers is that
they are a clear and often unnoticeable sugar substitute. Second are
flavoring agents, such as citric acid."4 The purpose of flavoring
agents is to pull up the unique, tart flavor of pomegranate juice that
is lost from the inclusion of fillers. Third are coloring agents, in-
cluding black currant, aronia, elderberry, grape pigment, cherry,
and raspberry." These coloring agents substitute for the natural
pomegranate color. Where filler fruit juice concentrate is used in
place of pomegranate concentrate, these flavoring and coloring
agents are employed to help disguise the adulteration. For example,
a small measure of aronia can go a long way toward rectifying color-
ing deficiencies when a large measure of cheap apple juice replaces
pomegranate juice in concentrate. The fourth category consists of
tannins, including grape skin and extract, which are used to replace
the astringent, antioxidant properties that are lost because of adul-
teration. A combination of these cheap ingredients is used in vari-
ous ways to orchestrate the fraud.
III. REGULATORY RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC ADULTERATION
A. History Tour
Economic adulteration is not new, nor is it unique to 100%
pomegranate juice. Food fraud in the form of economically-
motivated adulteration has been an interminable scar on food
commerce throughout history. It has involved basic food staples





66. See Presentation Materials, supra note 27.
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such as wine and bread, as noted in Isaiah: "Wherefore do ye spend
money for that which is not bread?"67 Goods that have been com-
monly masqueraded as something else include seafood, olive oil,
honey, maple syrup, and vanilla.8 Economic adulteration is not only
a story about cheating, but also about governments' responses to the
dishonesty. It raises the general question of governmental will and
commitment to enforce against economic adulteration and the spe-
cific question of how a government can successfully employ its re-
sources to stop cheaters who continue to devise new, innovative,
and sophisticated methods of cheating.69
1. Greco-Roman Society
The first stopping point in a historical tour of economic adul-
teration is the Greco-Roman society. The Greek botanist Theo-
phrastus (370-295 BC) reported on the use of artificial flavors in the
food supply and on the use of adulterants for economic reasons in
some items of commerce.76 As documented by Pliny the Elder (23-
79 AD) and the physician Galen (131-201 AD), a sizeable trade in
foods from the Mediterranean and beyond brought economic food
adulteration to Rome.7 ' Food products in Rome that were particular
targets of adulteration included grains, spices, wine, and preserva-
tives. Romans worried about economic adulteration of food not
just because of the fraud, but also because they realized that foods
could be tampered with in such a way to endanger the health of
73Roman consumers. As Pliny complained, "so many poisons are
employed to force wine to suit our taste - and we are surprised that
it is not wholesome!"74  Roman law recognized food fraud and,
through limited imperial decrees, attempted to regulate markets to
protect citizens from crooked merchants. Under fraud laws, those
67. Isaiah 55:2 (KingJames).
68. See Elizabeth Weise, Something Fishy? Counterfeit Foods Enter the US. Market,
USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-01-19-
fake-foodsN.htm.
69. See REAY TANNAHILL, FOOD IN HISTORY 293 (Three Rivers Press 1988).
70. See AMERICAN SPICE TRADE ASSOCIATION, supra note 55.
71. See id. at 2.
72. James F. Bush, Science and the Adulteration of Food and Other Natural Products
in Ancient Rome, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 573, 576-582 (2002).
73. Id. at 576.
74. Id. at 573.
75. Id. at 573.
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who engaged in the fraudulent sale of food were subject to private
rights of action.16
2. Middle Ages in Europe
Another stopping point is Europe during the Middle Ages,
where staple foods like meat, bread, and wine were targets for adul-
teration. The "medieval nose" was particularly sensitive to the smell
of decay, and was used to catch suppliers of putrid meat." Bread
was more difficult to manage, as catching a wily baker could be a
challenge. Cheating bakers sold underweight bread, the price of a
loaf being fixed in relation to its weight.79 Such cheating led to regu-
lations like the "Assize of Bread and Ale," which dictated what went
into everyday food goods.80 Guilds comprised of ale conners, pep-
perers, and garblers enforced these purity laws with considerable
effectiveness."' A particular enforcement action suited to the sensi-
bilities of early fourteenth-century London was used against bakers
selling underweight bread: the offending loaf would be slung
around the neck of the condemned baker and he would be drawn
through the dirtiest streets in town on a mobile pillory to be jeered
at and targeted by flying debris hurled from fellow citizens.82
3. Industrialized England
Industrialization increased the scope and sophistication of eco-
nomic adulteration. Reay Tannahill, in her book Food History, notes
that food manufacturers have always practiced adulteration on a
limited and local scale, but the growth of towns and the expansion
of roads and railways brought into being an organized food industry
that was not equipped to cope with the problems of handling trans-
port and availability of raw materials. Bee Wilson, in her recent
book, Swindled: The Dark History of Food Fraud, From Poisoned Candy
to Counterfeit Coffee, posits that adulteration went hand in hand with
76. Id.
77. TANNAHILL, supra note 69, at 162.
78. Id. at 163.
79. Id.
80. See BEE WILSON, SWINDLED: THE DARK HISTORY OF FOOD FRAUD, FROM
POISONED CANDY TO COUNTERFEIT COFFEE 67 (Princeton University Press 2008).
81. Id. at 88-93.
82. TANNAHILL, supra note 69, at 163-164.
83. Id.
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the rise of industrialized capitalism.8 Wilson's story begins in Eng-
land, which was the first country to simultaneously urbanize and
embrace laissez-faire economic policies. In the process, the elabo-
rate regulatory system conceived in medieval times to control food
adulteration gradually crumbled in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries." As the power of the guilds waned and urban entrepre-
neurs gained greater control of the market, the buying and selling of
food came to be ruled by the law of caveat emptor." "It was a
'buyer beware' culture," Wilson laments, one that "foisted huge re-
sponsibility onto a population that lacked even basic democratic
rights."m
Notwithstanding Industrial Era governments' failure to control
food adulteration, many enterprising scientists exposed cases of
food fraud to the public. In 1820, German-born chemist Friedrich
Accum published A Treatise on Adulterations of Food, and Culinary
Poisons.89 The text contained startling revelations about adulteration
in the English food system, including vinegar mixed with sulfuric
acid," pickles colored with copper,91 sugary confections dyed red
with lead, and pepper mixed with floor sweepings." Following al-
legations of theft from the Royal Science library, Accum was forced
to leave the country in shame.94 However, the proverbial cat was out
of the bag. 5  In 1850, discerning a public appetite for the truth
about food, Dr. Arthur Hill Hassall, a chemist, and Dr. Henry
Lethaby, a dietician, published a series of articles in England report-
ing on the extraneous matter found in samples of food products
they randomly purchased in London shops.9 With the aid of a mi-
84. See WILSON, supra note 80, at 13.
85. See, e.g., id. at 19-20, 34.
86. See id. at 85-89.
87. Id. at 34.
88. Id. at 95.
89. See FREDRICK ACCUM, A TREATISE ON ADULTERATIONS OF FOOD, AND CULINARY
POISONS (2nd ed., Ab'm Small 1820).
90. Id. at 220.
91. Id. at 217.
92. Id. at 224.
93. Id. at 212.
94. See WILSON, supra note 80, at 3945.
95. See id. at 145 (providing an excellent summary of the "glorious" career of
Fredrick Accum). Ms. Wilson dramatizes Accum's place in food history by stating
that "[i]n the history of food adulteration, there are two stages: before 1820 and
after 1820; before Accum and after Accum." Id. at 1.
96. See TANNAHILL, supra note 69, at 294.
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croscope, they uncovered disturbing fraudulent practices." Their
findings showed that loaves of bread were adulterated with alum, a
mineral-salt whitening agent, and that coffee was diluted with chic-
ory, acorns, or a type of beer called mangelwurzel.9" Hassall worked
with Thomas Wakely, founder and editor of the Lancet, to publish
the names and addresses of the shops selling adulterated goods.9 A
few savvy manufacturers soon recognized that the new focus on pu-
rity might pay dividends. When Hassall praised provisioner Crosse
& Blackwell for no longer adding copper to its pickles, the company
began to market their products as "natural."'00 Wilson reports, "pu-
rity became a marketing device; and it has been so ever since."1o'
Not leaving the dealing of economic adulteration solely to enterpris-
ing scientists and the marketplace, the government responded in
1860 by enacting the first comprehensive English food safety legisla-
tion, the Adulteration of Food and Drink Act.'o2
B. U.S. Regulatory Response
1. Early Years
The United States followed much the same historical trajectory
as Britain. Prior to passage of the Food and Drug Act, early food
laws were limited to state and local regulation - there was no fed-
eral control over the processing of food. 103 In the last half of the
nineteenth century, problems associated with food safety began to
develop as food production shifted from the home to the factory.'0
Developments in chemistry facilitated this shift, bringing advance-
ments in food science and new food additives, colorings, and means
of adulteration."' The lack of government regulation led to tamper-
97. See WILsoN, supra note 80, at 119-24.
98. TANNAHILL, supra note 69, at 294.
99. WILSON, supra note 80, at 124-32.
100. Id. at 143.
101. Id.
102. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 84 (Eng.). Although the Act is referred to as the first mod-
ern food regulatory statute, "it was rarely enforced and real changes [in food regu-
lation] did not come until additional legislation was adopted in 1875." Charles
Lister, Discord and Change: An Assessment of the European Community's Food Packaging
Laws, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 589, 589 n.4 (1993).
103. FORTIN, supra note 53, at 4.
104. Id. at 5.
105. Id.
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ing with products by substituting cheap ingredients for those repre-
sented on labels.'06
The tampering of food for an economic advantage led to a se-
rious milk contamination problem in New York City in 1858 that
was recently retold in an op-ed contribution to the New York Times
by Bee Wilson.'07 According to Wilson, the increase from 90,000 to
120,000 quarts of milk a day entering New York City in the 1850s
was due to dairies padding their milk with water, and then restoring
its richness with flour.'08 In time, however, the preferred adulterant
became "swill milk, a filthy, bluish substance milked from cows tied
up in crowded stables adjoining city distilleries and fed the hot alco-
holic mash left from making whiskey."' Wilson notes that the mash
itself was doctored "with plaster of Paris to take away the blueness,
starch and eggs to thicken it and molasses to provide a buttercup
hue of honest Orange County milk.""o This deliberate economic
adulteration reportedly killed up to 8,000 children in a year.'
Dr. Harvey Wiley entered the food world to combat contempo-
rary emerging problems like "swill milk," and left his stamp firmly
on the development of food law in the US. In 1883, Dr. Wiley be-
came the chief chemist of the U.S. Bureau of Chemistry, which was
then part of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)."'
Dr. Wiley expanded the research and testing of food and docu-
mented the widespread adulteration of foods. He helped spur pub-
lic concern over food safety and quality by his publications and by
campaigning for a national food and drug law." 3 Wiley specifically
focused on chemical preservatives as adulterants through his highly
publicized poison squad, comprised of young men who tested the
effects of chemicals and adulterated food on themselves.' 14
106. Harvey W. Wiley: Pioneer Consumer Activist, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE, Jan-
Feb 2006, at 34, available at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/
History/CentennialofFDA/HarveyW.Wiley/ucm081121.htm.






112. See Dale A. Stirling, Profiles in Toxicology: Harvey W. Wiley, 67 TOXICOLOGICAL
SCIENCEs. 157 (2002).
113. See id.
114. See Carol Lewis, The "Poison Squad" and the Advent of Food and Drug Regula-
tion, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE, Nov. - Dec. 2002, at 1, available at
http://www.toxicology.org/gp/2 1PoisonSquadFDA.pdf.
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
At the turn of the century, another important figure in the de-
velopment of food law emerged on the U.S. scene: Upton Sinclair.
As a muckraking journalist, Sinclair published his book The Jungle in
1905."' Sinclair's novel was set amid the wretched working condi-
tions of Chicago's meat packing plants. While Sinclair's intent was
to expose the "inferno of exploitation" of the typical American fac-
tory worker,"6 the food safety concerns are what piqued public at-
tention. The Jungle portrayed nauseating practices and unsanitary
conditions in the meat-packing industry. Sinclair described diseased
and rejected meat products, where mounds of meat were stored in
great piles under leaky roofs and layers of dried rat dung."' This
portrayal captured the public's attention and focused food safety
regulations squarely on the conditions of food processing."8
2. 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act
As a result of the public furor following publication of The Jun-
gle, on June 30, 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt signed into law
both the Pure Food and Drug Act"" and the Meat Inspection Act,120
thus commencing the modern era of U.S. food regulation. While
the primary purpose of the Act was to prevent the use of potentially
harmful constituents, a secondary objective was to protect the public
from the possibility that valuable ingredients would be watered
down or left out of basic foods in favor of cheaper substitutes. 121
"Upon the passage of the 1906 Act, the Government began a vigor-
ous attack upon economic adulteration in both criminal and civil
115. UProN SINCLAIR, THEJUNGLE (1906).
116. MARK SULLIVAN, OUR TIMEs 222 (Dan Rather ed., Scribner 1996).
117. SINCLAIR, supra note 115, at 134..
118. See Roger Roots, A Muckraker's Aftermath: The Jungle of Meat-Packing Regula-
tion After A Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2413 (2001).
119. Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, § 6, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938).
120. Federal Meat Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 59-242, 34 Stat. 1260 (1907),
amended by the Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967) (codi-
fied as amended 21 U.S.C. § 601-695. The Meat Inspection Act, along with the later
Poultry Products Inspection Act, Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-
172, 71 Stat. 441 (1957) (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. § 451-470), gives the USDA
responsibility for the regulation of meat, poultry and certain egg products. The
USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) administers a food safety and inspec-
tion program over these products. The FDA has responsibility over all food prod-
uct not under the responsibility of the USDA. See Michael T. Roberts, Mandatory
Recall Authority: A Sensible and Minimalist Approach to Improving Food Safety, 59 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 563, 566 (2004).
121. See Richard A. Merrill & Earl M. Collier, Jr., "Like Mother Used to Make": An
Analysis of FDA Food Standards of Identity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 561, 564 (1974).
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cases. Convictions were secured in numerous criminal cases."12 2
Although the Act appeared to adequately address blatant cases of
economic adulteration, the concern became focused on imitation
products.123 The concern was that with advancements in food tech-
nology, manufacturers could produce new products that resembled,
but were not identical to, traditional foods.2 However, absent for-
mal standards, courts held that fabricated food products were not
adulterated, but were a pure and distinct separate food product.2
The government suffered a number of defeats.'26 Especially prob-
lematic was the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Ten Cases,
More or Less, Bred Spred, that found that "Bred Spred" was not an
adulterated version of jam, even though it closely resembled jam
and had less than half as much fruit, because there was no authorita-
tive standard for comparing "Bred Spred" with jam and no mislead-
ing statements on the "Bred Spred" labeling.1
3. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
Partly in response to these perceived shortcomings, in 1938
Congress passed the Federal Food and Drug Act (FD&C Act), which
has since served as the statutory basis for food regulation in the
U.S. 2 8 Safety and health problems were to be regulated through the
adulteration provisions of section 402 - section 402(b) grants the
122. Wesley E. Forte, The Food and Drug Administration and the Economic Adultera-
tion of Foods, 41 IND. L.J. 346, 352 (1965); see, e.g., Union Dairy Co. v. United States,
250 F.231 (7th Cir. 1918) (milk diluted by water); Frank v. United States, 192 F. 864
(6th Cir. 1911) (pepper diluted by corn); United States v. Frank, 189 F. 195 (S.D.
Ohio 1911) (lemon extract diluted by alcohol and water); United States v. South
Hero Creamery Ass'n, White & Gates 1142 (D. Vt. 1925) (butter with less than 80
per cent milk-fat); United States v. Atlantic Macaroni Co., White & Gates 793
(E.D.N.Y. 1917) (macaroni dyed yellow to conceal inferiority); United States v.
German American Specialty Co., White & Gates 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (eggs diluted
by skim milk).
123. See Christopher Chen, Food and Drug Administration Food Standards of Identity:
Consumer Protection Through the Regulation of Product Information, 47 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 185, 192-93 (1992).
124. See id.
125. See generally Traci S. Takaki, Temporary Marketing Permits: The Hidden Regulation
in Market Testing, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 675, 675-83 (1993) (providing a brief history of
cases addressing FDA's enforcement authority against economic adulteration).
126. Forte, supra note 122, at 352-353.
127. United States v. Ten Cases, More or Less, Bred Spred, Etc., 49 F.2d 87, 90-91
(8th Cir. 1931).
128. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2006) (codified as amended).
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FDA clear authority to act in cases involving economic adultera-
tion.'2 1 Under this section, a food is deemed adulterated:
(1) If any valuable constituent has been in whole or in part omitted or
abstracted therefrom; or
(2) If any substance has been substituted wholly or in part therefor; or
(3) If damage or inferiority has been concealed in any manner; or
(4) If any substance has been added thereto or mixed or packed
therewith so as to increase its bulk or weight, or reduce its quality or
strength, or make it appear better or of greater value than it is."
The FDA has authority to act even if the economic adulteration
poses no known risk to public health.
Another important provision of the FD&C Act that was de-
signed to avoid the upshot of the Bred Spred case - that labeling re-
quirements could combat economic adulteration - is section 401,
which gives the FDA broad authority to establish identity standards
for foods: "Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary such action
will promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers,
he shall promulgate regulations fixing and establishing for any food,
under its common or usual name so far as practicable, a reasonable
definition and standard of identity.. . Standards of identity are
used as a "yardstick" by which to measure economic adulteration.
A FDA standard of identity defines the composition of a food and
may prescribe a method of production or formulation.3 The result-
ing standard closely resembles a recipe.13 ' As part of the standard,
the FDA assigns a name under which all conforming products shall
be sold.' "Once a food has been standardized, no product that fails
to meet the compositional requirements of the standard may be
marketed under the name the FDA bas [sic] appropriated."136 The
controlling provision of the FD&C Act is section 403(g), which states
that a food shall be deemed misbranded:
[i]f it purports to be or is represented as a food for which a definition
and standard of identity has been prescribed . .. unless (1) it conforms
to such definition and standard, and (2) its label bears the name of the
food specified in the definition and standard."'
129. Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act § 402(b), 21 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2006).
130. Id.
131. Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act § 401, 21 U.S.C. § 341 (2006).
132. See Merrill, supra note 121, at 563.




137. Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act § 403(g), 21 U.S.C. § 34 3 (g) (2006).
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Accordingly, a product that "purports to be or is represented as" a
standardized food either must meet the standard or it may not be
sold.
The FDA moved quickly to implement and enforce food iden-
tity standards. From 1938 through the 1960s, the FDA promulgated
highly detailed "recipe" standards of food identity and vigorously
enforced standards of identity during this period.18 By 1972, there
were 248 standardized foods.'" In the 1970s, however, standards
began to lose favor with the FDA, as the rapid increase in the variety
of food products available in the marketplace caused the standards
of identity to be viewed as unwieldy.4 0 In the recent book, Squeezed,
Alissa Hamilton, by chronicling the development of standards for
orange juice in the 1960s, demonstrates that standards of identity
are expensive, convoluted and political.'4' Additionally, standards of
identity lost their enforcement power when the FDA moved to a
greater reliance on information labeling to prevent consumer de-
ception of identity and on to "hard-core credence issues" such as
nutrition and safety.' 2 Vice-President Al Gore's shock at learning
that the FDA set forth precise standards for the shapes in which
canned green beans could be sold spurred a 1995 advance notice of
proposed rulemaking to solicit comments on the viability of food
standards.' 3 Although the value of standards has been deprecated,
one commentator notes that "amidst all the ridicule, [food stan-
dards] are serious issues of food policy with enormous implications
for both domestic and international trade in foodstuffs."" As will
be seen later in this article, the use of standards of identity by states
has recently gained favor as a way to prevent economic adulteration,
but on a federal level, there is little enthusiasm for the endeavor.
A leading case that further limited the scope of the FD&C Act is
the 1951 decision in United States v. 88 Cases, More of Less, Containing
138. See Christopher Chen, Food & Drug Administration Food Standards of Identity:
Consumer Protection Through Regulation of Product Information, 47 FOOD DRUG L.J.
185, 185 (1992).
139. Merril, supra note 121, at 566.
140. Takaki, supra note 125, at 680.
141. See ALISSA HAMILTON, SQUEEZED: WHAT You DON'T KNow ABOUT ORANGE
JUICE (2009).
142. See Chen, supra note 138, at 203-204.
143. See Stuart Pape, Food Standards - Are They Obsolete?, Prepared Foods, June
1996, at 33, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3289/is-n7-
v165/ai_18515392/.
144. Id.
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Bireley's Orange Beverage.1 45 The Third Circuit court found that even
though "Bireleys" was an orange drink containing 6% orange juice,
2% lemon juice, 87% water and artificial coloring, it was not delete-
rious.'4 1 "The Government contended that since yellow coal tar dye
had been added to change the beverage's naturally unattractive ap-
pearance into a rich orange color, the drink had been made to 'ap-
pear better or of greater value than it [was]'."'4 7 The court conceded
that this was literally true, but denied that a product can "appear
better than it is" within the meaning of the FD&C Act unless the
food is made to appear to be some defined superior product.4" This
decision returned the law of economic adulteration back to the state
it was under the 1906 case and the Bred Spred case.'4 9 Although Bi-
reley 's is not relevant to indisputable fraud, as in the present case of
100% pomegranate concentrate where there is a clearly defined su-
perior standard, it is illustrative of the narrowing of the application
of section 402 to accommodate developing food technology.
4. Lack of Enforcement
Some scholars believe section 402(b) is no longer enforced -
except for outright fraud - because enforcement is incompatible
with modern food technology. This argument is made in the 3rd
Edition of Food and Drug Law as follows:
Applied literally, the economic adulteration provisions of the FD&C Act
would render most modem food technology problematic. Many func-
tional ingredients - color additives, preservatives, emulsifiers - are in-
tended to improve the appearance of the product and thus could be
challenged as making food appear 'better than it is.' Food producers
would claim that these ingredients in fact improve the food and only
make it appear to be as good as it genuinely is. Without purporting to
resolve this debate, FDA has virtually abandoned enforcement of section
402(b) except in cases of outright fraud, which are rare. The agency has
embraced though never publicized, the philosophy that, notwithstanding
145. 187 F.2d 967, 971 (3d Cir. 1951).
146. Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act - Determination of Whether a Food Has Been
Made to "Appear Better or of Greater Value Than It Is," 100 U. PA. L. REV. 139 (1951-
1952).
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the proper legal interpretation of the statute, informative labeling can
cure 'economic adulteration."
The irony is that while technology has led to innovative, novel food
products that would be stifled by the economic provisions of the
FD&C Act, technology also permits unethical parties to employ so-
phisticated adulteration procedures for profit.5 '
In cases of outright fraud, there are a few well-known prece-
dents where the FDA exercised its statutory responsibility to enforce
against the perpetuators. Enforcement led to a $100,000 fine and
five-year prison sentence for the former president and chief-
executive officer of an orange juice company that put more than
forty million gallons of adulterated orange juice on the U.S. market
over eleven years.'" Fines and forfeitures totaling $120,000 were
slapped on a seafood company and two of its principals for adding
water to scallops to increase their weight and thus net profit since
scallops are priced according to weight. 153 Fines of $20,000 each and
prison terms of 19 months and 30 months were issued for two Mis-
sissippi brothers for adulterating pure honey and pure maple can
and sorghum syrups that were sold in old-fashion tins at farmers'
markets and produce stands around the country.154 A $2.18 million
fine was issued for Beech-Nut Nutrition Corporation - an estab-
lished baby food manufacturer - for selling a product labeled "100
percent" apple juice but which actually contained only sugar, water
and flavoring. 55  Notwithstanding the sizeable fine issued against
Beech-Nut Nutrition Corporation, juice adulteration in the U.S. pro-
liferated in the early 1990s, when it was estimated that 10% of fruit
juice sold in the U.S. was not all juice.'5 David A. Kessler, then
commissioner of the FDA, expressed determination at the time to
prosecute, criminally, adulteration cases. He noted that "these are
serious prosecutions . ... .[people are going to jail."15' Tempering
the enthusiasm of Dr. Kessler, however, was the FDA's enduring
150. PETER BARTON Hurr, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND
DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 159 (3rd ed. 2007) (emphasis added).
151. R. Shapiro, The Double-Edged Sword of Technological Advancement: Food Authen-
ticity and Economic Adulteration, Cereal Foods World, Aug. 2000, at 376, 380-384.




156. See Diana B. Henriques, 10% of FruitJuice Sold in U.S. Is Not All Juice, Regula-
tors Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 31, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/31/us/10-of-
fruit-juice-sold-in-us-is-not-alljuice-regulators-say.html.
157. Id.
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problem of inadequate resources and an "institutional tradition" of
putting a low priority on prosecuting cases of economic adultera-
tion.58
The FDA's reluctance to vigorously enforce against economic
adulteration is not surprising; FDA enforcement decisions are often
guided more by exiguous circumstances than by public policy. With
limited resources, the agency struggles to enforce its statutory man-
dates, including that of stopping economic adulteration. FDA has
been aptly described as having become a "paradigmatic example of
the 'hallow government' syndrome - an agency with expanded re-
sponsibilities, stagnant resources, and the consequent inability to
implement or enforce its statutory mandates."'59 The FDA's budget
has stayed roughly the same for more than a decade, despite FDA
facing many new and complex problems.1o
In addition to resource limitations, the reluctance by the FDA
to enforce against economic adulteration may also be due to a
change in focus over time that diminished its resolve to address
economic matters. The FDA's original regulatory focus on fraud in
the marketplace expanded into mechanisms to protect consumers
against unsafe food."' The FDA later adapted to the science of nu-
trition and assumed a role in protecting the nutritional integrity of
the food supply.' This shift away from fraud, combined with the
FDA's resource constraints, has relegated economic adulteration to
low priority status, behind safety and nutrition.6 3 For example, in a
letter to the National Milk Producers Federation over the issue of
"imitation" labeling, the agency stated that "[o]ur high priorities are
health hazards, filth, and nutrition. Our lowest priorities are food
economics and food standards. Thus we expect no actions in the
near future concerning cheese substitute products indicated in your
letters.""
158. See id.
159. Peter Barton Hutt, Recent Development: The State of Science at the Food and Drug
Administration, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 432 (2008).
160. See The Food and Drug Import Safety Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 3610
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of William K. Hubbard, Senior Advisor, The Coa-
lition for a Stronger FDA), available at http-//archives.energycommerce.
house.gov/cmte-mtgs/1 10-he-hrg.092607.Hubbard-testimony.pdf.
161. See Peter Barton Hutt, Government Regulation of the Integrity of the Food Supply,
4 Ann. Rev. Nutr. 1 (1984).
162. Id. at 8.
163. See PETER BARTON HUTrr & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW CASES
AND MATERIALS, 1056-57 (2nd ed. 1991).
164. Id. at 1057.
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The assumption of this relegation of fraud as a low priority is
that economic adulteration does not pose significant health risks.F5
100% pomegranate juice exemplifies this assumption. The court in
PurelyJuice determined that as early as 2006, "it was widely known in
the super premium juice industry that there were serious issues of
adulteration with pomegranate juice concentrate originating from
outside the United States.""'6 The same evidence of fraud from seven
certified laboratories that was found to be persuasive to the Califor-
nia District Court in PurelyJuice was provided to the FDA, along with
the request that the agency take "prompt, forceful and visible regula-
tory action" against companies selling adulterated product.r7  In
January 2008, the FDA notified complainants that due to a lack of
resources both to investigate and develop sufficient sophisticated
methodology to analyze the adulteration, it was unwilling to commit
resources to investigate the economic adulteration of 100% pome-
granate juice.6 a In the words of a FDA food-safety officer, "[iln terms
of priorities, [food fraud] often ranks at the bottom of the list."6
The danger with this assumption is that it fails to appreciate the
emerging interconnection in the new global food trade system be-
tween economic adulteration, especially high-premium healthy prod-
ucts like 100% pomegranate juice, and safety and nutrition.
C. Globalization and the FDA's Budding Interest
The melamine public-health disaster in China jolted the food
industry and government agencies, including the FDA, into at least
an introspective mode concerning economically-motivated adultera-
tion. There is a growing recognition that globalization means that
165. Jeneen Interlandi, The Fake-Food Detectives, Newsweek, Feb. 8, 2010,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/233253.
166. POM Wonderful LLC v. Purely Juice, Inc., No. 07-02633, 2008 WL 4222045,
at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2008), affd, No. 08-56375, 2009 WL 5184233 (9th Cir. Dec.
28, 2009).
167. See Letter from law firm of Hogan & Hartson to Joseph R. Baca, Director,
Office of Compliance, CFSAN, FDA (Apr. 17, 2007) (on file with author). See, e.g.,
Krueger Food Laboratories, Inc., Certificate of Analysis (Apr. 2, 2007) (on file with
author). See also POM Wonderful LLC, 2008 WL 4222045 at *4 (describing tests
conducted by Krueger on Purely Juice's 100% pomegranate juice and the results).
168. See Baca Letter, supra note 167. Complainants will not find help from courts
to compel action by the FDA, as the U.S. Supreme Court in Heckler v. Chaney de-
termined that decisions by the FDA not to take enforcement actions are presump-
tively unreviewable, as such actions are "committed to agency discretion by law"
under section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
169. Interlandi, supra note 165.
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economic adulteration cases of "outright fraud" are no longer rare
in a global food system that is growing more dependent every day
on the importation of food and that there are potentially serious
food-safety consequences from unchecked adulteration.o70
1. FDA Public Hearing
Notwithstanding the general disinclination by the FDA towards
enforcement against economic adulteration, on April 6, 2009, the
FDA announced a public meeting "pertaining to economically-
motivated adulteration." 7 ' FDA called the meeting "to stimulate
and focus a discussion about ways in which the food.., drug, medical
device, and cosmetic industries, regulatory agencies, and other par-
ties can better predict and prevent economically-motivated-
adulteration with a focus on situations that pose the greatest public
health risk."'72 The specific purpose of the meeting was to stimulate
discussion on how industry "can better predict and prevent eco-
nomically motivated adulteration" of food.'73 The FDA noted that
"despite longstanding FDA requirements to assure the safety of
regulated products, such as requirements for the use of ingredients
of known identity and quality in drugs, economically motivated
adulteration remains a public health threat."'74
For purposes of the meeting, FDA proposed that economically
motivated adulteration be defined as "the fraudulent, intentional
substitution or addition of a substance in a product for the purpose
of increasing the apparent value of the product or reducing the cost
of its production, i.e., for economic gain."'7 The FDA further clari-
fied that this would include dilution of products with an already pre-
sent substance, "to the extent that such dilution poses a known or
possible health risk to consumers, as well as the addition or substitu-
tion of substances in order to mask dilution."'76
The FDA's principle concern at the meeting on May 1, 2009
was the affect of the importation of foods on economic adulteration.
Based on presentations at a recent FDA public meeting on eco-
nomic adulteration, the proliferation of imported food products
170. See AT Kearney, supra note 2, at 4-5.
171. See FDA Notice of Public Meeting on Economically Motivated Adulteration,
74 Fed. Reg. 15,497 (Apr. 6, 2009).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 15498.
175. Id.
176. FDA Notice of Public Meeting, supra note 171, at 15,498.
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subject to economic adulteration include honey, oils, spices, sup-
plements, wheat gluten, seafood, pet food, and superfruit juices.'7
Much of this product is imported from developing countries, which
themselves have reported in the last year a significant increase in the
amount of economic adulteration of food product."'
Three of the four examples of economically-motivated adultera-
tion provided by the FDA's Federal Register notice announcing the
meeting involve mainland Chinese products, and the fourth exam-
ple is partially linked to mainland Chinese manufacturers as well.'
The first of these incidents include the contamination in 2007 of pet
food containing ingredients labeled as wheat gluten and rice protein
concentrate that included melamine and melamine-related com-
pounds. 80 Melamine was allegedly added to the pet food to boost
its protein content.'8 ' The other two incidents involve the contami-
nation in 2008 of heparin products used in pediatric dialysis patients
with a heparin-like molecule known as oversulfated chondroitin sul-
phate that was manufactured in China, and the contamination in
2008 of milk-based infant formula with melamine added to increase
measured nitrogen levels and thereby inflate the apparent protein
content.' 2 The fourth example involves the adulteration of tooth-
paste, cough syrup, and other drugs with diethylene glycol which is
used to replace glycerine in those products.8 1
The FDA's opening comments at the meeting, made by Dr.
Randall Lutter, address the changing paradigm for economic adul-
teration that results from globalization. Dr. Lutter stated that "[t]he
reason this problem has resurged is largely because of globalization.
That's the new challenge that we face."'84 He further noted that
"[p]rotection at the border is intrinsically more challenging. Inspec-
tions are most costly overseas, equivalent state regulatory agencies
do not exist and other information is more scarce."'"5 He concluded
by stating "[s]o our strategy for identifying the next melamine, if you
will . . . is that large-scale economically-motivated contamination is
177. Transcript, Public Meeting on Addressing Challenges of Economically-
Motivated Adulteration, May 1, 2009, available at http://www.regulations.gov/
search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=0900006480al0b82.
178. See id. (statement of Shaun Kennedy).





184. See Transcript, supra note 177.
185. Id.
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likely where people can make money. And to put it more specifi-
cally, the expected reward to somebody from this illegal activity is -
exceeds expected costs."'"8
During the public meeting, the FDA received no shortage of
suggestions on how to better prevent, detect, and address instances
of economic adulteration. Suggestions included increased educa-
tional outreach, improved enforcement at the borders, more prose-
cutions, and establishing a greater presence abroad.' A number of
industry representatives also expressed the view that FDA should
broaden its working definition of economic adulteration to address
situations that do not necessarily pose a public health risk, but that
nonetheless threaten to undermine product integrity in certain in-
dusties.'" The suggestion that received the most attention was for
the FDA to step up its enforcement activity.1
2. GMA Report
In early 2010, following the FDA public hearing, the Grocery
Manufacturer's Association (GMA), a trade group that represents
the food, beverage, and consumer products industry, issued a
lengthy report about the increasingly significant problem of food-
product fraud in the global marketplace, including economic adul-
teration and counterfeiting.o90 Consistent with FDA statements, the
report characterizes the melamine incident in China as the trigger
point which proved that economic adulteration has serious global
consequences.'9 ' The report accounts for the spike in global eco-
nomic adulteration in part by noting that technology has allowed
cheaters to become more sophisticated.9 2 The reports notes that
"[for example, in the melamine incident, the guilty parties used
their knowledge of the 'value' ingredient protein and the indirect
nitrogen-based testing method used to measure it, to mask and en-
hance the naturally occurring protein levels in milk products and
186. Id. at 4-5.
187. See generally id.
188. See id.
189. See Transcript, supra note 177.
190. AT KEARNEY, supra note 2, at 1 (counterfeiting is defined as the unauthor-
ized representation of a registered trademark carried on goods similar to goods for
which the trademark is registered, with a view to deceiving the purchaser into be-
lieving that he or she is buying the original goods). Id.
191. Id. at 1.
192. Id. at 5.
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cheat the test methods."'" Another problem cited by the report is
the culture of acceptance of cheating, especially in "markets with
severe economic tension, weak regulations and poor legal frame-
works ... ." The report calls on governments "to more effectively
execute existing laws and regulations and to deter fraud and protect
consumers and increase penalties for violators."'5 Given the GMA's
role as an industry association, the report predictably encourages
governments to coordinate with all stakeholders throughout the
food supply chain and collaborate with trading partners to reduce
fraudulent activity.' An interesting idea in the report is for gov-
ernments to "consider establishing a center of expertise for food
fraud similar to efforts on food safety and defense"'17
IV. DEFINING THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
ENFORCEMENT AGAINST ECONOMIC ADULTERATION
The FDA views itself as a scientifically oriented law enforcement
agency with a mission to protect consumers through judicious en-
forcement of various laws entrusted to its administration.'" To de-
termine what constitutes "judicious enforcement" against the type of
economic adulteration that has emerged in the global food trade
system - such as in the case of 100% pomegranate juice - it is useful
first to inventory and assess the enforcement tools available to FDA,
and second to frame a cost-benefit analysis that, while often associ-
ated with the promotion of economic efficiency, is best understood
as a way of ensuring "better priority setting and of overcoming pre-
dictable obstacles to desirable regulation."9
A. FDA Enforcement Tools at the Border
Imported food fraud presents a special challenge for enforce-
ment because a nation's food regulatory jurisdiction ends at its na-
193. Id. at 5.
194. Id. at 5.
195. AT KEARNEY, supra note 2, at 17.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 18.
198. See Swindlers, Hucksters and Snake Oil Salesman: Hype and Hope Marketing Anti-
Aging Products to Seniors: Hearing Before the S. Special Comm. On Aging, 107th Cong. 3
(2001) (statement of John M. Taylor, Director, Office of Enforcement, Office of
Regulatory Affairs, Food and Drug Administration).
199. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059,
1060 (2000).
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tional border. This limits the regulator's ability to induce a foreign
supplier's compliance with domestic food standards using tradi-
tional avenues of law and regulation backed by civil, criminal, and
administrative penalties. International agreements that comprise
rules to govern international trade in food goods, including the
World Trade Organization Agreement on the Application of Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and World Trade
Organization Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT
Agreement), are historically slanted toward removing trade barriers
rather than assessing accountability. 00 Thus, the safety and integrity
of imported food depends on the importing country's regulations
and enforcement activity.
1. Section 801, FD&C Act: Import Alerts
FDA's authority over imported food is derived from section 801
of the FD&C Act.20 1 Section 801(a) prescribes that a food may be
refused entry into the United States if it appears to be manufac-
tured, processed, or packed under unsanitary conditions or if it is
adulterated or misbranded.202  The basic enforcement tool used by
FDA in connection with imported food is the automatic detention of
goods through what are known as import alerts.20 s This administra-
tive remedy allows for a specific food article to be detained without
physical examination.204 Import alerts are guidance documents that
inform FDA field personnel that the FDA has sufficient evidence
about a product, producer, shipper, or importer to determine that
the food article is unsuitable for import.200 Examples of import
alerts for adulterated product include an alert in August 2007 that
detained farm-raised catfish, basa, shrimp, dace, and eel products
from China after the discovery of unapproved drug residues and
200. See generally MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: BACTERIA, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND
BIOTERRORISM 236-240 ((2003).
201. See Diminished Capacity: Can the FDA Assure the Safety and Security of the Na-
tion's Food Supply?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of David
Acheson, Associate Commissioner for Food Protection, Food and Drug Administra-
tion), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2007/10/t20071011a.html.
202. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 801(a), 21 U.S.C. § 381(a) (2006).
203. See FDA REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL 9-50 (Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProcedur
esManual/UCM074300.pdf.
204. See id. at 9-19, 9-50.
205. See id. at 9-19, 9-21, 9-50.
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food additives.206 In 2008, the FDA issued import alerts for vegeta-
ble protein and milk products tainted with melamine from China.
There have even been FDA import alerts for economic adulteration
unrelated to safety concerns. In the 1990s an import alert that still
remains in effect was issued for apple juice and apple juice concen-
trate that contained an undeclared sweetener that rendered the
products both economically adulterated and misbranded. 20  An-
other import alert unrelated to safety concerns was issued by the
FDA for morel mushrooms, due both to microbial contamination
and substitution of less valuable mushrooms for a portion of the
morels.209 Finally, another import alert covers numerous products
and importers due to violation of the Nutrition Labeling and Educa-
tion Act of 1990, which involves nutrition labeling and ingredient
declaration requirements that are unrelated to food safety.210
The lack of resources limits the application of import alerts.
While the number of food imports has increased exponentially, the
number of import inspectors has remained stagnant.21' Only 1.3%
of imported fish, vegetables, fruit, and other foods are inspected by
FDA." The FDA information systems focused on imports are old
and out of date, making it difficult to interact directly with the Cus-
toms Border Patrol.2 13  Given these resource constraints, there
206. See FDA Import Alert #16-131, "'Detentions Without Physical Examination of
Aquacultured Catfish, Basa, Shrimp, Dace, and Eel Products from China- Presence
of New Animal Drugs and/or Unsafe Food Additives," (Jan. 14, 2010),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cms-ia/importalert_33.html.
207. See FDA Import Alert #99-29, "Detention Without Physical Examination of
All Vegetable Protein Products From China for Animal or Human Food Use Due to
the Presence of Melamine and/or Melamine Analogs" (Mar. 29, 2008),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cms-ia/importalert_267.html; See aLbo FDA Import
Alert #99-30, "Detention Without Physical Examination of All Milk Products, Milk
Derived Ingredients and Finished Food Products Containing Milk from China Due
to the Presence of Melamine and/or Melamine Analogs" (May 3, 2008),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cms-ia/importalert_401.html.
208. See FDA Import Alert #20-02, "Detention Without Physical Examination of
Apple Juice and Apple Juice Concentration Containing an Undeclared Sweetner"
(Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cms-ia/importalert_54.html.
209. See FDA Import Alert #25-02, "Detention Without Physical Examination of
Morel Mushrooms Due to Adulteration and Substitution" (Oct. 2, 2009),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cmsia/importalert_80.html.
210. See FDA Import Alert #99-20, "Detention Without Physical Examination of
Imported Food Products Due to NLEA Violations" (Aug. 14, 2010),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cms-ia/importalert-264.html.
211. Hubbard, supra note 160.
212. Bridges, supra note _
213. Hubbard, supra note 160.
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should be no surprise that after the import alerts were issued for
Chinese seafood, at least one million pounds of suspect Chinese
seafood made it through without being stopped and tested, thereby
landing on store shelves and dinner plates. "
2. Bioterrorism Act: Notice
Another useful tool for the FDA for import control of food
product is the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Prepared-
ness and Response Act (Bioterrorism Act), enacted by Congress in
2002 2 Under the Bioterrorism Act and the Final Rule issued on
November 7, 2008 (effective May 6, 2009), importers are required to
submit to FDA "prior notice of food, including animal feed, that is
imported or offered for import into the United States."216 The FDA
receives approximately 33,400 prior notice submissions per business
day.217 Although the Bioterrorism Act does not stop the importation
of economically-motivated adulterated food product, prior notice
allows the FDA to work closely with the Customs Border Patrol to
identify and trace back imports of adulterated product that threaten
the food supply.21 1
3. The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act
A positive development in the overall strengthening of the
FDA's border enforcement is the recently enacted FDA Food Safety
Modernization Act (FSMA), which was passed by Congress on De-
cember 21, 2010, and signed into law by President Barak Obama on
January 4, 2011.2'9 The FSMA has been heralded as a historic Act
because it is the first overhaul of food safety regulations in over sev-
enty years, even though enactment will take several months for
214. See Sean Alfano, "Import Alert" For Chinese Seafood Ignored, CBS NEWS, Aug. 8,
2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/08/08/health/main3145740.shtml.
215. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
216. Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and Bioter-
rorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974 (Oct. 10, 2003)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
217. Acheson, supra note 201.
218. See id.
219. Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353 (2011) [hereinafter
FSMA].
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many provisions and years for some provisions.220 A major thrust of
the FSMA is to "shift[] the focus of federal regulators from respond-
ing to contamination to preventing it."22' In this preventive mode,
the FSMA enhances FDA enforcement on imported foods in several
ways. The FSMA requires facilities operating within the U.S. or im-
porting food to the U.S. to implement written safety plans that iden-
tify and protect against food hazards.2 Records must be main-
tained to document steps to implement, correct, monitor and revise
the safety plan.2 As an additional layer of protection, FSMA re-
quires the originating country's government or qualified certifying
entities to certify that the imported food has met all U.S. food safety
requirements. The FSMA also authorizes FDA to enter into agree-
ments with foreign governments to facilitate the inspection of for-
eign registered facilities.225 The FSMA permits the FDA to develop
voluntary security measures for imported foods in order to expedite
the importation process.2 In establishing who qualifies for the pro-
gram, the FDA will consider the personnel of the importers, security
of the supply chain, preventive controls and vendor and supplier
227information. Finally, FSMA requires the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture
and State departments of health and agriculture, to establish pilot
programs to track and trace food in order to prevent or mitigate
foodborne illness outbreaks.2 While it is unclear to what extent
these changes will bear on economic adulteration or imported food
product, arguably more attention will be focused on the overall
compliance of imports.
220. See Michael R. Taylor, Deputy Comm'r for Foods, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act: Putting Ideas into Action, Address at the




221. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Food Safety Legislation, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERV., http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm237934.
htm (last updated Jan. 14, 2011).
222. See FSMA, supra note 219, at § 418(h).
223. Id. at § 4 18 (g).
224. Id. at § 303.
225. Id. at § 807(a).
226. Id. at § 806.
227. See FSMA, supra note 219, at § 806(d).
228. Id. at § 204.
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B. "Standards" Activity
Standards of identity to stop the import of economically adul-
terated food product have been employed recently for three pre-
mium food products: honey or "pure" honey, extra virgin olive oil,
and 100% pomegranate juice.
1. Honey
In the sweetener industry, honey is a prime target for economic
adulteration - a problem that has been exasperated by the increase
of foreign imports." In 2006, five major honey producers and
processors asked the FDA to establish a standard of identity for
honey. Two years later the FDA responded that, due to other press-
ing matters, it would not be able to review the petition.230 Florida
then instituted a state standard of identity that prohibits any addi-
tives, chemicals, or adulterants in honey produced, processed, or
sold in Florida.3 In 2009, Congress stepped in, and as recorded in
the June 23, 2009, House Agriculture Appropriations Committee
Report accompanying the 2010 Agriculture Appropriations bill, the
Committee references the problem of economically-motivated adul-
terated honey entering the U.S. market and directs FDA as follows:
Honey.-The Committee recognizes that honey is produced in the United
States, traded internationally and consumed as both a packaged food
and as a food ingredient. However, there have been instances where
manufacturers have been marketing products illegally as "honey" or
"pure honey" that contained other ingredients. The Committee be-
lieves that guidance about the composition and labeling of honey is
needed to protect consumers and the domestic honey industry from
misbranded honey and honey-derived products that are currently enter-
ing the U.S. market. The Committee directs FDA to remind manufac-
turers of honey about the misbranding and adulteration provisions of
the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. It is the Committee's under-
standing that FDA intends to respond to the pending citizen petition
proposing a standard of identity for honey, and the Committee expects
the agency to do so.'
229. Fairchild, supra note _ , at 138-39.
230. Press Release, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services,
Bronson Announces First Regulation in the Nation Banning Additives in Honey
(July 13, 2009), available at http://www.doacs.state.fl.us/press/2009/07132009.
html.
231. Id.
232. H.R. REP. No. 111-181, at 63 (2009).
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Similarly, the July 7, 2009, Senate Agriculture Appropriations
Committee report accompanying the companion Senate bill in-
cluded the following directive:
Standards of Identity.-The Committee recognizes that honey is produced
in the United States, traded internationally and consumed as both a
packaged food and as a food ingredient, and believes FDA needs to
work to prevent misbranded honey and honey-derived products from
entering the U.S. market. The Committee is aware that the FDA has
been in receipt of a proposed standard of identity for honey for 3 years,
and directs FDA to respond to this proposal and, if deemed appropriate,
begin working toward a U.S. standard of identity for honey.""
Thus, it appears that Congress is willing to direct an otherwise resis-
tive FDA to take enforcement action for economic adulteration in-
volving the importation of adulterated food even where no safety
risk is present.
2. Olive Oil
Like pomegranates, olive oil has a long history rich in lore, used
for centuries for medicine and religious rituals.3 In recent years,
American per capita olive oil consumption has exploded, with the
annual per capita olive oil consumption in the U.S. having increased
over 650% since 1980.235 Much of this demand has been generated
by olive oil becoming over recent years a gourmet must-have item,
and by the higher-graded olive oil being touted for its heart-health
properties and taste.23' The higher-grade extra virgin oil is one of
the most frequently economically adulterated food products, includ-
ing in Europe, where fraud was so bad in the late 1990s that the
European Union's anti-fraud office established an olive-oil task
force.3 According to one investigator, "[p]rofits were comparable
to cocaine trafficking, with none of the risks. .. 23" High-end olive
233. S. REP. No. 111-39, at 109 (2009).
234. See OLIVE OIL & HEALTH 26 (J.L. Quiles et al. eds., 2006).
235. Christopher R. Gustafson & Travis J. Lybbert, What's Extra Virgin? An Eco-
nomic Assessment of California's Olive Oil Labeling Law, 12 AGRIC. RES. ECON. UPDATE
3, 9 (Jan. - Feb. 2009), available at http://www.agecon.ucdavis.edu/extension/
update/articles/v12n3_2.pdf.
236. See Elizabeth Weise, Something fishy? Counterfeit Foods Enter the U.S. Market,
USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-01-19-
fake-foodsN.htm.
237. See Tom Mueller, Slippery Business: The Trade in Adulterated Olive Oil, THE
NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, available at http://www.newyorker.com/report-
ing/2007/08/13/070813fa fact mueller.
238. Id.
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oil is expensive to produce and fraudulent extra virgin olive oil was
priced substantially less than the pure product.239
Proponents for preserving the integrity and health benefits of
the extra virgin oil have petitioned the FDA for a standard of identity
based on a standard set by the International Olive Council (IOC).240
This standard is two-fold: first, an objective chemical test considers
the level of fats and oils present in the olive oil; second, a subjective
organoleptic test (i.e., taste, smell and appearance) checks the purity
of the olive oil product.24' Oil qualifying as extra virgin must pass
both of these tests. Given the FDA's reluctance to act on petitions
for standards of identity, there is not much enthusiasm for the FDA
moving quickly on a petition. There is also a petition to the USDA
for a voluntary standard that appears also to be languishing.
The federal government's delay in setting standards of identity
has shifted enforcement activity to the state level. Connecticut be-
gan testing for extra virgin oil in 2007, and in November 2008 it
became the first state to adopt a standard of identity that mirrors
standards developed by IOC.244 State officials were concerned about
the safety of economically adulterated olive oil, especially the pros-
pects of allergen problems. Following Connecticut's example,
California has created standards for olive oil, including extra virgin
oil, that follow the IOC standards. Other states are also consider-
ing adopting similar standards for olive oil.247
239. Id. Low-grade olive oil housed in tins labeled as extra virgin were found to
be mostly soybean oil mixed with low grade olive-pomace oil. Diane Orson, Olive
Oil Fraud, CONNECTICUT PUBLIC RADIO, Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.cpbn.org/arficle/
olive-oil-fraud.
240. See National American Olive Oil Association Mid-Year Meeting Minutes and
Presentations (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.mytradeassociation.org/cgi-bin/moxie-
bin/bmtools.cgi?print=82;s=2_2;site=4.
241. See IOOC Label Standards, OLIVEOILBUSINESS.COM, http://olivebusiness.com/
index.php?option=comcontent&view-article&id=41:olive-products-a-law-aus-iooc-
label-standards&catid=21:finance-and-legal-information&Itemid=38 (last visited Aug.
28, 2010).
242. See National American Olive Oil Association, supra note 240.
243. See id.; See also Notice for Proposed United States Standards for Grades of
Olive Oil and Olive-Pomace Oil, 73 Fed. Reg. 31,426 (June 2, 2008).
244. See Diane Orson, Olive Oil Fraud, CONNECTICUT PUBLIC RADIO, Dec. 9, 2008,
http://www.cpbn.org/article/olive-oil-fraud.
245. Connecticut Adopts Standards Governing the Sale of Olive Oil, BOsTON.com, Nov.
23, 2008 (interviewing Jerry Farrell, Jr., Connecticut's consumer protection com-
missioner), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2008/11/23/connecticut
adopts._standards-governing.thesale of olive oil/.
246. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 112875 (West 2010).
247. Connecticut Adopts Standards Governing the Sale of Olive Oil supra note 245.
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3. 100% Pomegranate Juice
The proponents of a California 100% pomegranate juice bill
hope to mirror the success of the state standards established for ex-
tra virgin oil. Efforts to stop the economic fraud of 100% pome-
granate juice are now in the form of a proposed bill that is working
its way through the California legislative process that would establish
a standard of identity for pure, 100% pomegranate juice.2 4 8  The
stated purpose of the bill is to address issues of economic adultera-
tion of pomegranate juice originating from outside the United
States.2 19 The standard will likely be based on authentication stan-
dards that are developed in what is referred to as the recently pub-
lished International Multidimensional Authenticity Specification (IMAS)
Algorithm for Detection of Commercial Pomegranate juice Adulteration.250
The IMAS "algorithm was developed through consideration of exist-
ing databases and comprehensive chemical characterization of 45
commercial juice samples from 23 different manufacturers in the
United States."2 5  "In addition to analysis of commercial juice sam-
ples obtained in the United States, data from other analyses of
pomegranate juice and fruits including samples from Iran, Turkey,
Azerbaijan, Syria, India, and China were considered in developing
this protocol."2 5 2 "The profile generated from these analyses com-
bined with information from existing databases and published litera-
ture has been integrated into a validated IMAS for [pomegranate
juices] which can be utilized to detect [pomegranate juice] adultera-
tion."25 3
Notwithstanding these developments and a recent, general rec-
ognition of the effects of globalization on economic adulteration,
enforcement remains limited. Notwithstanding examples of a few
exceptions, the general rule is that for the FDA to initiate an import
alert against adulterated imported food product, the contamination
must first ripen into an immediate, discernable food-safety risk.
While this recalcitrance may reflect the FDA's traditional method of
doing business, it does raise the issue of whether the costs of un-
248. See S.B. 190 (Cal. 2009).
249. See Elaine K. Alquist, Chair, Senate Health Committee, Bill Analysis, available
at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0151-0200/sb_190cfa 20090428
160418_sen comm.htil.
250. See Zhang, supra note 15.
251. Id. at 2550.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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checked economic adulteration in the emergent global food trading
system are fully understood and sufficiently weighed.
C. Measuring the Costs of Failure to Enforce
Effective "cost-benefit balancing" that is "enshrined in the for-
mal law of the executive branch" requires that a deliberative process
be engaged to know the real costs. 5 4 A problem with the FDA's cur-
rent mind set in assessing the costs of economic adulteration is that
a single incident is not likely going to amount to an immediate
threat to food-safety. The importance of safe food is obvious.
There is little dispute that significant resources should be devoted to
food safety regulation. Addressing adulteration problems in isola-
tion, basing enforcement activity exclusively on the immediate food-
safety impact, is short-sighted in a global regulatory system because
the "real" costs are not factored into the deliberative process. In-
deed, globalization of food distribution not only introduces addi-
tional costs, but changes the cost-assessment paradigm for imported
food. Costs should be assessed in a coherent, cognitive and holistic
approach.' Such an approach accounts both for the growth of eco-
nomic adulteration due to globalization and the full range of public-
health, governance, and economic and social costs of non-
enforcement.1" Below is a sampling of the costs of unchecked eco-
nomic adulteration of imported food product. These costs are not
exhaustive, but provide a framework for further analysis and consid-
eration in risk assessment.
1. Public-Health Costs
Non-enforcement of economic adulteration of imported food
product increases food safety risks. As noted in the melamine disas-
ter, economic adulteration poses the risk of unintended conse-
quences, such as "olive oil adulterated with peanut oil being unwit-
tingly served to someone with a peanut allergy, or someone eating a
mislabeled fish of which they are allergic.",25  Former FDA Commis-
sioner David A. Kessler observed that "[i]n most cases of adultera-
tion, it turns out to be just economic and nobody gets hurt - but
254. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 6-7 (2002).
255. See generally id. at 1071-722 (assessing a separate evaluation and incoherence
in cost-benefit analysis).
256. See id. at 8.
257. Interlandi, supra note 165.
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there is always that potential." It stands to reason that continuing
to marginalize economic adulteration as a low priority - meaning no
enforcement - the FDA not only condones, but unwittingly enables
and even encourages additional unscrupulous manufacturers to
cheat in order to increase their profits. Simply put, waiting for a
melamine-type tragedy to strike before initiating enforcement in-
creases the chances that such a tragedy will occur. This is precisely
what happened in the two melamine adulteration cases in China,
where manufacturers added the chemical to increase measured ni-
trogen levels in order to reduce costs and inflate the protein con-
tent. It is naive to hope that these same cheaters will be con-
cerned about safety while adulterating a product for profit. The
benefit of deterrence to public health against melamine-type inci-
dents was recognized by FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg in
her first public speech upon taking office: "[e]ffective enforcement
has many clear benefits to public health. It enables FDA to intercept
unsafe or fraudulent products promptly . . . and prevent additional
harm. By holding violators accountable, enforcement deters others
who would put the public at risk or prey upon vulnerable consum-
ers.
A failure to enforce also eviscerates the nutrition value for con-
sumers of premium, nutritious products. In the case of adulterated
100% pomegranate juice for example, consumers are denied "the
very phytochemicals that account for the unique benefits of' pure
261pomegranate juice. Permitting the fraud to abound spoils incen-
tives for manufacturers to develop pure, nutritious, and healthy
food and beverage products. It also conveys a message to purveyors
of healthy products like 100% pomegranate juice - who have spent
tens of millions of dollars to research the medicinal and health
benefits of their products and to develop, market, and brand the
product category for the benefit of the public - that these types of
investments may be disgorged by fraud.
Finally, the failure to enforce against economic adulteration is
an abdication by the FDA of its public-health responsibilities. Be-
cause there is no private cause of action under the FD&C Act, the
258. Henriques, supra note 156.
259. Julie R. Ingelfinger, Melamine and the Global Implications of Food Contamina-
tion, 359 NEw ENG.J. MED. 2745 (2008).
260. Margaret Hamburg, Remarks at the Food & Drug Law Institute on "Effective
Enforcement and Benefits to Public Health" (Aug. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucml75983.htm.
261. See Zhang, supra note 15, at 2556.
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proponents for prosecuting cheaters were left with one alternative -
to file the PurelyJuice lawsuit in the Central District of California for
false and misleading labeling and advertising under the Lanham
Act.262 While the lawsuit was successful, and while "regulation by
litigation" may be welcome in some economic sectors, it "has several
features at odds with sound health policy - including its cost, its
hindsight bias and its adversarial character. . . .,,2" Depending on
litigants to settle matters of economic adulteration also detracts
from the core mission of the FDA. Above all else, the FDA is a pub-
lic health agency.2 " Its "overriding purpose," in the words of the
U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, is "to protect
the public health."265 To protect public health, especially in cases of
clear fraud, is to be prophylactic and anticipate harm and then en-
force the law, not to leave it to the courts to "assign responsibility
for harm that has already occurred." 2 6
2. Good Governance Costs
Economic adulteration threatens the foundations of good gov-
ernance in the global food sector. To permit this practice is at best
government irresponsibility and at worse is a sign of anarchy. Per-
mitting widespread swindling erodes the fundamental trust between
citizens and the government in a society. The connection between
maintaining public confidence and good government was recog-
nized FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg in her inaugural
speech, when she said that "[u]ltimately, an effective enforcement
strategy creates public confidence in FDA oversight, which in turn
keeps trust in the safety of FDA-regulated products from eroding."26 7
In a system replete with economic adulteration, consumers over-
spend for adulterated product that they perceive to be an authentic
high-end product, such as 100% pomegranate juice, which under-
mines this trust.
262. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006); POM Wonderful LLC v. Purely Juice, Inc.,
No. CV-07-02633, 2008 WL 4222045 at *10 (C.D. Cal. July, 17, 2008).
263. See William M. Sage, Unfinished Business: How Litigation Relates to Health Care
Regulation, 28J. OF HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 387 (2003).
264. Margaret A. Hamburg & Joshua M. Shartstein, The FDA as a Public Health
Agency, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED., 2493 (2009) (the authors are the new commissioner
and principal deputy commissioner of the FDA, respectively).
265. United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969).
266. Sage, supra note 263, at 393.
267. See Hamburg, supra note 260.
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The erosion of trust by consumers due to economic adultera-
tion of imported product contributes to a growing cynicism in the
food regulatory system. Critics of modern food point to the deliv-
erables of obesity and poor nutrition from the modern food manu-
facturer.26" Highly processed foods and juices loaded with sugar and
additives stock grocery shelves and provide fodder for spirited criti-
cism towards food and beverage producers, processors, and gov-
ernment bodies.2"' The U.S. government has responded by acceler-
ating its emphasis on good nutrition policy. Three examples illus-
trate these efforts. First, the government has made a concerted ef-
fort to improve the delivery of nutrition information. Congress
passed the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) in 1990,
which "mandated changes in label declarations for collective terms...
in response to the consumer's demand for more information about
the nutritional content of food products and the presence of food
additives and allergens. 270 Second, in a more recent example, the
government has launched new efforts to combat the epidemic prob-
lem of obesity, especially among obese children who are at risk to
have high blood pressure, high cholesterol and Type 2 diabetes.
Michelle Obama has recently committed her efforts as First Lady to
the cause of reshaping the diets of children with the goal of reduc-
ing childhood obesity.272  Third, the government has implemented
policies to improve nutrition. Even the USDA, whose agricultural
policy has primarily been concerned with the performance of the
agricultural sector, has played a major role in the implementation of
policies to improve nutrition.27' The USDA Center for Nutrition
Policy and Promotion "develop[s] and promot[es] dietary guidance
that links scientific research to the nutrition needs of consumers."
These positive efforts are incongruous with the indifference shown
268. See, e.g., GREG CRITSER, FAT LAND: How AMERICANS BECAME THE FATTEST
PEOPLE IN THE WORLD (2003); ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE
OF THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL (2001).
269. See RA PATEL, STUFFED & STARVED: THE HIDDEN BATTLE FOR THE WORLD
FOOD SYSTEM 215-247 (Melville House Publishing 2008) (2007).
270. FORTIN, supra note 53, at 101.
271. Childhood Overweight and Obesity, CDC.GOV, http-//www.cdc.gov/obesity/
childhood/index.html (last visisted Aug. 26, 2010).
272. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Michelle Obama Leads Campaign Against Obesity, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, http-//thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/michelle-
obama-leads-campaign-against-obesity/.
273. See S.R. Johnson, How Nutrition Policy Affects Food and Agricultural Policy, 124
J. NUTR. 1871S, 1872S (1994).
274. See Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion, USDA.GOV, http://www.
cnpp.usda.gov.
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by the FDA towards economic adulteration that raises potential sig-
nificant safety risks and enervates the nutritional value of healthy
premium products. Inconsistent approaches to health and nutrition
do not help restore consumer confidence or trust in the govern-
ment's ability to regulate a troubled food system.
Ineffective enforcement against economically-motivated adul-
teration also weakens the FDA's global leadership role in food regu-
lation. Former FDA Commissioner Andrew C. Von Eschenbach
noted that the FDA is "recognized as around the world as the gold
standard for ensuring the health of our food."2 15 Setting the gold
standard for enforcement against economic adulteration of pre-
mium fruit juices, such as 100% pomegranate juice, is not the FDA
however, but the New Zealand Commerce Commission. In Septem-
ber 2009, the Commission recalled from supermarket shelves fruit
juices imported from Armenia and determined that the juices sold
as premium drinks, labeled as 100% pomegranate juice, 100% black-
currant juice, and 100% peach juice, were in fact not authentic.2 76
The warning letter issued by the Commission to Amerenian Imports
Limited references the importance of trust to the extent that con-
sumers need to be able to rely on information in order to make an
informed choice.7
3. Economic Costs
Parallel to trust between consumers and government - the
linchpin of good governance - is the trust between consumers and
industry - the linchpin of economic vitality for honest brokers. The
undermining of this trust especially threatens the financial viability
of companies producing high-value food and beverage products.
Products with pure, natural, and wholesome images are particularly
vulnerable to erosion from negative publicity which undermines
consumer confidence in the underlying product attributes. Compe-
tition is also quashed.7 Using economic adulteration to reduce in-
put costs may result in cost differences that are significant enough
275. Diminished Capacity: Can the FDA Assure the Safety and Security of the Nation's
Food Supply?: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigations of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 472 (2007) (statement of Andrew C.
Von Eschenbach, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration).
276. Watchdog Says 'Pure' Juices Actually Devoid of Any Juice, FOODNEWS, July 31,
2009.
277. See Warning Letter to Armenian Imports Limited (Sept. 2, 2009) (on file
with Author).
278. See Fairchild, supra note 60, at 40.
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for cheaters to sell adulterated product below product cost for pure
products and drive competitors out of business.2 '9 Non-enforcement
encourages less responsible manufacturers to flaunt the law and can
force even the most responsible members of the industry to cut cor-
ners in order to meet competition. Faced with this situation, a
company must either follow suit and adopt similar rule-breaking
behavior, or somehow get the violator to cease its illegal actions.
When these companies approach the FDA, they are told that insuffi-
cient resources prevent it from taking action. The rest of an indus-
try - left with only expensive, risky, and relatively less powerful
remedies - often sinks to the level of the violator, increasing fraud
and deception to consumers. In many cases, companies determine
that the risk of enforcement is greatly outweighed by the benefits of
adulteration and they err on the side of profitability rather than
compliance. In order to be competitive, food firms should not need
to choose between doing the right thing and staying competitive.8 o
The magnitude of the economic cost to industry due to eco-
nomic adulteration is striking. The GMA report estimates that eco-
nomic adulteration and counterfeiting of global food and consumer
products costs the industry $10 to $15 billion per year.28 ' The report
notes that the cost of one adulteration incident averages between
two to fifteen percent of yearly revenues for a company.8 For a ten
billion dollar company, this revenue loss translates into roughly
$400 million dollars; for a small $500 million dollar company the
impact is approximately $60 million dollars.8 Where economic
adulteration leads to a food safety problem, the costs are even
greater. In the case of melamine, more than thirty local and global
milk brands were affected and the adulteration resulted in a total
cost of $10 billion dollars and the bankruptcy of companies.284 The
cost of a food safety disaster in the U.S. was demonstrated in 2009,
when intentional sales of salmonella-contaminated products caused
the peanut butter market to shrink 25% and forced the Peanut Cor-
poration of America to file for bankruptcy.2 5
279. Id.
280. See Fairchild, supra note 60.




285. Id. at 6.
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4. Social Costs
In addition to fracturing the links of trust between government
and industry to consumers, unchecked economic adulteration also
spoils the opportunity for linkage between farms and consumers.
Even farms, long a symbol of the Jeffersonian ideal in America,
along with the subsidy programs that incentivize production, have
been censured for producing large quantities of food product, such
as corn for high-fructose corn syrup, that contribute to obesity and
poor nutrition. 8 ' A nutritionally-bankrupt food supply tears at the
social connections between farmers and consumers. In this much
malaised sector, non-subsidized pomegranate farms and the juice
they provide are a breath of fresh air. 100% pomegranate juice al-
lows pomegranate farmers who produce the appealing product to
forge a trust linkage with consumers who are searching for healthy,
nutritious choices. Adulteration thwarts this linkage to the detri-
ment of consumers, farmers, and the agriculture sector.
V. CONCLUSION
In his opening remarks at the FDA's adulteration meeting, Dr.
Randall Lutter, FDA's Associate Commissioner for Policy and Plan-
ning, noted the scope of the problem of economic adulteration by
stating:
I need to stress something else, and this is very important for everyone
here. This is not solely an FDA responsibility addressing this problem.
It should never be construed as such. Every manufacturer and seller of
an FDA-regulated product or products or more broadly, that can be
adulterated and can harm people as a result of the adulteration, has a
responsibility to the American public and to ensure that harmful adul-
teration does not occur. We are bringing you here in part to get you all
to recognize that this is not solely an FDA responsibility; this is one that
industry shares with us. We need you to recognize that we need your
help.m
286. See Michael Pollan, When a Crop Becomes King, N.Y. TIMEs, July 19, 2002,
http-://www.nytimes.com/2002/0 7/19/opinion/when-a-crop-becomes-king.html?scp
=1&sq=when%20crop%20becomes%20king&st=cse; See also ALICIA HARVIE &
TIMOTHY A. WISE, SWEETENING THE POT: IMPLICIT SUBSIDIES TO CORN SWEETNERS AND
THE U.S. OBESITY EPIDEMIC, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE
POLIcY BRIEF No. 09-01 (Feb. 2009).
287. Randall Lutter, Address at the Public Meeting on Addressing Challenges of
Economically-Motivated Adulteration (May 1, 2009).
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While the spirit and intent of Dr. Lutter's remarks are appropriately
tuned to calibrate the expectations of what the FDA can do given its
limited resources, promoting "shared responsibility" with manufac-
turers also implies that the FDA intends to take action.
Taking enforcement action against economic adulterators, in-
cluding that of imported 100% pomegranate juice concentrate,
would reflect a measured and deliberative approach that appreciates
the real costs of economic adulteration. It would send a message
vital in today's global food system that cheaters do not prosper, and
stem what presages to be an increase of cheating proportionate to
the continued expansion of international food trade. It would safe-
guard the health interests of consumers and the integrity of the food
market. It would build bonds of trust between consumers and the
government, between consumers and industry, and between con-
sumers and pomegranate farmers that would help ensure a more
safe and nutritious food supply, restore integrity in the food supply,
and shore up confidence in the ability of the government to regulate
the food supply.
The pomegranate is a durable fruit and its derivative, healthy
100% pomegranate juice product, stands as a symbol of the good
that can be harvested from a global food system - a product that is
healthy and appealing in sundry ways. It is also unfortunately a
symbol of the harm of globalization - a victim of food swindling that
portends serious health, social, and safety consequences. The dura-
bility of modern food regulatory bodies in this global food society,
including the FDA, will depend on their ability to stop the cheating
and preserve the good health and well being of consumers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent rise of consumer consciousness regarding the health
qualities of foods and beverages has become something akin to
common knowledge. Reflecting this rise, studies reveal that labels
regarding the health qualities of a food are more likely to increase
sales.' And among the health labels consumers prefer, labels de-
scribing the product as natural top the list. One website reports that
according to a recent study, 31.3-percent of respondents thought
that "100% natural" was the best description to read on a label,
compared with only. 14.2-percent who thought that "100% organic"
was the best description.2 "All natural ingredients" was the second
most preferred description; it was preferred by 25.4-percent of re-
spondents. Because it is such a powerful phrase in labeling, how
the term "natural" should be used is a hotly contested issue.
Equally pervasive in consumer food and beverage products is
the use of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS), a sweetener found in a
variety of food and beverage products including yogurt, sauces and
condiments, energy bars, and frozen beverage concentrates. Devel-
oped in Japan in 1971, HFCS is cheap to produce, and is six times
sweeter than cane sugar. At a time when cane sugar prices were
artificially high due to trade issues, HFCS became the sweetener of
choice for food manufacturers, and its use has remained wide-
spread.'
In recent years, several lawsuits have been filed contesting the
use of the phrase "natural" on products that contain HFCS. The
common factual basis for the claims is that HFCS is allegedly not
* J.D. Candidate, Spring 2011, University of Arkansas School of Law. The
author thanks Professors Robert B. Leflar and Susan A. Schneider for their re-
markably patient, wise, and candid assistance.
1. Claudia Andre, What's In That Guacamole? How Bates And The Power Of Pre-
emption Will Affect Litigation Against The Food Industry, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227,
254 (2007).
2. John Laumer, US Consumers Prefer "100% Natural" Food Label, TREEHUGGER
(Jul. 3, 2009), http-//www.treehugger.com/files/2009/07/us-customers-prefer-
natural-label-100-organic.php.
3. Id.
4. Jennifer Nelson, High Fructose Corn Syrup: What Are The Concerns?, MAYO
CuNIC (Oct. 23, 2010), http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/high-fructose-corn-
syrup/AN01588; High Fructose Corn Syrup In Foods And Beverages, SWEETSURPRISE,
http://sweetsurprise.com/learning-center/why-is-hfcs-used (last visited Dec. 27,
2010)
5. GREG CRITSER, FAT LAND: How AMERICANS BECAME THE FATTEST PEOPLE IN
THE WORLD 10 (2003).
6. Id. at 11.
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natural, and that by placing the term "natural" on products contain-
7
ing HFCS, defendant-manufacturers are misleading consumers.
The legal theories pursued by plaintiffs upon this factual basis
include violations of state-law consumer fraud and unfair competi-
tion statutes, unjust enrichment, and breach of warranty claims.8
The most common legal defenses used by defendants seeking sum-
mary judgment are preemption and primary jurisdiction.9 This pa-
per focuses exclusively on the former.
According to the author's count, there are presently nine cases
involving the use of "natural" on products containing HFCS that are
being litigated or have been recently decided."o The products in-
volved include granola bars, pasta sauce, iced tea, and juice drinks."
The current hotbeds of this litigation are New Jersey and California.
All of the decisions in cases on this issue were given in 2009 or 2010,
save one, which was given in June 2008.12 This suggests that this
field of litigation is in its infancy, and can be expected to grow.
7. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 2009).
8. Id.; Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1029 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
9. For an explanation of preemption doctrine, see infra, section 2. Though this
paper does not focus on primary jurisdiction, note that several courts have recently
stayed proceedings in "natural" cases based on primary jurisdiction grounds, in or-
der to refer the definition of "natural" to the FDA. However, all of the stays were
temporary, and most have been lifted due to the FDA's express refusal to consider
the issue. See, e.g., Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07-3018, 2010 WL 4065390
(D.N.J. Oct. 15, 2010) (order granting motion to reopen the action); Coyle v. Hornell
Brewing Co., No. 08-2797 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2010) (order dissolving temporary stay).
10. Those cases are: Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d Cir.
2009); Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2009);
Covington v. Arizona Beverage Co., No. 1:08 21894 (S.D. Fla.) (see In re Arizona
Beverage Co. Products Marketing and Sales Practice Litigation, 609 F. Supp. 2d
1369 (J.P.M.L. 2009)); Coyle v. Hornell Brewing Co., No. 08-2797, 2009 WL
1652399 (D.N.J. June 9, 2009); Hitt v. Arizona Beverage Co., No. 08cv809, 2009
WL 449190 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2009); Wright v. General Mills, Inc., No. 08cv1532,
2009 WL 3247148 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009); Von Koenig v. Snapple Beverage
Corp., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp.,
No. 07 Civ. 8742, 2010 WL 3119452 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010); Ries v. Hornell Brew-
ing Co., No. 10-1139-JF 2010 WL 2943860 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2010). Additionally,
in 2007, both Cadbury Schweppes and Kraft were threatened with lawsuits regard-
ing "natural" claims on 7Up and Capri Sun drinks, but changed the labels before
the matter was resolved legally. Laura Crowley, HFCS is Natura4 Says FDA in a
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It is the position of the author that the claims being pursued by
plaintiffs in cases on this issue are not preempted by federal law, but
that clarification of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) la-
beling policy and the general curtailment of FDA labeling authority
would best serve consumers. This paper will provide a brief back-
ground on the FDA's authority to regulate food products, followed
by a brief history of litigation on point. It will then provide a brief
overview of current preemption doctrine, and seek to apply that
doctrine to the common factual issues regarding the use of "natural"
on products containing HFCS.1 Finally, it will conclude by encour-
aging greater clarity from the FDA, and a retreat from the agency's
control of labeling in general.
A. FDA Authority to Regulate Food Products
Federal governmental regulation of the food industry began in
earnest with the passing of the Food and Drug Act of 1906, which
permitted regulation of certain labels.14  This authority, initially
given to the Bureau of Chemistry, was expanded in 1912.'1 Then, in
1938, Congress passed the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), which further expanded regulatory authority, and which
formed the basis for the modern incarnation of the FDCA.' Sub-
sequent legislation in 1946 and 1970 revised the FDCA, and in do-
ing so signaled a trend toward consumer protection concerns in
labeling. 7 This trend culminated in the passage of the Nutritional
Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA), the contents of which
form the basis for the legal issue discussed in this comment.
13. Though the immediate focus of this paper is the use of "natural" in relation
to HFCS, its implied preemption analysis reaches the broader issue of the FDA
policy on the use of "natural," and thus may provide useful insight for a broad
range of specific issues under the "natural" umbrella.
14. MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLTCS: How THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES
NUTRITION AND HEALTH 233 (2002). This act is also known as the "Wiley Act." Holk
v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 331 (3d Cir. 2009).
15. Id.
16. Claudia Andre, What's In That Guacamole? How Bates And The Power Of Pre-
emption Will Affect Litigation Against The Food Industry, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227,
230 (2007).
17. Id. at 231.
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B. Survey of Cases
In 2007, Stacy Holk filed a class action claim against Snapple
Beverage Corporation regarding the use of "natural" on its juice
drinks.'8  This claim was dismissed by the district court on the
ground of implied field preemption.'9 That ruling was reversed by
the Third Circuit.20 In the time between the district court Holk rul-
ing and the appellate court Holk ruling, five additional district court
rulings involving the use of "natural" on products containing HFCS
were issued. Of these, two were substantive rulings on motions to
dismiss (which were denied in both cases),2' and three were proce-
dural. There have been numerous rulings since then, but aside
from the district court Holk case, no court that has considered the
issue has found the plaintiffs' claims to be preempted, expressly or
impliedly."
18. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D.N.J. 2008). This
claim was originally filed in New Jersey state court, but was removed to federal
court. See Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07cv03018, 2007 WL 4677862
(D.N.J. June 29, 2007).
19. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D.N.J. 2008).
20. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2009).
21. In one of these cases, Hitt v. Arizona Beverage Co., the plaintiff subsequently
decided that she did not want to pursue the case as a class representative, and filed
a motion to amend. In an order dated Nov. 24, 2009, the court gave her 20 days to
file a motion for voluntary dismissal or an affidavit stating that she would pursue
the action as the named plaintiff and class representative. Her final decision is
unknown at this time. Hitt v. Arizona Beverage Co., No. 08cv809, 2009 WL
4261192 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009).
22. In Wright v. General Mills, Inc., the court denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss on the ground of preemption, but granted it without prejudice for plain-
tiff's failure to state a claim. Wright v. General Mills, Inc., No. 08cv1532, 2009 WL
3247148 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009). In Hitt v. Arizona Beverage Co., the court denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss. Hitt v. Arizona Beverage Co., No. 08cv809, 2009
WL 449190 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2009). In Coyle v. Hornell Brewing Co., the court af-
firmed a Magistrate Judge's order denying the defendant's application for a stay of
discovery pending the resolution of the Holk appellate case. Coyle v. Hornell Brew-
ing Co., No. 08-2797, 2009 WL 1652399 (D.N.J. June 9, 2009). In a third ruling, a
judicial panel on multidistrict litigation denied a motion to centralize three separate
actions against Arizona Beverage Co. (one of which was Coyle). In re Arizona Bever-
age Co. Products Marketing And Sales Practices Litigation, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1369
(J.P.M.L. 2009).
23. See supra note 9.
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II. RULES OF PREEMPTION
Preemption occurs when federal law bars the enforcement of
state law requirements. The legal basis for preemption rests in the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides
that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." 24 State law may be preempted expressly
or impliedly."
Express preemption occurs when Congress designates the spe-
cific types of state law requirements that are preempted.2 ' A com-
mon ancillary feature of express preemption provisions is a savings
clause, which specifies what types of state-law requirements are not
preempted by the federal law in question.
Implied preemption may occur in two ways: a.) Implied field
preemption; and b.) Implied conflict preemption. Implied field
preemption occurs when state law regulates "in a field that Congress
intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively."2 7 There
are two ways to infer Congressional intent to preempt the field.
One is the presence of a "scheme of federal regulation so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the states to supplement it."2 8 The other is where an Act of Con-
gress touches "a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject."2
Implied conflict preemption can also occur in two situations. It
can occur when it is "impossible for a private party to comply with
both state and federal requirements." Or it can occur when state
law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."0' And neither the
absence of express preemption nor the presence of a savings clause
precludes implied conflict preemption. As the Supreme Court in
Geier v. American Honda pointed out, "the saving clause (like the ex-
24. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
25. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 334 (3d Cir. 2009).
26. See 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006) (example of an express preemption clause).
27. English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
28. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
29. Id.
30. English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
31. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 339 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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press pre-emption provision) does not bar the ordinary working of
conflict pre-emption principles.""
Further, federal statutory law is not the only federal law with
preemptive effect. Federal agency regulations may preempt state
law as well. As the Third Circuit noted, "[w]here Congress has
delegated the authority to regulate a particular field to an adminis-
trative agency, the agency's regulations issued pursuant to that au-
thority have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes."
A. Presumption Against Preemption
The Supreme Court has said that "[c]onsideration of issues aris-
ing under the Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded
by... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.' "- This assumption operates as a presumption against
preemption. The idea that regulation of food labeling falls within
the province of state regulation dates back to at least 1894, when the
Supreme Court, in Plumley v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, noted
that "[i]f there be any subject over which it would seem the states
ought to have plenary control... it is the protection of the people
against fraud and deception in the sale of food products."
Nor did the advent of the FDCA take regulation of food label-
ing out of the province of state authority. The Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the principle stated in Plumley in a 1963 case.3 8 And in 2009,
the Court specifically rejected an argument that the presumption
against preemption should not be applied to drug labeling - which
is regulated under the FDCA along with food labeling - merely be-
cause the federal government has regulated drug labeling for more
than a century.3 9 Thus, even the century-long tradition of federal
regulation of food labeling under the FDCA cannot take the matter
out of the states' police power.
The practical effect of the presumption is that if a court is faced
with two equally plausible interpretations of a text, it has a "duty to
32. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000).
33. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009).
34. Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008).
35. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
36. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
37. 155 U.S. 461, 472 (1894).
38. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963).
39. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1195 n.3 (2009).
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accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption."0 0 Further, the pre-
sumption applies not only to the question of whether preemption
exists at all, but also to the question of the scope of preemption.'
III. EXPRESS PREEMPTION
Because the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in
every preemption case, preemption analysis should begin with ex-
press preemption, where Congressional intent is most clearly com-
municated.' Because the state law causes of action examined in this
article involve labeling, the express preemption provision governing
any issues that might arise in connection with the use of the term
"natural" on food and beverage labels is 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a). This
statute, labeled "National Uniform Nutrition Labeling," is the only
express preemption statute in the NLEA, and limits the require-
ments that states can establish as to certain products regulated un-
der 21 U.S.C. § 341 and 21 U.S.C. § 343 . As to these products,
states cannot establish any requirements that are "not identical to"
the requirements already imposed by 21 U.S.C. § 341 and 21 U.S.C.
§ 343 . The exact text of the statute reads as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or po-
litical subdivision of a State may directly or indirectly establish under
any authority or continue in effect as to any food in interstate com-
merce-
(1) any requirement for a food which is the subject of a standard of
identity established under section 341 of this title that is not identical to
such standard of identity or that is not identical to the requirement of
section 343(g) of this title, except that this paragraph does not apply to a
40. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
41. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
42. Altria v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008).
43. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a) (2006).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(1)-(5) (2006). The FDA has noted that "'[n]ot identical
to' does not refer to the specific words in the requirement, but instead means that
the State requirement directly or indirectly imposes obligations or contains provi-
sions concerning the composition or labeling of food, or concerning a food con-
tainer, that: (i) are not imposed by or contained in the applicable provision (includ-
ing any implementing regulation) of section 401 or 403 of the act; or (ii) differ from
those specifically imposed by or contained in the applicable provision (including
any implementing regulation) of section 401 or 403 of the act." 21 C.F.R. §
100.1(c)(4) (2010). Further, the definitional breadth of the phrase "of the type
required" has not been explicitly defined by courts. While the phrase seems to
encompass requirements of a similar category, and not just of an identical effect or
wording (cf 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006), which seems to suggest a narrower defini-
tional breadth), an authoritative statement of its breadth is impossible at this point.
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standard of identity of a State or political subdivision of a State for ma-
ple syrup that is of the type required by sections 341 and 343(g) of this
title,
(2) any requirement for the labeling of food of the type required by sec-
tion 343(c), 343(e), 343(i)(2), 343(w), or 343(x) of this title that is not
identical to the requirement of such section, except that this paragraph
does not apply to a requirement of a State or political subdivision of a
State that is of the type required by section 343(c) of this title and that is
applicable to maple syrup,
(3) any requirement for the labeling of food of the type required by sec-
tion 343(b), 343(d), 343(f), 343(h), 343(i)(1), or 343(k) of this title that is
not identical to the requirement of such section, except that this para-
graph does not apply to a requirement of a State or political subdivision
of a State that is of the type required by section 343(h)(1) of this title
and that is applicable to maple syrup,
(4) any requirement for nutrition labeling of food that is not identical to
the requirement of section 343(q) of this title, except a requirement for
nutrition labeling of food which is exempt under subclause (i) or (ii) of
section 343(q)(5)(A) of this title, or
(5) any requirement respecting any claim of the type described in sec-
tion 343(r)(1) of this title, made in the label or labeling of food that is
not identical to the requirement of section 343(r) of this title, except a
requirement respecting a claim made in the label or labeling of food
which is exempt under section 343(r)(5)(B) of this title.
Courts and litigants have tended to give little attention to ex-
press preemption in "natural" cases. The defendant in Holk v. Snap-
ple Beverage Corp. did not even raise the issue of express preemption
in the district court.45 Nor did the defendant in Wright v. General
Mills, Inc. Perhaps misunderstanding the law, the defendant in Hitt
v. Arizona Beverage Co. raised an express preemption defense, but
failed to cite a specific express preemption provision that would ap-
ply to the plaintiffs claim." The district court briefs in Lockwood v.
Conagra Foods, Inc. are unavailable, making it impossible to ascertain
how detailed the defendant's arguments on express preemption
were, but the court's opinion gave the topic little attention.8 And
an article in the Journal of Food Law and Policy focusing on the dis-
45. 575 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 2009).
46. No. 08cv1532, 2009 WL 3247148 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009)
47. No. 08cv809, 2009 WL449190 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2009).
48. Regarding the defendant's 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) preemption claim, the court
stated, "[p]laintiffs do not allege that defendant's pasta sauce contains artificial
flavoring, coloring, or a chemical preservative," and thus finding § 343(k) inappli-
cable. Regarding the defendant's 21 U.S.C. § 343(c) claim, the court stated,
"[p]laintiffs are not alleging that the pasta sauce is an imitation of some other
food," and thus found § 343(c) inapplicable.
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trict court Holk and Lockwood decisions devoted only one paragraph
to the express preemption issue.
The above highlighted tendency, which is manifest on all sides
of this issue (court, plaintiff, and defendant), might suggest that ex-
press preemption is not a persuasive defense as to the use of "natu-
ral" in relation to HFCS. Such a suggestion is premature, however,
and does not sufficiently account for the complex issues surround-
ing HFCS and 21 U.S.C. § 343-1.
A. HFCS an Artificial Flavoring?
Snapple's appellate brief in Holk raises an express preemption
argument that future litigants should not ignore. Central to Snap-
ple's argument is 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(3), which preempts state law
requirements for the labeling of food that are of the type required
by § 343(k), but that are not identical to the requirements of
§ 343(k). Section 343(k) applies to "artificial flavoring, artificial col-
oring, or chemical preservatives," and states that foods bearing or
containing such components are misbranded unless they bear label-
ing stating that fact.5 1 In its brief, Snapple claimed that the plain-
tiffs argument that HFCS was not "natural" was 'Just another way of
49. Adam Schlosser, A Healthy Diet of Preemption: The Power of the FDA and the
Battle Over Restricting High Fructose Corn Syrup From Food and Beverages Labeled 'Natu-
ral,' 5 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 145 (2009). Schlosser's treatment of express preemption is
not only inadequate as to depth, but he also focuses on the wrong analytical aspect
of the express preemption arguments being made in HFCS cases. Schlosser sug-
gests that because the claims being raised involve the use of the term "natural," and
because the express preemption provision of the NLEA does not mention any FDA
regulation on the term "natural," the claims are not expressly preempted. But the
use of "natural" only encompasses half of the pertinent subject matter in these
suits. The other half is HFCS, which, as the present comment shows, requires a
more thoroughgoing analysis in light of 21 U.S.C. § 343-1.
50. The FDA definition of "food" extends to drinks as well. 21 U.S.C. § 321(f)(1)
(2006).
51. 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) (2006) (emphasis added). Specifically, the statute states
that a food shall be deemed to be misbranded "if it bears or contains any artificial
flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical preservative, unless it bears labeling stating
that fact, except that to the extent that compliance with the requirements of this
paragraph is impracticable, exemptions shall be established by regulations promul-
gated by the Secretary. The provisions of this paragraph and paragraphs (g) and (i)
with respect to artificial coloring shall not apply in the case of butter, cheese, or ice
cream. The provisions of this paragraph with respect to chemical preservatives shall
not apply to a pesticide chemical when used in or on a raw agricultural commodity
which is the produce of the soil." Id.
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saying it is 'artificial.' " Snapple also claimed that HFCS is a "flavor-
ing" within the meaning of 21 C.F.R. § 101.22, which defines flavor-
ing as "any substance, the function of which is to impart flavor."53
The conclusion Snapple was trying to reach is obvious: if a
plaintiff is essentially arguing that HFCS is "artificial," and if HFCS
is a "flavoring," then the plaintiffs claim would seem to be expressly
preempted because it seeks the imposition of a state-law require-
ment of the type required by 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) (i.e. a requirement
about artificial flavoring) that is not identical to § 343(k). Snapple's
position at least highlights the subtlety of the point at issue, but is its
position correct? Leaving aside for now the issue of whether argu-
ing something is not "natural" is just another of way of arguing it is
"artificial," Snapple's argument that HFCS is a "flavoring" raises a
potentially valid point.
1. Is HFCS a "Flavoring"?
The FDA appears to consider HFCS a "nutritive sweetener,"
which may be distinct from a "flavoring." An examination of the
FDA's specific definition of HFCS, found at 21 C.F.R. § 184.1866,
supports this interpretation. There, HFCS is defined as a "sweet,
nutritive saccharide mixture" which must "conform to the identity
and specifications" listed for HFCS in the Food Chemicals Codex, 4"'
Ed.5 The Food Chemicals Codex, in turn, states that the functional use
of HFCS in foods is as a "nutritive sweetener." By adopting the Food
Chemicals Codex identity of HFCS, the FDA appears to consider
HFCS a "nutritive sweetener."" On the surface, the distinction be-
tween "flavoring" and "nutritive sweetener" may appear to be one
without a difference, but FDA regulations contain many otherwise
common phrases that bear a technical definition within the regula-
tions that is different from their vernacular definition. Such is the
case with the terms "flavoring" and "nutritive sweetener."
52. Brief for Defendant/Appelle Snapple Beverage Corp. at 19, Holk v. Snapple
Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2009) (No. 07-3018); Snapple appeals to 21
C.F.R.
§ 101.22 (2010), which distinguishes "natural flavors" from "artificial flavors," for
support for this argument.
53. 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(a)(1) (2010).
54. 21 C.F.R. § 184.1866(a)-(b) (2009).
55. The FDA website also appears to consider HFCS a sweetener, in a chart that
explains the different functional effects for which ingredients can be added to
foods. Food Ingredients 6f Colors, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
food/foodingredientspackaging/ucm094211.htm (last updated April 2010).
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The technical distinction between these terms is raised in 21
C.F.R. § 170.3(o), where the FDA lists terms that "describe the
physical or technical functional effects for which direct human food
ingredients may be added to foods." Section 170.3(o)(12) defines
"flavoring agents," while § 170.3(o)(21) defines "nutritive sweeten-
ers." These terms are treated as entirely separate technical terms.
But while the terms are treated as entirely separate technical
terms, the two categories are not mutually exclusive, and the precise
effect for which HFCS is added to a food depends in large part on
the manufacturer's intention. According to an FDA representative,
"[t]he properties of HFCS would be compatible with use both as a
nutritive sweetener and as a flavoring, though use as a sweetener is
most common. It is the manufacturer who determines why a sub-
stance is added to food."59
The fact that an ingredient may serve two simultaneous func-
tional effects, combined with the fact that the intended function is
typically determined by the manufacturer, suggests that HFCS could
be considered a "flavoring." However, in most cases the ingredient
labeling requirements established in 21 § C.F.R. 101.4 and § 101.22
do not require an indication of an ingredient's intended use on a
label. The independent and potentially subjective nature of the de-
termination makes a universal declaration of HFCS's functional ef-
56. 21 C.F.R. § 170.3(o) (2009).
57. The FDA is not the only organization to refer to HFCS as a sweetener. The
Corn Refiners Association itself calls HFCS a "corn sweetener." CRA Petitions FDA
for use of "Corn Sugar, " SWEETSURPRISE.COM (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.
sweetsurprise.com/news-and-press/press-releases/corn-sugar-fda-petition. The web-
site sweetsurprise.com, an advocacy site for HFCS, also calls HFCS a sweetener on
its page defining HFCS. What is HFCS? Learn About Sugar, SWEETSURPRISE.COM,
http://sweetsurprise.com/learning-center/what-is-hfcs (last visited Dec. 27, 2010).
Further, in a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court (on an issue unre-
lated to labeling), the primary U.S. manufacturers of HFCS referred to HFCS as
"the primary sweetener in many baked goods and soft drinks. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Dellwood Farms, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1254 (2002) (No.
02-736), 2002 WL 32133638, at *5. Finally, Snapple itself stated that HFCS was a
sweetener in one of its pleadings in the district court Holk case. Reply Memoran-
dum of Law in Further Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First
Amended Class Action Complaint at 33, Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 3:07-
cv-03018, 2007 WL 4677863 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2007).
58. Email from Jeremiah Fasano, Consumer Safety Officer, Food & Drug
Admin., to Josh Ashley, J.D. Candidate 2011, Univ. of Arkansas Sch. of Law (Mar.
17, 2010, 08:06:53 CST) (on file with author).
59. Id. Note that even though HFCS may in particular be both a flavoring and a
sweetener, the FDA has also stated that "[t]he vast majority of flavoring ingredients
used in foods are flavorings only." 56 Fed. Reg. 28,467, 28,599 (June 21, 1991).
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fect very difficult, if not impossible. The plausibility of a claim of
intended effect can vary depending on, inter alia, the quantity used
in the food.0 But even so, most cases would require an examination
of the specific formulation of the food product to determine the
credibility of the intended effect claimed by the manufacturer.6' For
example, with HFCS, a high use level could indicate a nutritive
sweetener function, and a low use level could indicate a flavor func-
tion." Because of the difficulty in determining the functional use in
a specific product, it would be very difficult to refute a manufac-
turer's claimed intended function, and thus a manufacturer could
potentially claim a certain function over another for the purpose of
limiting its liability in a lawsuit. However, the difficulty in determin-
ing HFCS's functional effect as an ingredient does not leave open
the express preemption issue.
2. If HFCS is a Flavoring, is it an Artificial or a Natural Flavoring?
Even assuming HFCS is a "flavoring," it is still not within the
reach of the NLEA express preemption statute. The possibility that
HFCS could be a "flavoring" implicates the distinction between
natural and artificial flavoring raised in 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.22(a)(1)
and 101.22(a)(3). Recall that the express preemption provision be-
ing discussed here applies to artificial, and not natural, flavorings.
In comments to the FDA, the Corn Refiners Association (CRA)
claimed that the production of HFCS involved hydrolysis and enzy-
molysis, and that HFCS thus meets the FDA's definition of "natural
flavor," since it is derived from a vegetable using the prescribed
processes. And at least one news story states that HFCS is pro-
duced by enzymolysis, which seems to buttress the CRA's position."
If HFCS is a "natural flavoring," then the express preemption
provision would not apply. Note, though, that even if HFCS is a
"natural flavoring," this fact would not foreclose the suits at issue
here. Consumers would still be able to argue that HFCS is not natu-
ral for purposes of the state law claims at issue, because a state law
60. Jeremiah Fasano, supra note 58.
6 1. Id.
62. Id.
63. Letter from Corn Refiners Ass'n to the Food and Drug Admin. (Nov. 14,
2006), at 15, available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/06p0094/
06p-0094-c000004-voll.pdf.
64. Jerry DeMarco, Snapple All Natural? Yeah Right, judges Say, EXAMINER.COM
(June 25, 2009), http://www.examiner.com/x-2446-North-Jersey-Crime-Exami-
ner-y2009m6d25-Snapple-all-natural-Yeah-right-judges-say.
2472olo]1
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
definition of what is "natural" may differ from the technical chemi-
cal definition used by the FDA.
But exactly how strictly the FDA construes the language of 21
C.F.R. 101.22(a)(1) and (3) - particularly the phrase "derived from"
- is unclear, and thus it is possible that HFCS might not meet the
definition of a "natural flavoring," in which case it would seem to be
an "artificial flavoring" by default. However, even if HFCS were
considered an "artificial flavoring," the suits at issue here would still
not be expressly preempted because the statute at issue, 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(k), is a narrow disclosure requirement of a type that would
not preclude the present legal claims.
B. 21 U.S. C. § 343(k) Is A Narrow Disclosure Requirement
Even if HFCS is an artificial flavoring, and thus subject to the
strictures of 21 U.S.C. § 343(k), the nature of the plaintiffs' claims
are not implicated by the statute. The function of § 343(k) is to
mandate a certain required disclosure on the labeling of foods that
contain an artificial flavoring. Specifically, the statute states that a
food is deemed to be misbranded "[i]f it bears or contains any artifi-
cial flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical preservative, unless it
bears labeling stating that fact.",6  Based on the plain reading, the
statute requires that if a food contains an artificial flavoring, then
66
the label must disclose that the food contains an artificial flavoring.
Thus, under the plain reading, the disclosure could be as simple as
placing the words "contains artificial flavoring" on the label.
The FDA has codified regulations pertaining to the labeling of
products that contain artificial flavors at 21 C.F.R. § 101.22.67 The
FDA's interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) as revealed in its state-
ments regarding artificial flavors can be accorded considerable
weight because "a major function of § 101.22 is to distinguish be-
tween artificial and natural flavors for purposes of 21 U.S.C. §
343(k)."68 This indicates that the FDA has carefully considered what
is required by § 343(k).
The FDA's interpretation of § 343(k) is revealed by the agency's
paraphrase of 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(3), the express preemption provi-
sion. The FDA interprets that statute as a "requirement that the
65. 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) (2006).
66. This reading is supported by the fact that many food labels include the term
"artificial flavor" in the actual ingredient list.
67. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,467, 28,615 (June 21, 1991).
68. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,467, 28,599 (June 21, 1991).
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label states whether a food contains any artificial flavoring, artificial
coloring, or a chemical preservative that is not identical to the re-
quirements of section [343(k)] of the act.",6 The FDA has also stated
that "[t]he act specifically requires in section [343(k)] that when a
food contains any artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical
preservative, the label must state that fact.""o
A specific example of the language required to disclose the
presence of something within the purview of § 343(k) can be found
in the Federal Register. There, the FDA provides an example of
how a sulfating agent should be disclosed:
"If the sulfating agent is directly incorporated in the food as a
preservative, under section [343(k)], the declaration of the pres-
ence of the sulfating agent must be accompanied by an appro-
priate statement of this fact (e.g., 'With (common or usual name
of sulfating agent), a preservative'; 'Contains _ , a preserva-
tive'; or 'to retard spoilage')."0
From this example, it appears that the function of the ingredi-
ent is what must be disclosed. Following the above model, if one
substituted HFCS for a sulfating agent, the examples of required
disclosures would be as follows: "'With high fructose corn syrup, an
artificial flavoring;' 'Contains high fructose corn syrup, an artificial
flavoring."'
Thus, it appears that 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) is a very narrow disclo-
sure requirement that specifically pertains to the disclosure of the
function of the ingredient in the food. And the functions required
for disclosure are those specifically limited to those listed in
§ 343(k); that is, "artificial flavorings," "artificial colorings," and
"chemical preservatives."
The above analysis of § 343(k) reveals why claims regarding the
use of "natural" on products containing HFCS are not preempted by
§ 343(k). Section 343(k) does not pertain to all label disclosures
involving ingredients that could be considered artificial flavorings.
It merely requires that the presence of an ingredient functioning as
an artificial flavoring be disclosed as serving that function. A "natu-
ral" claim on the label of a food containing HFCS is not a claim as
to the function of HFCS as an artificial flavoring in the food. In the
vast majority of cases, the "natural" claim does not pertain to a fla-
voring function at all. But even if the claim pertains to flavoring in
69. 56 Fed. Reg. 60,045, 60,528 (Nov. 27, 1991).
70. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,467, 28,615 (June 21, 1991).
71. 53 Fed. Reg. 50,911, 51,063 (Dec. 19, 1988).
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the sense of a "natural flavoring," § 343(k) is still not applicable, be-
cause § 343(k) only applies to an "artificial flavoring" functioning as
such. Plaintiffs in HFCS cases are not seeking to impose any re-
quirement regarding the labeling of "artificial flavorings," function-
ing as such, that differs from § 343(k).
Further, the plaintiffs in these HFCS cases are attempting to en-
force state law as to what cannot be placed on the label of a food
containing HFCS. Federal law (via § 343(k)) speaks to what must be
disclosed, and speaks to a narrow disclosure." The only way a claim
as to what cannot be placed on a label could run afoul of § 343(k) is
by requiring that an ingredient used to serve a function listed in
§ 343(k) cannot be labeled in accordance with § 343(k). For in-
stance, if HFCS was used as an artificial flavoring in a food, a state
could not require that the term "artificial flavoring" be absent from
the label. The plaintiffs in these cases are in no way seeking such a
requirement. They are merely alleging that the use of the term
"natural" on products containing HFCS violates state law; and these
claims, however they are argued under state law, have no bearing on
21 U.S.C. § 343(k).
C. Court Decisions On Whether HFCS Claims Are Expressly Preempted
Thus far, only one court has explicitly ruled that HFCS claims
are not expressly preempted based on federal law. 3 The Lockwood
court gave minimal attention to the argument, and perhaps focused
attention on the wrong analytical component of the express pre-
emption argument, by simply noting that the plaintiffs did not allege
that defendant's product (pasta sauce) contained an artificial flavor-
72. The Third Circuit stated its support for this interpretation of 21 U.S.C. §
343(k) in Holk, but did not formally enforce its interpretation, because the express
preemption issue was not properly before the court. In a footnote, the court
stated, "[a]dditionally, § 343(k) is a disclosure requirement - i.e., it regulates only
what companies must place on a label. Holk's claims go to what a company cannot
put on a label for the purposes of commercial marketing, an important distinction."
Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d, 329, 336 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009). Further, a
district court adopted Holk's understanding of the disclosure issue in finding ex-
press preemption where a plaintiff did seek to impose disclosure requirements
different from the NLEA. Turek v. General Mills, Inc., No. 09 C 7038, 2010 WL
3527553, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2010).
73. I say "based on federal law," because the court in Hitt v. Arizona Beverage Co.
held that the plaintiffs claims were not preempted, but this holding was based on
the fact that the defendants did not reference any express preemption provision at
all, even when making their express preemption argument. No. 08-cv809, 2009 WL
449190 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2009).
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ing." Analytically, the issue of whether plaintiffs explicitly alleged
that defendant's pasta sauce contained an artificial flavor is irrele-
vant. The relevant issue is whether HFCS - which defendant's pasta
sauce contained - is an artificial flavoring. If it is, then plaintiffs are
impliedly alleging that defendant's pasta sauce contains an artificial
flavoring. A plaintiff cannot escape preemption merely by carefully
avoiding certain terms of art and obscuring the underlying issue.
Nevertheless, the court arrived at the correct legal conclusion.
The issue of express preemption of HFCS claims was not prop-
erly before the Holk court but, as noted above, Snapple did make
the argument on appeal, and the court made several observations
about the argument in a footnote. The court noted that "the FDA
appears to consider HFCS a sweetener and not a flavoring, and thus
the allegedly troublesome statute, § 343(k), would be inapplicable."7
The court referred to 21 C.F.R. § 184.1866 and the Food Chemicals
Codex to support its view.7 The Holk court also interpreted 21
U.S.C. § 343(k) to be a disclosure requirement, as discussed above.
IV. SAVINGS CLAUSE
The savings clause contained in the NLEA7 reveals that Con-
gress did not intend the act to preempt the state lawsuits at issue
here:
(1) The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 shall not be con-
strued to preempt any provision of State law, unless such provision is
expressly preempted under section [§ 343-1] of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act.
(2) The amendment made by [section 343-1(a)] and the provisions of
[section 343-1(b)] shall not be construed to apply to any requirement re-
specting a statement in the labeling of food that provides for a warning
concerning the safety of the food or component of the food.
(3) The amendment made by subsection (a), the provisions of subsection
(b) and paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection shall not be construed
to affect preemption, express or implied, of any such requirement of a
State or political subdivision, which may arise under the Constitution,
any provision of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act not amended
by subsection (a), any other Federal law, or any Federal regulation, or-
74. Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
75. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 336 (3d Cir. 2009).
76. Id. The court's interpretation of the functional effect of HFCS conflicts with
the position of at least one FDA representative, and highlights the difficulty of the
"function effect" analysis. See supra, section III.A.1.
77. Id.
78. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1.
2010] 251
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
der, or other final agency action reviewable under chapter 7 of title 5,
United States Code."9
Subsection 6(c)(1) directs that the NLEA shall not impliedly pre-
empt state law; the preemption must be express.o Subsection
6(c)(2) directs that the express-preemption provision at section 343-1
does not apply to requirements regarding food safety and compo-
nent warnings. Subsection 6(c)(3) states that subsections 6(c)(1) and
(2) are not to be construed to affect preemption analysis of food
safety and component warnings that arise under any other source of
law. A closer examination of the savings clause supports these con-
clusions.
A. Construction of Subsection 6(c)(1)
First, we must address the exact meaning of subsection 6(c)(1).
The subsection indicates that there can be no preemption based on
the NLEA, except as provided by section 343-1, the express-
preemption provision. This means that practically speaking, no law-
suit based on state law can be impliedly preempted on the basis of
the NLEA."
The way the courts discuss the clause suggests their agreement
with this interpretation. In Holk, a Third Circuit case that consid-
ered whether the plaintiffs state-law labeling claims were impliedly
preempted by the NLEA, the court stated that "courts may not find
implied preemption based on any provision of NLEA."82 The court
also stated that if it were to find implied preemption, it would have
to do so based on federal law other than the NLEA." The way the
court discusses the clause suggests that it takes the first, implied-
preemption-barred, approach to subsection 6(c)(1). In Lockwood v.
Conagra Foods, Inc. a California federal district-court case that also
considered the issue, the court took a slightly stronger stance favor-
ing the approach, noting that the clause "disavows any implied pre-
emption.",4 Finally, in In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, a California
state-court case that considered an unrelated NLEA preemption
79. 21 U.SC. § 343-1 note (2006) (Construction).
80. However, implied conflict preemption may apply even when a savings clause
otherwise bars implied preemption. See supra Section II.
81. Note the possible exception of conflict preemption. Supra note 76.
82. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 336 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis
added).
83. Id.
84. 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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issue, the court interpreted subsection 6(c)(1) to mean that Congress
made clear that the preemptive scope of section 343-1 was to sweep
no further than the plain language of the statute itself."8 5 These
cases seem to point to a single conclusion in favor of the implied-
preemption-barred approach.
There is, however, an even stronger argument to be made for
the implied-preemption-barred approach based on the statutory lan-
guage itself, interpreted in light of comments made on the Senate
floor upon the adoption of the amendment to the NLEA that intro-
duced the savings clause. While there is no specific reference to
the meaning of subsection 6(c)(1) in the legislative history, refer-
ences to the meaning of subsections 6(c)(2) and (3) are analytically
useful. The pertinent comments are from Senator Orrin Hatch, and
can be accorded considerable interpretive weight because he was a
co-sponsor of the amendment itself.87
The argument focuses on how the phrase "shall not be con-
strued" is used in subsections 6(c)(1) through (3). In subsection
6(c)(1), the statutory language is "shall not be construed to pre-
empt."8" In subsection 6(c)(2), the statutory language is "shall not be
construed to apply to any requirement." 8 9 And in subsection 6(c)(3),
the statutory language is "shall not be construed to affect preemp-
tion."'O The bulk of Senator Hatch's comments concern subsections
6(c)(2) and (3), which pertain to state-law warning requirements (as
applied to content-labeling requirements). In his comments, the
Senator stated that the "uniformity section" (section 343-1) "does
not preempt" state-law warning requirements."' Later, he stated that
"the provisions of [the NLEA] may not preempt a State warning re-
quirement."" Thus, if we compare Senator Hatch's comments with
the wording of the underlying text, we will see that he interpreted
subsection 6(c)(2) to completely bar preemption of state warning
requirements based on the NLEA. But his comments also reveal
that he considers subsection 6(c)(3) to potentially allow preemption
of state warning requirements based on sources of law outside the
NLEA. Speaking of subsection 6(c)(3), he noted, "that very same
[state warning] may be preempted by virtue of . .. another statutory
85. 175 P.3d 1170, 1179 (Cal. 2008).
86. 136 CONG. REc. S18056-01 (1990).
87. Id.
88. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006) (emphasis added).
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. 136 CONG. REc. S16607-02 at S16611 (1990).
92. Id. (emphasis added).
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provision. We may apply his comments to the respective underly-
ing phrases as follows:
"shall not be construed to apply to any requirement" = preemption
barred
"shall not be construed to affect preemption"= preemption not barred
If we interpret subsection 6(c)(1) in light of the meaning given
to the other "shall not be construed" phrases, we are led to the con-
clusion that subsection 6(c)(1) is a complete bar to NLEA-based im-
plied preemption. Subsection 6(c)(1) is much closer in form to sub-
section 6(c)(2), which altogether bars NLEA-based implied preemp-
tion, than it is to subsection 6(c)(3), which leaves the door open to
preemption based on other sources of federal law. Subsection
6(c)(1) states that the NLEA "shall not be construed to preempt."
This is very similar to the subsection 6(c)(2) language, "shall not be
construed to apply." Both suggest a complete bar when compared
with subsection 6(c)(3), where the phrase is "shall not be construed
to affect preemption." The addition of the word "affect" leads to a
more restrained approach than that found in subsections 6(c)(1) and
(2). That these phrases are repeated in such close proximity, in such
a short provision, and yet differ slightly as to wording, suggests that
Congress intended for subsections 6(c)(1) and (2) to have a different
meaning than subsection 6(c)(3).
B. Construction of Subsections 6(c)(2)-(3)
Under this construction of subsection 6(c)(1), the NLEA may
not be used to support an implied preemption defense. Some de-
fendants have therefore preferred to argue that their preemption
defenses derive from portions of the FDCA that were not amended
by the NLEA, and thus fall outside the scope of the protections af-
forded by the savings clause.94 These defendants appeal to subsec-
tion 6(c)(3) of the savings clause, which states:
The amendment made by subsection (a), the provisions of subsection (b)
and paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection shall not be construed to
affect preemption, express or implied, of any such requirement of a
State or political subdivision, which may arise under the Constitution,
any provision of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act not amended
by subsection (a), any other Federal law, or any Federal regulation, or-
93. Id.
94. For example, in Lockwood, the defendant based its preemption argument on
FDA "misbranding" regulations. Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d
1028, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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der, or other final agency action reviewable under chapter 7 of title 5,
United States Code.95
They argue on the basis of subsection 6(c)(3) that the limited nature
of preemption in the NLEA and savings clause may not be used to
infer a lack of congressional intent to preempt when the defendants'
preemption arguments arise under other parts of federal law. In
such cases, the argument goes, the NLEA and subsections 6(c)(1)
and (2) may not be used to affect the preemption analysis pertaining
to other federal law.
Thus, the effect of the savings clause on implied preemption
defenses based on portions of federal law other than the NLEA is
also important, and is informed by subsections 6(c)(2) and (3). Sub-
section 6(c)(2) states that 21 U.S.C. §§ 343-1(a) and (b) (the express
preemption provisions) do not apply to food-safety and component-
warning requirements. Subsection 6(c)(3) states that subsections
6(c)(1) and (2) are not to be construed to affect preemption analysis
"of any such requirement" that arises under any other source of law.
Taken together, subsections 6(c)(1) and (2) do not support the de-
fendants' argument.
A plain reading suggests two possible effects of the savings
clause on implied-preemption arguments based on portions of fed-
eral law outside the NLEA. One, the NLEA is barred from having
any effect on preemption analysis at all. This is the broader reading.
Or two, the clause is only barred from having an effect on preemp-
tion analysis pertaining to state-law food-safety and component-
warning requirements. This is the narrower reading. How one in-
terprets subsection 6(c)(3) will dictate which possibility is correct.
Defendants prefer the broader reading because under it, if a
defendant grounds its preemption argument in portions of the
FDCA outside the NLEA, the court cannot use the NLEA or the
savings clause to infer a lack of intent to preempt in the food-and-
beverage-labeling field. For example, in Lockwood v. Conagra Foods,
Inc., the court reasoned that "the existence of a savings clause which
explicitly disavows any implied preemption with certain subject ar-
eas [i.e. those covered by the NLEA] suggests that Congress did not
intend to occupy the field of other related subject areas."96 This kind
of reasoning would be prohibited under possibility one, because
under it, the savings clause in the NLEA cannot be construed to af-
95. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 note (2006).
96. 575 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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fect preemption outside the NLEA in any way. However, Congress
seems to have intended the narrower reading.
The decisive interpretive issue is the meaning of the phrase
"any such requirement" in subsection 6(c)(3). If the phrase refers to
the state-law warning requirements mentioned in subsection 6(c)(2),
then the narrow reading is correct. If the phrase has a more general
meaning, and refers to any state-law requirement that concerns any
of the specified provisions of federal law, then the broader reading
is correct. Senator Hatch's comments on the amendment make it
clear that the phrase refers to the state law warning requirements in
subsection 6(c)(2). Speaking of subsection 6(c)(3), the Senator said:
Specifically, the uniformity amendment has two components. First, it
states that the carefully crafted uniformity section of this legislation is
limited in scope. That section does not preempt or affect a requirement
respecting a statement in the labeling of food that provides for a warn-
ing concerning the safety of a food or a component of a food. An exam-
ple of such a warning would be a statement required under a state law
regarding the possibility of an allergic reaction from a component of a
food. Perhaps more important is the second rule of construction em-
bodied in [subsection 6(c)(3)], which makes it abundantly clear that the
lack of preemption of such warning requirements in the legislation is
not extrapolated, through overzealous statutory interpretation, to imply
that preemption of such warning requirements is somehow affected by
the enactment of limited preemption in this legislation. Specifically, the
amendment provides that the bill" does not affect preemption, express
or implied, of any State or local warning requirement which arises under
the Constitution, any other provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, any other Federal law, or any regulation, order or other
final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act.
In Senator Hatch's own paraphrase of subsection 6(c)(3), he
substitutes the phrase "any State or local warning requirement" for
the phrase "any such requirement," found in the actual amendment.
This substitution indicates that the phrases are equivalent. It should
be noted that Senator Hatch made a statement immediately follow-
ing the one above that leaves open the possibility of his preference
for the broader approach. He said, "[t]he decision of Congress in
this legislation to specifically preempt certain State or local re-
quirements is not evidence, one way or the other, of any Congres-
sional view about the existence of preemption which may arise from
other existing legal authorities or actions."98
But the above statement occurred in the immediate context of
his comments on state-law warning requirements, which suggests
97. 136 CONG. REc. S16607-02 at S16611 (1990) (emphasis added).
98. Id.
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that he had those requirements in mind when he made the state-
ment. And because he said nothing about the type of requirements
outside the NLEA that may sustain a preemption defense, we may
be reasonably confident that he is still speaking within the "state
warning requirements" frame of reference.
Further, this narrower reading is supported by Lockwood.
There, the court noted that a fair reading of the phrase "any such
requirement" in subsection 6(c)(3) is one that interprets the phrase
as referring to the topic of food-safety or component warnings in
subsection 6(c)(2).99 The court did not refer to any legislative his-
tory in making this observation, so we may assume this to be its
plain reading of the clause.
Taken together, these indications from the statute itself and
from the case law and legislative history show that the there is no
implied preemption based on the NLEA, but that the NLEA may be
used to infer a lack of preemption when defendants raise preemp-
tion defenses that arise out of other sources of federal law.
V. IMPLIED FIELD PREEMPTION
A. What is the Field?
Because the claims involving HFCS in products labeled "natu-
ral" are fundamentally about labeling, any implied field preemption
arguments must derive from the field of food and beverage labeling.
Some defendants have preferred to argue that their preemption
defenses derive from portions of the FDCA that were not amended
by the NLEA.'00 However, even these portions involve food and
beverage labeling.
B. Preemption Defenses Under the NLEA
As noted above, defendants in HFCS litigation have preferred
to ground their preemption arguments in portions of the FDCA not
amended by the NLEA.'0 ' The reason should be obvious based on
99. Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
100. See supra, note 94.
101. Defendants' primary way of arguing that plaintiffs' claims fall outside the
scope of the NLEA is to argue that the claims are basically misbranding claims un-
der the FDCA. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 337 (3d Cir. 2009);
Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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the analysis of the savings clause above: the NLEA savings clause,
§ 6(c)(1), bars implied preemption based on claims arising under the
NLEA. However, claims involving the use of "natural" on products
containing HFCS do fall within the NLEA, and therefore are not
preempted unless expressly preempted by 21 U.S.C. § 343-1, or
through conflict preemption.
The FDA policy on the use of the term "natural" is a central
part of the analysis of claims involving the term's use on products
containing HFCS. This being the case, the law under which the
FDA has undertaken the development of its position on the use of
the term "natural" should be given great weight in determining
whether the claims alleged fall under the NLEA or portions of the
FDCA outside the NLEA.
The Lockwood court recognized this argument, and its import,
and came to the following conclusion:
[W]hen the FDA considered whether to adopt formal regulations defin-
ing the use of the term 'natural' on food labels it did so pursuant to the
NLEA amendments to the FDCA - not the FDCA provisions left un-
touched by the NLEA. See 58 F.R. 2302-1 (1993) ("This action is part of
the food labeling initiative of the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices (the Secretary) and in response to the Nutrition Labeling and Edu-
cation Act of 1990 (the 1990 amendments)."). In other words, if the
FDA were to adopt formal regulations defining the use of 'natural' on a
food label, it would do so pursuant to the NLEA - the very act that un-
ambiguously provides that there is no preemption of state laws except as
expressly provided.o2
Thus, there is a strong argument that the claims involving the use of
the term "natural" do arise under the NLEA, because the FDA's pol-
icy on the term has been developed under the NLEA. If this argu-
ment is correct, then the claims are not subject to implied field pre-
emption, and cannot be, because of the savings clause.
C. Preemption Defenses Under the FDCA Generally
Though there is a strong case to be made that claims involving
the use of the term "natural" on labels fall within the NLEA and
therefore cannot be impliedly preempted, even if the claims fall out-
side the NLEA, they are still not impliedly preempted based on FDA
regulation in the food-and-beverage labeling field. As noted above,
because regulation of health and safety issues generally, and food
and beverage labeling in particular, have traditionally been areas of
102. Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
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state regulation, Congressional intent to supersede state law in the
field must be "clear and manifest."03 Contrary to being clearly and
manifestly intended to supersede state law in the food-and-beverage
labeling field, Congressional activity and FDA regulation strongly
appear to envision and permit simultaneous state law in the field.
1. Inference Drawn from Express Preemption Provision
The first and primary indicator of Congressional intent to allow
for state regulation in the food-and-beverage labeling field is the
NLEA express savings clause. The NLEA is part of the FDCA's food
and beverage labeling provisions. Therefore, we may infer Congres-
sional intent as to the field by looking at the NLFA itself.10 4
The Supreme Court has noted that "an express definition of the
pre-emptive reach of a statute 'implies' - i.e., supports a reasonable
inference - that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other mat-
ters."' 5 The express preemption clause at 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 is just
such an express definition of preemptive reach. And while the
Court has also noted that an express definition of preemptive reach
"does not mean that the express clause entirely forecloses any possi-
bility of implied pre-emption," the inference, combined with other
sources of Congressional intent, suggests that Congress did not in-
tend to preempt state-law claims of the type at issue here.'r
The reasoning behind the non-preemption inference drawn
from express preemption clauses was summarized by the Holk court
in a paraphrase of the plaintiffs argument: "[the plaintiff] reasons
that the limited nature of the express preemption provision in
NLEA, which applies only to those federal laws specifically enumer-
ated, 'would serve no purpose and would simply be surplus if Con-
gress had intended to occupy the entire field of food and beverage
labeling.""' The idea, which the plaintiff argued correctly, is that if
the field of food and beverage labeling were already dominated by a
pervasive scheme of federal regulation that left no room for state
103. English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); Holk v. Snapple Bev-
erage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 334 (3d Cir. 2009).
104. Recall that, as shown above, the express savings clause in the NLEA fore-
closes consideration of the NLEA only as to preemption of warning requirements
that arise under other sources of law. Because warning requirements are not the
subject of the current analysis, the NLEA may be considered in analyzing the pre-
emption of the labeling claims at issue here.
105. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995).
106. Id.
107. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d. 329, 337 (3d Cir. 2009).
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regulation, a limited express-preemption provision would be unnec-
essary, because every state law requirement in the field would already
be preempted.
The California Supreme Court, in In re Farm Raised Salmon
Cases, advanced another persuasive argument for inferring the lack
of implied preemption based on the express preemption statute.
The court said:
Various provisions of the FDCA clearly demonstrate that "Congress
knows how to write a preemption clause" when it wants to (Consumer
justice, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 749) and that
"the [FDCA] evidences, far from implied preemption, an instance of
implied non preemption." (Id. at p. 1063, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 749.) Con-
gress enacted numerous specific express preemption provisions in the
FDCA. (See, e.g., §§ 360k (medical devices), 360ss (radiation emissions),
379r (nonprescription drugs), 379s (cosmetics).) The inference to be
drawn from these provisions is that Congress, in light of the history of
dual state-federal cooperation in this area, did not intend to limit states'
options in a broad fashion. Indeed, the preemption provision at issue
here, section 343-1, demonstrates Congress's care in deciding what to
preempt and what to allow. Section 343-1 is notable both for the num-
ber of misbranding provisions it deals with (approximately 20) and for
the detailed nature of its preemptive scope. The language of section 343-
1 and the NLEA's express preemption provision is further evidence that
Congress chose carefully the manner with which it preempted certain
state labeling laws."
2. Other Expressions of Congressional Intent
There is also ample evidence that Congress was well aware of
the existence of the regulatory roles played by the states prior to the
enactment of the NLEA, and that Congress intended to preserve
those roles while enacting the NLEA. The sponsor of Amendment
3125 (discussed above), Senator George Mitchell, commented on
the balancing of state and federal roles sought in the NLEA. The
Senator noted that "[i]t is also important that [the NLEA], which
requires nationally uniform nutritional labeling, is sensitive to the
regulatory roles played by the States. This bill has been refined to
provide national uniformity where it is most necessary, while other-
wise preserving State regulatory authority where it is appropriate.,"'09
This statement suggests exactly the type of tension the Supreme
Court was concerned about when it said "[t]he case for federal pre-
emption is particularly weak where Congress has indicated its
108. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170 (Cal. 2008).
109. 136 CONG. REc. S16607-02, 16609 (1990).
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awareness of the operation of state law in fields of federal interest,
and has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and to toler-
ate whatever tension there [is] between them.""o
VI. CONFLICT PREEMPTION
Claims regarding the use of HFCS in products labeled "natural"
are not preempted by implied conflict preemption. They are not
preempted due to the impossibility of compliance with state and
federal requirements, and they are not preempted by raising an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment of the purposes of Congress.
A. Impossibility
The claims in question are not preempted due to the impossi-
bility of dual compliance because, as the Lockwood court noted, "[a]
manufacturer could comply, that is, not violate the FDA's policy as
to use of the term 'natural' and still comply with state law as articu-
lated by plaintiffs in this case."' The claims being brought basically
allege that, under state law, products containing HFCS should not
be labeled "natural," because HFCS is not natural. Manufacturer
defendants can physically comply with the requirements of state law,
as alleged, and FDA policy. Because the state law requirements al-
leged by the plaintiffs in HFCS cases are arguably more restrictive
than the FDA's policy on "natural," defendants' compliance with the
state law requirements would pose no conflict to their compliance
with the less restrictive FDA policy. Further, in the Holk appellate
case, Snapple did not even raise impossibility of dual compliance as
a conflict preemption defense."'
B. Obstacle
Nor are the claims in question preempted because the state law
requirements they seek to enforce stand as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment of the objectives of Congress. The purpose and ob-
110. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 489 U.S. 141, 166-167 (1989). However, food and bever-
age labeling is not necessarily a "field of federal interest," given the historic food
safety regulatory roles played by the states.
111. Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1034 (N.D. Cal
2009).
112. Brief for Defendant/Appellee Snapple Beverage Corp., Holk v. Snapple
Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2009) (No. 08-3060), 2009 WL 383336.
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jectives of Congress regarding the use of "natural" may be discerned
though the FDA's regulation of the use of the term, because of the
authority delegated to the FDA by Congress. Thus, to determine
whether any state law requirements alleged by the plaintiffs pose an
obstacle to Congressional purpose, one must determine whether the
FDA's regulation of the use of "natural" evidences any particular
purpose that is entitled to preemptive effect. This purpose, if it ex-
ists, must be manifested in law. As one court noted, "it is federal
law which preempts contrary state law; nothing short of federal law
can have that effect.""' The reasoning behind this idea is that if
there is no federal purpose, there is nothing with which state law
can conflict, and thus no conflict preemption. To this end, the FDA
has noted that "[i]f there is no applicable Federal requirement that
has been given preemptive effect by Congress, there is no compet-
ing claim of jurisdiction, and, therefore, no basis under [the NLEA]
for Federal preemption."' 14
Various courts have rightly determined that the FDA has not
evidenced such a preemptive purpose through law. The Holk court
put it thus: "[T]here is no conflict preemption in this case because
there is no FDA policy with which state law could conflict.""
In determining whether a federal pronouncement is entitled to
preemptive effect, courts focus on the process by which the decision
is arrived at. For example, in a Third Circuit case, the court de-
clined to "afford preemptive effect to less formal measures lacking
the 'fairness and deliberation' which would suggest that Congress
intended the agency's action to be a binding and exclusive applica-
tion of federal law."" 6 That court also said that "[c]ourts with good
reason are wary of affording preemptive force to actions taken un-
der more informal circumstances.""'7 This reflects a desire to limit
preemption to those instances in which Article VI of the Constitu-
tion truly applies; that is, where it is really the "supreme law of the
land" that is doing the preempting. But it also reflects a policy de-
sire. Thus, the Third Circuit noted:
Regularity of procedure - whether it be the rulemaking and adjudicatory
procedures of the APA or others which Congress may provide for a par-
113. Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008) (em-
phasis original).
114. 56 Fed. Reg. 60,528, 60,530 (Nov. 27, 1991).
115. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 342 (3d Cir. 2009).
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ticular purpose - not only ensures that state law will be preempted only
by federal 'law,' as the Supremacy Clause provides, but also imposes a
degree of accountability on decisions which will have the profound ef-
fect of displacing state laws, and affords some protection to the states
that will have their laws displaced and to citizens who may hold rights or
expectations under those laws."'
The FDA has not issued any policy statements on the use of
"natural" that meet the standards outlined above. The FDA does
not have a formal policy on the use of the term "natural." When the
FDA referenced its policy in a Federal Register statement in 1991,
the FDA referred to the policy as "informal.""" In the same Register
statement, the FDA said that the use of the term on labels was "of
considerable interest to consumers and industry," and noted that it
was considering establishing a definition for the term.o20 In fact, the
FDA stated that if an adequate definition of the term were estab-
lished, "the ambiguity surrounding use of the term that results in
misleading claims could be abated."'2' This shows that the FDA was
aware of the precise problem raised by the litigants in HFCS cases
today. And yet, even though the FDA recognized this problem, it
"decided not to define the term."' 2 Further, the FDA recently de-
nied a specific request by several federal district court judges to de-
termine whether HFCS qualifies as "natural."'23 Recognizing the
problem resulting from the lack of a definition of "natural" and con-
sciously abstaining from a rulemaking regarding the term suggests
that the FDA, and therefore Congress, does not have the "purpose"
to regulate the term's use. 2 1
118. Id.
119. 56 Fed. Reg. 60,421, 60,466 (Nov. 27, 1991).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2397 (Jan. 6, 1993).
123. See, e.g., Coyle v. Hornell Brewing Co., No. 08-2797 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2010)
(order dissolving temporary stay) (the letter from the FDA denying the judge's re-
quest is attached to the order).
124. Nor does the absence of regulation evince a Congressional purpose. The
Supreme Court, in Spietsma v. Mercury Marine, noted that mere absence of regula-
tion cannot be given preemptive weight as an agency's determination not to regu-
late, without an "'authoritative' message" that the absence is intended as such. The
Court said "although the Coast Guard's decision not to require propeller guards
was undoubtedly intentional and carefully considered, it does not convey an "au-
thoritative" message of a federal policy against propeller guards." Sprietsma v.
Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 67 (2002). This is parallel to the FDA's actions here.
The FDA's decision not to define "natural" was carefully considered, but it does not
convey an authoritative message of a federal policy against any definition of the
term, as evidenced by the very existence of an informal policy. Id.
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Nor does the informal policy on "natural" sustain preemptive
authority based on a fair process analysis. The Holk court rightly
pointed out that the fact that the FDA requested comments on the
term's use "in reaching a decision on any future FDA course of ac-
tion" implies that the agency's informal policy pre-dated a request
for notice and comment. 2  And, noted the Holk court, "[b]ecause a
search of the Federal Register results in neither earlier references to
this policy nor other requests for comments on the use of the term
'natural,' the record demonstrates that the FDA arrived at its policy
without the benefit of public input.",26 This suggests that the FDA's
current informal policy was arrived at in a way that falls far short of
the requisite "fairness and deliberation" that courts have looked for
in other preemption contexts.
Further, the FDA did not respond to all of the comments it re-
ceived. The agency noted one comment that it considered "moot"
in light of its decision not to define the term.'2 7 And even after dis-
cussing several comments, the agency said that "there are many fac-
ets of this issue that the agency will have to consider if it undertakes
a rulemaking to define the term." 2 ' This illustrates an incomplete
consideration of all the facets of the issue, and an admission that the
agency will have additional issues to consider before making a final
rule. Again, as Holk recognized, all of these facts indicate a lack of
the "fairness and deliberation" required for the FDA policy to have
preemptive effect.
Finally, an agency letter authored by the FDA proclaiming
HFCS to be "natural" is not entitled to preemptive effect. In April
2008, FoodNavigator-USA.com published an article that quoted an
FDA representative as saying HFCS would not comply with the
agency's policy on "natural."'29 Then on July 3, 2008, the same FDA
representative said, in a letter to the Corn Refiners Association, that
the FDA would consider HFCS to meet the agency's policy on "natu-
125. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 341; 56 Fed. Reg. 60,045,
60,467 (Nov. 27, 1991).
126. Id.
127. 58 Fed. Reg. 2125, 2397 (Jan. 22 1991).
128. 58 Fed. Reg. 467, 2407 (an. 6, 1993) (emphasis added).
129. Laura Crowley, HFCS is Natura Says FDA in a Letter, FOOD NAVIGATOR-USA
(July 8, 2008), http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Financial-Industry/HFCS-is-
natural-says-FDA-in-a-letter.
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ral," depending on how the HFCS is made. 30 However, this letter
cannot be accorded preemptive weight. 3'
The court in Fellner stated, "we have found no case in which a
letter that was not the product of some form of agency proceeding
and did not purport to impose new legal obligations on anyone was
held to create federal law capable of preemption."132 The letter does
not even appear to constitute an advisory opinion, which itself may
not operate as a legal requirement.33
VII. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the legal merits of state-law claims that HFCS is
not "natural," the claims themselves are not preempted by federal
law. Even without applying the presumption against preemption,
the claims are neither expressly nor impliedly preempted. Applying
the presumption, the lack of preemption is even clearer. However,
there are serious problems with the current regulatory structure that
should be addressed.
If the FDA is going to claim control over food-and-beverage la-
beling standards, the agency should create a more objective method
for determining the functional effect for which ingredients are
added to foods and beverages. The opacity of this determination
regarding HFCS is not unique to that particular ingredient. The
vast implications for litigation portended by 21 U.S.C. § 343(k), and
thus the importance of distinctions regarding the functional effects
of ingredients, are enough reason to undergo a rulemaking to de-
velop a more objective and predictable method of distinction. Con-
sumers should not be forced to hire a food chemist or commence
litigation in order to determine the functional effect of an ingredi-
ent.
However, the FDA has illustrated its inability to serve the inter-
est of consumers and manufacturers on the "functional effect" issue,
and labeling issues more broadly. A better approach would be to
leave all labeling requirements up to the states via consumer fraud
litigation. That way, consumers would be their own judges regard-
130. Letter from the Food and Drug Admin. to Corn Refiners Ass'n (July 3,
2008), available at http-//www.corn.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/FDAdec-
ision7-7-08.pdf (emphasis added).
131. Apart from any other legal consideration, the fact that the agency's view is so
vacillating weighs against according either of these letters authoritative weight.
132. Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
133. 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(j) (2010).
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ing what their interests in labeling are, and how to protect them,
through the courts and the jury system. This would result in a more
efficient use of economic and bureaucratic resources, and more ac-
curately reflect the issues that consumers are concerned with, rather
than forcing consumers and industry to expend exorbitant sums
merely to address the regulatory hurdles that encumber litigation in
the current system, on top of the costs of litigating the underlying
issues. Federal encroachment on the states' police powers in the
labeling field has left confusion and stagnation in its wake. The fed-
eral leviathan has certainly bitten off more than it can chew. But,
unfortunately, when it comes to the issue of "natural" labeling
claims, it is the consumer who is choking.
Public interest in "natural" claims and HFCS shows no sign of
abating anytime soon. The current regulatory structure, while not
preemptive as to the state-law claims examined in this comment,
should be clarified, if not abolished. The right changes will restore
consumer confidence in food and beverage labeling by creating
greater clarity and simplifying civil legal enforcement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Isolated food safety crises are not uncommon occurrences in
the United States. Indeed, the history of public scares indicates a
pattern of deficiencies in the safety of the American food supply. In
the early 20th century, the public learned of the squalid conditions
of meatpacking facilities through muckraking publications such as
Upton Sinclair's The jungle.' In the 1980s, a 60 Minutes report
documented research finding carcinogenic properties of a wide-
spread pesticide, traces of which were commonly found in apple-
based products. In the 1990s, widespread media reports of beef
tainted with E. coli' led to both product recalls unprecedented in
scope and massive sales losses in the beef and fast-food industries.'
* J.D. Candidate, May 2011, University of Wisconsin Law School. The author
wishes to thank Professor Stephanie Tai for her helpful comments and suggestions
in preparing this article.
1. UroN SINCLAIR, THEJUNGLE (Signet Classics ed. 1998) (1906).
2. Daminozide, commonly known as Alar, is a chemical used to enhance apples
during the 1970s and 80s. In the late 1980s, research had shown a correlation be-
tween Alar exposure and tumor development in animals. In response, consumer
groups called for the ban of Alar use on crops, which the EPA implemented. Since
then, further research has indicated that the minimum administration amount of
Alar before expressing carcinogenic properties is far higher than normal human
consumption. Today, the ordeal of the late 1980s is commonly referred to as the
"Alar scare." See Environmental Working Group, Myth of Alar Scare Persists,
ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP (Feb. 1, 1999), http://www.ewg.org/book/
export/htmV8004.
3. The E. coli 0157:H7 strain of bacteria is one of the most formidable patho-
gens responsible for severe foodborne illness. An E. coli 0157 bacterium produces
verotoxin and shiga-like toxins, damaging the host's intestinal lining and causing
severe, "grossly bloody" diarrhea. See Foodborne Pathogenic Microorganisms and Natu-
ral Toxins Handbook: Escherichia coli 0157:H7, FDA.Gov, http://www.fda.gov/Food/
FoodSafety/Foodbornellless/FoodbornelllnessFoodbornePathogensNaturalToxins/
BadBugBook/ucm07 1284.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). Although infection
from E. coli 0157 is uncommon, the bacterium is most lethal to young children
(who may develop hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS), causing kidney failure) and
the elderly (who suffer a mortality rate as high as 50% from 0157 infection). Id.
4. Two incidents marred the beef industry through the 1990s. First, in 1993,
several deaths were attributed to consumption of contaminated beef from the fast-
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In this decade, fresh produce has been the source of one of the
largest outbreaks of foodborne illness in American history.' But
perhaps the most noteworthy distinguishing factor between each of
these incidents has been the relative amount of top-down regula-
tions imposed immediately after the resulting scare. Not coinciden-
tally, federal legislation requiring agency inspection of all meat
products passed in the same year as The Jungle was published.' In
1989, the EPA banned the use of the Alar pesticide.! Federal
and/or state regulation, therefore, has become accepted as a stan-
dard part of day-to-day operations for the majority of agricultural
industries.'
On the other hand, the fresh produce industry has seemingly
rested in an isolated bubble, untouched by agency hands.! This ab-
sence of a true regulatory framework has perhaps been most pro-
nounced in the leafy produce industry - one of the largest and fast-
est growing produce sectors, including cultivation of spinach, let-
tuce, and cabbage.'o Before 2006, no mandates were imposed on
food chain Jack in the Box Jack in the Box E. coli Outbreak - Western States,
MARLERCLARK.COM., http://www.marlerclark.com/case-news/view/jack-in-the-box-
e-coli-outbreak-western-states (last visited Sept. 20, 2010). Second, in 1997, the
Hudson Foods Company recalled over 25 million pounds of ground beef (much of
which had been sold to the fast-food chain Burger King), amounting to the largest
food recall in U.S. history. See Press Release, USDA, USDA Announces Recall of
Additional Hudson Frozen Ground Beef (Aug. 15, 1997), available at
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/08/0276; See also Dana Canedy, Busi-
nesses Remove Beef and Assure Customers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997,
http://www.nytimes.com/ 1997/08/22/us/businesses-remove-beef-and-assure-
customers.html.
5. See Carl Nagin, How Safe Is Your Salad?, San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 16,
2007, http://articles.sfgate.com/2007-12-16/living/17272757_1 natural-selection-
foods-coliout break-0157-h7.
6. See Meat Inspection Act of 1906, ch. 3913, 34 Stat. 674 (1906) (discussed in
Part IIB, infra).
7. See Environmental Working Group, supra note 2.
8. See, e.g., Meat Inspection Act, supra note 6 (requiring inspection of all meat
products); Poultry Products Inspection Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441
(requiring inspection of all domesticated fowl intended for human consumption);
Egg Products Inspection Act, 7 C.F.R. § 57 (2010) (requiring federal inspection of
all eggs sold in interstate commerce and intended for human consumption); Haz-
ard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems, 21 CFR § 120 (2010)
(requiring juice processor compliance with HACCP (discussed infra) regulations).
9. See infra notes 25-26.
10. See Food Safety: Special Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Agriculture, Rural Devel-
opment, Food and Drug Administration and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appro-
priations, 110th Cong. 35 (2007) (statement of Andrew C. von Eschenbach, Com-
missioner of Food and Drug Administation, Department of Health and Human
Services) ("In the past decade, fresh produce consumption has increased, and fresh-
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growers in following baseline quality-control standards." Growers'
interest groups controlled the dictation of which agricultural prac-
tices furthered food safety. 2 Then, the E. coli outbreak in 2006,"
linked to contaminated spinach crops, received ubiquitous media
exposure. Sales of the once blossoming leaf plummeted." Restau-
rants reported large losses? Grocers and supermarkets were forced
to pull substantial stocks from their shelves. Industry actors, per-
haps realizing that another such outbreak could spell economic dis-
aster for the entire industry, yet wanting to avoid top-down govern-
mental regulation, took the lead in crafting a private, contractual
marketing plan to spur better agricultural practices." The arrange-
ment, known as the Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement, has been
both hailed as a model of regulatory cooperation between industry
and state, and sharply criticized as an inadequate safeguard for food
safety. The former position, it seems, has become dominant, as
cut produce represents a particularly fast-growing segment of the fresh produce
market."). Revenue from spinach and lettuce sales alone totaled nearly two billion
dollars in 2004. Matthew Kohnke, Reeling in a Rogue Industry: Lethal E Coli in Cali-
fornia's Leafy Green Produce & the Regulatory Response, 12 Drake J. Agric. L. 493, 495
(2007).
11. See infra notes 25-26.
12. See infra notes 27, 29.
13. The E. coli 0157:H7 strain (discussed at supra note 3) was implicated as the
culprit pathogen responsible for the illnesses and fatalities caused by the outbreak.
See Nagin, supra note 5 ("[A] rare and particularly virulent strain of Escherichia coli
0157:H7 sickened more than 200 people across North America, hospitalizing half
of them, some with severe kidney damage, and killing two elderly women and a
child.").
14. See infra note 55.
15. See, e.g., Michael Y. Park, E. Coli Outbreak Hurts Spinach Farming Industry,
Restaurants, Fox News, Sept. 22, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,
215257,00.html ("The spinach scare has been devastating to restauranteurs like
Nancy Horn, of Reno, Nev. Her 38-seat restaurant... specializes in vegetarian op-
tions, and includes spinach on several of its sandwiches. Since the outbreak, busi-
ness is down on the restaurant side: Her average daily sales of $1,000 have declined
between $250 and $350, and her catering business has seen 'a huge drop"'); see also
Julie Schmit, Spinach Producers Take Financial Hit, USA Today, Sept. 19, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2006-09-19-spinach-usat-x.htm.
16. See Press Release, FDA, FDA Statement on Foodborne E. coli 0157:H7 Out-
break in Spinach (Oct. 4, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucml08757.htm..
17. See Kohnke, supra note 10, at 508 ("With [Governor Schwarzenegger's] veto
hanging in the balance, it was up to Western Growers to prove that its industry-run
program was better than a traditional, government-based food safety framework.").
18. The most vocal critics tend to be consumer advocacy organizations. See, e.g.,
Testimony of Patty Lovera, Food & Water Watch, Before USDA Leafy Greens Mar-
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federal agencies are currently considering instituting a nationwide
version of California's Agreement." Because of the apparent
trendiness of this cooperative regulatory model, discussion of the
desirability and effectiveness of such strategies is all the more im-
portant.
Focusing on the victory of the Leafy Greens Marketing Agree-
ment in California for the purposes of improving food safety, this
paper examines the responses primarily by state and regional indus-
try actors, and provides a critical assessment of the relatively hands-
off approach settled upon. The California leafy produce" industry is
an ideal subject to focus analysis for several reasons. First, leafy
produce was implicated in the 2006 outbreak, and is a sector of the
produce industry in which consumer concern is high." Second,
leafy produce is one of the fastest growing produce sectors, making
it an industry in which improvement of food safety is critical for
continued growth." Finally, the leafy produce industry is largely
keting Agreement Hearing, Sept. 22-24, 2009, available at
http://www.nationalorganiccoalition.org/Loveratestimony.pdf.
19. The federal proposal is called the "National Leafy Greens Marketing Agree-
ment" (NLGMA). See Cary Blake, Leafy Green Growers Voice NLGMA Support, West-
ern Farm Press, Nov. 16, 2009, at 10.
20. For the purposes of this paper, I shall adopt the definition of the term "leafy
produce" as stated in the LGMA:
"'Leafy Green Products' means iceberg lettuce, romaine lettuce, green leaf
lettuce, red leaf lettuce, butter lettuce, baby leaf lettuce (i.e., immature let-
tuce or leafy greens), escarole, endive, spring mix, spinach, cabbage, kale,
arugula and chard."
CAL. DEP'T OF FOOD AND AGRIC., CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREEN PRODUCTS HANDLER
MARKETING AGREEMENT (Mar. 5, 2008), available at http://www.caleafygreens.
ca.gov/members/documents/LGMAmarketingagreement03.08_000.pdf.
21. See Carlos Arnade, Linda Calvin, & Fred Kuchler, Consumers' Response to the
2006 Foodborne Illness Outbreak Linked to Spinach, Amber Waves, Mar. 2010, available
at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/Marchl0/Features/OutbreakSpinach.htm
(finding that sales of bagged spinach is still some $2-4 million less than would be
predicted without the initial food safety shock in 2006, and that consumers "rapidly
responded" to the FDA's warnings); Press Release, Harris Interactive, Consumer
Concern Over Product Recalls High (June 12, 2007), available at
http-//www.harrisinteractive.com/vaul/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Cisis-Food-
Recalls-2007-06.pdf (noting that nearly 85% of those polled were "familiar" with the
2006 spinach E. coli outbreak and that 86% expressed food safety concerns).
22. See California's Top 10 Commodities for 2002-03, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/economy/agtoplO.html (last visisted Sept.
15, 2010) (noting that lettuce (a leafy vegetable) was the most purchased produce
crop, only behind grapes).
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concentrated in California, making the interplay of state and indus-
try actors and the public easier to analyze."
Discussion of these topics will proceed in five parts. Part II of
this paper will examine the history and food safety track record of
the leafy produce industry before the watershed 2006 E. coli out-
break. Part III will detail the background of the outbreak, noting
the investigative activity and findings by federal and state agencies.
Part IV will analyze the responses proposed by state legislators and
industry actors. Specifically, this section will focus upon a compari-
son between a state-driven regulatory proposal essentially subjecting
leafy produce to top-down scrutiny similar to that found in the meat
or dairy industries, and an industry-driven proposal using consumer
demand as a motivating force to compel grower firms to implement
effective food safety mechanisms.
Part V will critically assess the proposal eventually adopted, the
Leafy Greens Marketing (LGMA), noting its strengths, peculiarities,
systemic problems, and, most importantly, its potential ineffective-
ness in improving food safety in leafy produce. This part notes that
the advantages of the LGMA are that it presents a low-cost, quick,
and seemingly cooperative method between industry and govern-
ment to improve food safety in the short term, and that it has
achieved widespread participation by individual growers and proces-
sors. However, these benefits are offset by mostly prospective defi-
ciencies in the terms of the Agreement which 1) actually make the
effort more industry-driven than cooperative, 2) vest standard-
making power disparately with larger firms, ignoring consideration
of the ability of smaller, less economically capable farms to comply
with guidelines, 3) do not bind participants to stay in the Agreement
and 4) do not provide sufficiently severe penalties for non-
compliance.
Finally, mindful of Part V's analysis, Part VI will propose solu-
tions for improving leafy produce food safety in the future. This
paper concludes that while the LGMA presents several concerns in
its overall ability to improve food safety, the Agreement can address
these deficiencies by slightly tweaking its structure and terms, while
23. See CAL. DEP'T OF FOOD AND AGRIC., CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL RESOURCE
DIRECTORY 2008-09 (2003), available at www.cdfa.ca.gov/statistics/files/CDFA
Secl.pdf (noting that 75% of the nation's leafy green produce is grown in Califor-
nia).
24. For further reading of the responses and rhetoric of state and industry actors
in the formation of the LGMA, see generally Kohnke, supra note 10 (providing a




still retaining its low-cost advantages. Thus, a modified LGMA may
be a viable type of regulatory scheme effective in enhancing food
safety not merely for leafy produce, but in many other agricultural
industries.
II. VOLUNTARY REGULATIONS IN LEAFY PRODUCE
A. Background of Production Directives
Historically, the leafy produce industry has been essentially a
self-regulated industry." Not one mandatory regulation (regulation
with which compliance is compulsory) had been imposed specifically
on growers." Instead, the primary "regulations" to control micro-
bial contamination of produce have come in the form of voluntary
guidance documents." These documents, usually compiled by pro-
ducer associations and interest groups, detail minimum quality con-
trol guidelines, known as Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs)." For
instance, guidance documents released in California by Western
Growers Association (WGA) and the International Fresh-Cut Pro-
duce Association (IFPA) set guidelines on the production of leafy
green crops, providing suggestions for proper irrigation and soil
25. See, e.g., Testimony of Caroline Smith DeWaal, Director of Food Safety for
the Center for Science in the Public Interest Before the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, July 29, 2009, available at
http://cspinet.org/new/pdf /house-govt oversight -leafy-green-testimony_-
july_09.pdf (noting that "domestic produce [emphasizing leafy produce] is largely
unregulated"). See also Marian Burros, E. Coli Fears Inspire a Call for Oversight, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 9, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/09/nyregion/
09produce.html?ex-1323320400&en=f6e8c8dcb68ba228&ei=5088&partner-rssnyt&
emc=rss (noting that prior to the outbreak, governmental regulation did not exist
within the leafy produce industry). But see CAL. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH: FOOD AND
DRUG BRANCH, FACILrIY INSPECTIONS, available at http://www.cdph.ca.gov/
pubsforms/Guidelines/Documents/fdb%20Facil%20Inspect.pdf (noting that Cali-
fornia imposes mandatory facility inspections for food processors, enforcing regula-
tions contained in Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) documents).
26. See Kohnke, supra note 10, at 502 ("growers, processors, and shippers of
fresh produce have successfully avoided food safety regulations on both the state
and federal levels").
27. See FDA Actions Regarding Produce Safety, PRODUCE SAFETY PROJECT,
http://www.producesafetyproject.org/admin/fact-sheets/files/0006.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2010).
28. See id.; see also NAT'L WATERMELON Ass'N, VOLUNTARY FOOD SAFETY
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amendment practices, harvesting techniques, and handling proce-
dures.2 ' Because most leafy produce is grown in California, federal
agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration often examined
these regional industry-created documents with a degree of defer-
ence, incorporating them into its own guidance documents for pro-
ducers across the country.'
In terms of comprehensiveness, guidance documents are suc-
cessful at covering all relevant stages of the production process, and
in suggesting techniques that are scientifically effective methods to
curtail pathogen contamination." However, the greatest flaw of
guidance documents is suggested within its name: these documents
are merely advisory and have no mandatory regulatory force. In
29. See, e.g. INT'L FRESH-CUT PRODUCE Ass'N ET AL., COMMODITY SPECIFIC FOOD
SAFETY GUIDELINES FOR THE LETITUCE AND LEAFY GREENS SUPPLY CHAIN (1st ed.
2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodSafety/Product-
Specificlnformation/FruitsVegetablesJuices/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnfor-
mation/UCM169008.pdf [hereinafter IFPA GUIDELINES]. Guidance document GAP
guidelines are usually separated into three categories. First, Production and Har-
vesting Unit Operation guidelines suggest minimum standards of irrigation water
quality, soil and soil amendment quality, irrigation practices, and harvesting ma-
chine quality. Examples of such guidelines are procedures for maintaining an iso-
lated clean water supply for irrigation (such as use of a water supply which is fumi-
gated or solarized before used for irrigation), or the appropriate type of irrigation
method (such as dripping versus overhead sprinkling) based on the type of crop
and the environmental setting of the facility. Other guidelines set standards for soil
suitability, such as proper composting procedures to minimize the risk of pathogen
survival. The second category of guidelines, Postharvest Unit Operations, suggest
standards during the postharvest cooling of produce. Cooling apparatuses may
become contaminated if contact is made with tainted produce, soil, water, or hands.
These guidelines reiterate many Production and Harvesting guidelines, and suggest
further handling techniques. The third category of guidelines, Value Added and
Distribution Unit Operations, suggest standards for distribution preparation, trans-
portation, and in-house final processing of produce. Id. A final global category of
operations suggested general, year-round practices to avoid crop contamination,
such as strategic placement of toilet facilities away from growing areas, or baseline
hand-washing procedures. See FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDE TO MINIMIZE
MICROBIAL FOOD SAFETY HAZARDS FOR FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES (1998), avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceDocuments/Produceand-
PlanProducts/UCM169112.pdf [hereinafter FDA GUIDE].
30. Compare IFPA GUIDELINES, supra note 29, with FDA GUIDE, supra note 29.
31. See Eschenbach Testimony, supra note 10 ("After enlisting the help of the
scientific community and the industry, FDA published the 'Guide to Minimize Mi-
crobial Food Safety Hazards for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables.' This
guide.. recommends good agricultural practices and good manufacturing practices
that growers, packers, and shippers can take to address common risk factors in
their operations. We have worked with the domestic and foreign fresh produce
industry since the release of this Guide to promote its recommendations and to
advance the scientific knowledge to enhance the safety of fresh produce").
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other words, producer compliance with these comprehensive guide-
lines had been entirely voluntary. No penalty was imposed on
growers for non-compliance with the guidance documents, nor was
there any immediate framework for state or federal agencies to im-
plement fines or other enforcement mechanisms." Because guid-
ance documents served as the plenary force for shaping agricultural
practices in leafy produce, producers did not face any mandatory
regulations before 2006.
B. Comparison of Leafy Produce Regulations with Other Industries
Compared to leafy (and generally, fresh) produce, other agri-
cultural industries have faced far more mandatory directives. For
instance, legislation such as the Meat Inspection Act removed a pre-
viously voluntary inspection program, and required federal employ-
ees to certify the safety of each meat product sold in interstate
commerce." By the 1980s, the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection
Service began to implement Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point (HACCP) regulations in addition to visual inspections." While
32. See supra note 25.
33. Supra note 6; Regulation of the meat industry has been expanded by
amendment to the original Act. See Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81
Stat. 584 (1967); see also Kohnke, supra note 10, at 502 ("Unlike beef, poultry or
seafood, which have been subject to firm mandatory federal government controls
since the early 1990s, growers, processors, and shippers of fresh produce have suc-
cessfully avoided food safety regulations on both the state and federal levels.").
34. HACCP regulations have existed since the 1950s, but did not enjoy wide-
spread recognition until later. HACCP programs are typically supported by schol-
ars in that they represent a second preventative dimension to improving food safety
by eliminating contamination before it is manifested in food products. As one food
safety official put it, "it is easier to keep all needles out of the barn than to find the
needle in the haystack." Neal Fortin, The Hang-Up With HACCP: The Resistance to
Translating Science Into Food Safety Law, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 565 (2003); see, e.g.,
Margie Russell, HACCP: What's the Hang-Up Food Engineering, Dec. 1995, at 48; see
also FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FOOD CODE 530-531 (2009) (noting that
HACCP regulations are useful in that they are "the most effective and efficient way
to ensure that food products are safe."). While few argue against the principle of
H4ACCP regulations, there are practical limits to its success. As the process of creat-
ing HACCP regulations is primarily a science-driven, risk-assessment approach,
there are bound to be limits to the extent of scientific knowledge available on even
the most consumed items, much less in smaller agricultural commodities. Usually
the first scientific inquiry is the source and mechanism of contamination (often
referred to hazard and risk assessment). A secondary inquiry is identifying which
procedures are effective at eliminating these risks (known as critical control points).
A final scientific inquiry is a determination tolerable limits of the critical control
points (known as critical limits), such as minimum heating times, maximum non-
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inspections constitute a "command-and-control" type of regulation
(temporarily shifting responsibility for certifying the product's safety
to the inspector), HACCP regulations are a type of process control
mechanism, restoring responsibility for pathogen reduction and
control to the producer. Thus, meat, poultry, and other producers
are subject to both current-acting, product-point regulations, such as
inspection, and proactive, pre-production regulations, such as process
control rules, to prevent safety crises before they are found in the
product.
Before 2006, leafy producers were primarily subjected to the
latter type of regulation." Product-point regulations are simply im-
practical for implementation in the leafy produce context. No
agency or even producer can be reasonably expected to inspect
every leaf of its crops for impurity or pathogenic contamination.
On the other hand, the GAPs contained in guidance documents
typically indicate practices which specify preventative measures to
avoid contamination prior to cultivation.' But, as noted before, the
key indicator of regulatory exceptionalism" in leafy produce was the
refrigeration exposure time, etc. Beyond these scientific inquiries, a number of
administrative procedures must further be established, specifying a method of en-
forcement, a schedule of corrective action, and a system of verification. See id. at
505. Thus, most critiques of HACCP regulations usually point to gaps or lapses in
scientific data, which compromise the effectiveness of HACCP regulations and
allow for outbreaks. Very few scholars, however, criticize the mandatory nature of
HACCP guidelines (that compliance is required). This critique is usually reserved
for industry officials, who most usually cite cost concerns. See, e.g., Fortin, supra.
35. Although guidance documents are not H-ACCP regulations in practice (as
they are not mandatory), in theory, they similarly specify prospective steps to avoid
contamination before the end-product stage. See, e.g. supra note 17. However, even
with this theoretical similarity between formal HACCP regulations and GAPs of
guidance documents, some have expressed that inherent differences between pro-
duce industries and other commodities make GAP frameworks different. For in-
stance, the site of cultivation of produce usually occurs in an outdoors setting, as
opposed to meat slaughtering, processing, and most other agricultural industries.
Id. It is often conceded that raw products, which constitutes all produce, will con-
tain some bacteria even if GAP guidelines are closely followed. Thus, it may be that
GAP guidelines allow more tolerance in terms of possible contamination, and even
more, it is perhaps more difficult to determine the independent effectiveness of
GAP standards as compared to official HACCP regulations. See Caroline Smith
DeWaal, Delivering on HACCP's Promise to Improve Food Safety: A Comparison of Three
HACCP Regulations, 52 Food Drug L.J. 331 (1997), noting the special difficulties of
assessing raw products.
36. See Eschenbach Testimony, supra note 10.
37. This is the critical distinction between leafy (and generally all) produce and
most other industries, and is why I do not technically refer to GAPs in guidance
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lack of mandatory obligations imposed on growers. The HACCP-
like guidance documents simply could not force compliance or
threaten sanctions upon producers.
C. Sources of Leafy Produce Regulatory Exceptionalism
There are several possible explanations to account for the his-
torical non-regulation of produce as compared to other industries.
On the one hand, before the 2006 outbreak, crops such as lettuce
and spinach were not viewed as high-risk foods." While the source
of the public's historical trust of produce is uncertain, it most likely
stems from the lack of a widespread, well-publicized recall (as seen
in the meat industry), the lack of history of sensational accounts of
the fresh produce industry (such as an equivalent of TheJungle), and
the inherently differential nature between meat, coming from an
animal, and produce."
Unfortunately, the public's trust of the produce industry is not
consistent with industry's food safety track record. Compliance with
the GAPs contained in guidance documents was usually poor, with
large portions of small and midsized production firms even report-
ing unawareness of general guidelines.0 These low rates of compli-
ance under a voluntary regulatory framework were reflected in the
number of foodborne illnesses attributed to produce - specifically
leafy produce. Between 1990 and 2003, a majority of foodborne
documents as HACCP regulations - they are not regulations, but merely suggestions.
See supra notes 26-27, 31.
38. Chryssa V. Deliganis, Death by Apple juice: The Problem of Foodborne Illness, the
Regulatory Response and Further Suggestions for Reform, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 681, 688
(1998); Kohnke, supra note 10, at 498.
39. Evidence of consumers' differential attitudes between produce and, for in-
stance, meat may be reflected in the preparation methods often used. Consumers
are far more likely to eat produce, especially leafy produce (such as packaged sal-
ads) without cooking or even washing the product as compared to meat. See, e.g.,
Food Safety: Current Challenges and New Ideas to Safeguard Consumers: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Health, Education, and Pensions, 109th Cong. 9 (2006) (statement of
Robert Brackett, Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, FDA)
[hereinafter Brackett Testimony].
40. See Center for Science in the Public Interest, Re: Comments on Proposed Pro-
duce Safety Action Plan (July 21, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/july4/072904/04N-0258-emcOO002-01.pdf (noting that
while larger growers tend to adhere to GAP guidelines, GAP "compliance is far
from universal," and that many producers were even unaware of or not complying
with guidance documents. CSPI's comment detailed a study surveying New York
farmers, finding that only 30% or growers were aware of GAPs for their particular
crop).
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illness outbreaks were attributed to contaminated produce, greater
than the number of illnesses caused by contaminated beef and eggs
combined." Leafy produce is particularly implicated in food con-
tamination occurrences. Further, despite the increasing breadth of
guidance documents in the 1990s, the number of leafy produce-
caused outbreaks doubled from 1998 to 2004.4 Another disturbing
trend is the increasing magnitude of outbreaks caused by leafy pro-
duce." Now, a single contaminated leaf may contaminate the leafy
vegetable supplies of dozens of states.4 1 In addition, the greater con-
sumption of leafy produce by consumers increases the likelihood of
foodborne illness from contamination." Despite these trends in
safety and in facility centralization prior to 2006, legislators and
agencies remained reluctant to promulgate mandatory regulations.
41. Kohnke, supra note 10, at 499; Daniel Akst, Big Farms Will Keep Spinach on




42. See Linda Calvin, Outbreak Linked to Spinach Forces Reassessment of Food Safety
Practice, AMBER WAVES, June 2007, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
AmberWaves/JuneO7/Features/Spinach.htm).
43. See Behind CSPI's Outbreak Data: A Look at the Produce Outbreak Numbers,
CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, http://www.cspinet.org/
foodsafety/produce data.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
44. See MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: BACTERIA, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND
BIOTERRORIsM 43 (2003).
45. Deliganis, supra note 38, at 696 ("When a contamination problem occurs at
[a growing facility] a product may be distributed to thousands, or hundreds of
thousands, of people before the danger is discovered."); Kohnke, supra note 10, at
500 ("In today's marketplace, where the majority of distribution is conducted by a
few large scale processing plants that mix products from numerous farms, all it
takes is a single contaminated leaf to spoil a massive multi-state supply of leafy
greens.").
46. See Deliganis, supra note 38, at 698 (noting that produce eaten daily rose
from an average of 3.9 servings during 1989-1991 to 4.4 servings between 1991 and
1994).
47. Kohnke, supra note 10, at 502 ("Unlike beef, poultry or seafood, which have
been subject to firm mandatory federal government controls since the early 1990s,
growers, processors, and shippers of fresh produce have successfully avoided food
safety regulations on both the state and federal levels.").
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III. THE 2006 E. COLI SPINACH OUTBREAK
On September 14, 2006 the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
alerted the nation of a widespread E. coli 0157:H7 outbreak." The
CDC linked the outbreak to fresh spinach produce, but was not ini-
tially aware of the source." In the ensuing weeks, hundreds of ill-
nesses were reported across 26 states, with three fatalities." After
pathogen genetic trace-back investigations of several suspected
farms, a single growing facility in the Salinas Valley" was implicated
as the source of one of the largest and deadliest outbreaks of food-
borne illness in recent years." The land was part of a cattle ranch
which was leased to a local spinach grower company." A report by
the FDA and the California Department of Health Services listed
several possible environmental causes of contamination, including
cross-contamination of irrigation reservoirs with nearby surface wa-
ter, feral pigs in the fields, and deficiencies in the producer's post-
harvest handling procedures."
The outbreak dealt a severe blow to produce farmers across the
nation. Nowhere was the impact more pronounced than in Califor-
nia, where dramatically slowed sales amounted to an estimated loss
of nearly $100 million to producers." Even though only a single
crop was involved, significant adverse economic effects were felt by
nearly every entity along the produce commodity chain, including
48. Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Multiple States
Investigating a Large Outbreak of E. coli 0157:H7 Infections (Sept. 14, 2006),
available at http://www2a.cdc.gov/han/ArchiveSys/ViewMsgV.asp?AlertNum=
00249.
49. Brackett Testimony, supra note 39, at 9.
50. Update on Multi-State Outbreak of E. coli 0157:H7 Infections From Fresh Spinach,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Oct. 6, 2006), http://www.
cdc.gov/foodborne/ecolispinach/100606.htm.
51. The Salinas Valley, often called the "Salad Bowl of the World," is home to a
heavy concentration of growers of leafy green vegetables, and accounts for the
majority of leafy vegetable production in the United States. See Rong-Gong Lin II,
E. Coli Outbreaks Prompt Review of Salinas Valley Lettuce Farms, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 11,
2006), http://www.marlerblog.com/ecolioutbreaks.pdf.
52. Id.; see also Jesse McKinley, Farmers Vow New Procedures; Bacteria Eyed in Boy's
Death, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2006), http://travel.nytimes.com/2006/09/22/
us/22spinach.html?partner-rssnyt&emc=rss.
53. Brackett Testimony, supra note 39, at 12.
54. Id.
55. See Spinach Farmers Try to Grow Public's Confidence, MSNBC.cOM (Oct. 2,
2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15095551/.
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supermarkets, restaurants, and fresh-cut processors." Compound-
ing the effects of the spinach E. coli outbreak, a second outbreak in
the Northeast and Midwest involving contaminated lettuce" oc-
curred less than two months later, further increasing consumer re-
luctance to purchase fresh produce. The seemingly limited scope of
tainted produce thus led to widespread economic effects well be-
yond the spinach or lettuce growing industries.
IV. THE POST-OUTBREAK LEAFY PRODUCE
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
Following the 2006 crisis, many believed the incident would
serve as a watershed moment in implementing mandatory regula-
tions on the fresh produce industry." However, federal agencies
normally charged with implementing food safety measures, such as
the FDA and USDA, continued to abstain from intervention." Even
more surprisingly, state legislators remained largely silent in setting
new regulatory proposals on the table. A single California state
senator proposed a two-tiered certification system, similar to the
56. See Elisa Odabashian, California Leafy Green Industry's Marketing Agreement
Will not Ensure Nation's Salad Bowl is Safe, CAL. PROGRESs REP. (July 25, 2007, 5:07
AM), http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site?q=print/4146.
57. Press Release, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Multistate Out-
break of E. coli 0157 Infections, November-December 2006 (Dec. 14, 2006), avail-
able at http://www2a.cdc.gov/HAN/ArchiveSys/ViewMsgV.asp?AlertNum=00256.
58. See, e.g., Marian Burros, Who's Watching What We Eat?, N.Y. TIMES (May 16,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/16/dining/16fda.html?_r-3&pagewant-
ed=l&oref =slogin ("The cause [of food safety regulatory overhaul] gained momen-
tum in the past year as at least three people died and more than a thousand were
sickened by contaminated tomatoes, lettuce, peanut butter, and spinach..fThe
commissioner of the FDA] believes the agency can achieve its goals through volun-
tary guidelines. But the fresh-cut produce industry, hit hard by outbreaks in recent
years, has been virtually begging for stronger intervention."); Growers Pursue Safety
Program for Leafy Green Vegetables After E. coli Scares, USA TODAY (Jan. 25, 2007,
11:25 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2007-01-25-safety-
program.x.htm ("Growers, packers and shippers of leafy green vegetables, still
reeling from the impact of devastating E. coli outbreaks, moved this week to create
voluntary food-safety standards.. [T]he United Fresh Produce Association an-
nounced that to regain customer confidence, the industry needs national, manda-
tory produce-safety standards overseen by the federal government.").
59. Kohnke, supra note 10, at 505 ("With [a] strong record of federal govern-
ment involvement in the regulation of food safety, the lethal multi-state outbreaks
of E. coli..in 2006 linked to California-grown spinach and lettuce provided officials




regulations found in the meat industry.' Leafy producers quickly
assembled opposition, suggesting a competing proposal which
would ultimately prevail.
A. A Traditional Response: The State-Regulation Proposal
Following the 2006 outbreak, legislative calls for reform were
limited to a single proposal by California State Senator Dean
Florez." A vocal proponent of direct governmental involvement in
regulating produce, Senator Florez introduced the "California Pro-
duce Safety Action Plan" in the state legislature. 2 While the Plan
ultimately was defeated, it is nonetheless worth detailing because of
its utility in providing baseline regulatory solutions when assessing
the problems of the industry-driven plan adopted instead, and its
clean summary of the line of governmental regulation arguments
typically made by consumer advocate organizations.
Senator Florez's Plan consisted of three food safety bills seeking
to charge the California Department of Health Services (CDHS)"
with inspection and certification duties. The first bill, S.B. 200, au-
thorized the CDHS to "adopt recall, quarantine, and sanitary regula-
tions necessary to prevent, circumscribe, or eliminate any condition
where any produce or food processed from produce may carry..a
pathogen" (emphasis added, indicating both proactive and current-
acting regulations).' Most significantly, S.B. 200 required the CDHS
director to "establish and administer a leafy green vegetable inspec-
tion program," and enabled the CDHS to impose civil penalties for
non-compliance with departmental regulations."
60. Id. ("[T]he only serious legislative proposal to materialize in the aftermath of
[the] crisis came from Senator Florez, who firmly believed that a government-
regulated solution was the only appropriate response.").
61. (D-Shafter). Florez is the Chair of the California Senate Select Committee
on Foodborne Illness.
62. Frank D. Russo, Package of Major Food Safety Bills Introduced by California State
Senator Dean Florez, CAL. PROGREss REP. (Feb. 1, 2007, 7:41 AM), http://
www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/?q=print/4963.
63. The CDHS has recently been reorganized into two separate entities. The
most relevant agency today for purposes of food safety in California is the state
Department of Public Health.
64. See S.B. 200, 2007 Sess. (Cal. 2007) (emphasis added to indicate both proac-
tive and current-acting regulations).
65. Id. In addition, inspectors would be appointed by the CDHS Director, and
would review a facility's agricultural practices as well as conduct periodic tests on
water, soil, and produce quality. Id.
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The Plan's second bill, S.B. 201, prohibited producers from en-
gaging in specific production practices, essentially making previ-
ously-existing GAPs mandatory.' Further, the bill increased pun-
ishment of non-compliance by allowing for imposition of criminal
sanctions.
The Plan's final bill, S.B. 202, proposed a revamped facility or-
ganization system to assist in regulatory enforcement and post-
outbreak trace-backs." Specifically, the bill required growers to im-
plement a coded lot numbering system, and to assign each product
produced from a specific lot the corresponding lot number.
As mentioned above, none of the Plan's components passed,
running into opposition from Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger."
Instead, the leafy produce industry was left to craft a food safety
regulatory proposal.
B. Redefining the Top-Down Regulatory State: The Industry's Response
Western Growers Association (WGA), one of the largest and
most influential agricultural trade associations on the West Coast,"
proposed a marketing agreement plan to compel producers to
adopt GAPs and improve food safety." Marketing agreements are
66. See S.B. 201, 2007 Sess. (Cal. 2007). Examples of restricted practices in-
cluded using surface water in irrigation, allowing cross-contamination of irrigation
water supply with surface water, using improperly composted manure as fertilizer,
maintaining toilet facilities in or adjacent to growing fields, or using irrigation water
exceeding acceptable pathogen levels. The CDHS would also be required to de-
velop model checklists to help producers comply with the bill's provisions.
67. Id.
68. See S.B. 202, 2007 Sess. (Cal. 2007).
69. Approximately a month after its introduction, a spokeswoman for Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger stated that the Governor preferred an "industry-regulated
solution," and GOP state senator Abel Maldonado said through a spokeswoman
that because industry actors "have a very vested interest in ensuring [product
safety]," self-policing was a reasonable solution. Marla Cone, Gov.'s Stance an Obsta-
cle for Spinach Safety Bills, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/
2007/mar/01/local/me-spinachl. Some of the bills did enjoy legislative success -
S.B. 200 initially passed in the senate, but was re-referred to the State Senate Com-
mittee on Agriculture, where it died; S.B. 201 managed to pass in the state assembly
and senate, only to be vetoed by Governor Schwarzenegger. Insufficient support to
overturn the veto marked the end of S.B. 201's run.
70. Western Growers represents over 90% of all fresh produce growers in Cali-
fornia and Arizona, consisting of over 3,000 members. Who We Are, WESTERN
GROWERS ASS'N, http-//www.wga.com/default.php?id=153&pagename=WhoWeAre
(last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
71. CAL. DEP'T OF FOOD AND AGRIC., CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREEN PRODUCTS
HANDLER MARKETING AGREEMENT (Mar. 5, 2007), available at
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voluntary programs that ensure products sold under the agreement
comply with particular predetermined regulations.' Membership
under an agreement, however, is not compulsory. Thus, producers
face no concrete regulation or enforcement threat from such
agreements; rather, the largest threats are imposed by consumers'
perception of a non-participating product's inferiority in the mar-
ketplace."
WGA's plan proposed the formation the Leafy Greens Market-
ing Agreement (LGMA) between the California Department of Food
and Agriculture (CDFA) and leafy produce "handlers" - defined as
any entity (except retail establishments) that "handles, processes,
ships, or distributes" leafy produce. Under the LGMA, the CDFA
would be charged with determining whether growers and handlers
http://www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/members/documents/LGMAmarketingagreeme
nt03.08_000.pdf [hereinafter LGMA].
72. See G.B. Wood, Marketing Agreements and Orders - Without Production Controls,
1961 INCREASING UNDERSTANDING OF PUB. PROBS. & POL'y 69, available at
http-//ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/17627/1/ar610069.pdf.
73. Marketing agreements tap into consumer demand to impose a force of mar-
ket-driven coercion to join the agreement. See Linda Calvin, Outbreak Linked to
Spinach Forces Reassessment of Food Safety Practices, AMBER WAVES, June 2007, available
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/June07/Features/Spinach.htm ("To
protect its competitive position and to minimize the risk of outbreaks elsewhere
that would further shake consumer confidence in leafy greens, the California indus-
try is considering whether to pursue a Federal marketing agreement or order that
would cover the entire U.S. leafy green industry."); Henrich Brunke et al., Industry-
Mandated Testing to Improve Food Safety: the New US Marketing Order for Pista-
chios (Aug. 20, 2004) (draft), available at http://aic.ucdavis.edu/researchl/
GermanPistachiosOnlineDraft0-25-04.pdf ("The marketing order is intended to
reduce the odds of an [outbreak], mitigate the consequences if an event should
occur, provide some quality assurance to buyers, and offset the negative conse-
quences of concerns over the potential for a food scare..."); Hank Giclas, Vice
President, Western Growers Association, Presentation to the National Restaurant
Assocuation: CA Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement & Marketing Order,
available at http://www.restaurant.org/pdfs/events/foodsafety/200703produce-
safety/giclas.pdf ("To restore and enhance the confidence of consumers, regulators
buyers and other interested parties a mandatory program that will help ensure
100% of the industry complying with 'best practices' 100% of the time is neces-
sary."); Press Release, Dean Florez, Florez Will Introduce Legislation to Enhance
Training, Monitoring and Enforcement (Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://
distl6.casen.govoffice.com/index.aspTypeB_PR&SEC={5E36B143-3FBF-4945-AD03-
OBAE9ED9CB67}&DE={740286F9-88EE-48B3-A80D-12FO562AB04E} ("The indus-
try contends that consumer demand for certified produce would force growers to
participate in the program to remain competitive.").
74. LGMA, supra note 71, at Article II, Section A(6).
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operated in compliance with GAPs.7 ' These GAPs, however, would
be largely industry-driven as opposed to promulgated by the CDFA
itself.' Handlers signing on to the LGMA are prohibited from pur-
chasing produce from growers found to operate in violation of
GAPs, or not subject to periodic inspection by the CDFA."
Handlers abiding by the LGMA could, in turn, display a seal of
approval, certifying membership in the Agreement and that the
produce was a product of optimal practices." Further, the terms of
the agreement focused on entities closer to the end-consumer along
the commodity chain.' In essence, the LGMA called upon a state
75. Id. at Article V, Section C(1)(a) (stating that growers are "subject to periodic
inspection by..state agricultural regulatory agency").
76. While the CDFA must approve any regulations suggested by the Leafy
Greens Advisory Board, the Board may recommend GAP rules and also is the pri-
mary information-gathering entity under the Agreement. See id. at Article III, Sec-
tion D.
77. Id. at Article V, Section C(2)(a). Additionally, handlers are required to fol-
low special GAPs in transport and processing.
78. The seal of approval is referred to as a "certification mark." See id. at Article
V. Under the terms of the LGMA, sanctions on handler non-compliance amount to
suspension or revocation of the right to display or market such certification. A
handler's first "flagrant or repeated violation" results in a suspension of the privi-
lege to display a certification seal for two weeks. One of three criteria must be met
in order to constitute such a violation: 1) the handler "knew the product was. ..
produced in violation of handler or grower best management practices, and chose
to [purchase] regardless"; 2) the handler had received prior best management prac-
tice (GAP) violation notices of the same type previously; 3) the handler received
prior violations regarding record-keeping requirements. A second flagrant or re-
peated violation results in an indefinite suspension of the privilege to display certi-
fication, until the handler establishes a "Corrective Action Plan" (CAP). A flagrant
or repeated violation occurring after the filing of a CAP results in a two year sus-
pension of certification privilege, unless the handler "demonstrates a significant
change in management and brand." Disputes over imposed sanctions proceed via
informal hearing before an independent arbiter whose decisions are "final." Id. at
Article V, Section D; see also CAL. LEAFY GREEN PRODUCTs HANDLER MKTG.
AGREEMENT, ANNUAL REPORT 2007-2008 6 (2008), available at
http://gna.mjrcgdev.com/sites/default/files/07.08_AnnualReport.pdf [herein-
after ANNUAL REPORT].
79. Placing the certification process at the "handler" level, as opposed to merely
growers, is a highly strategic attribute of the LGMA. Since marketing agreements
must rely upon consumer demand to give value to a certification mark (otherwise,
certification is nothing but a "pat on the back"), that demand is most cognizable in
firms situated higher in the commodity chain, such as grocers, distributors, proces-
sors, and general retail establishments. See generally supra note 73. But see Fresh
Express Declines to Sign California Marketing Agreement, PERISHABLE PUNDrr (Feb. 14,
2007), http://www.perishablepundit.com/index.php?date=02/14/07&pundit=l
(describing the refusal of a large leafy vegetable grower to enter the LGMA on the
ground that the seal of certification strategy may "give consumers a false sense of
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agency to enforce privately promulgated rules within a, at best, quasi-
private mass contractual agreement.
Soon after the LGMA was proposed, the CDFA accepted the
terms of the Agreement."o Within six months of enactment, 51 han-
dlers, constituting over 99 percent of leafy produce crops grown in
California, had entered into the LGMA."' Thus, it appears that the
industry's proposal soundly defeated calls for a more traditional
governmental regulatory response. Indeed, the LGMA is often seen
as a model of food safety reform even at the federal level, as some
have proposed the incorporation of a National Leafy Greens Mar-
keting Agreement." Because of the rapidly growing popularity of
LGMA-style arrangements, analysis of marketing agreements is par-
ticularly critical from a food safety policy standpoint.
V. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE LGMA
In this section, I provide two general categories of criticism of
the LGMA. The first line of criticism contends that the authoritative
body responsible for setting GAPs is not subjected to sufficient
oversight or even equal participation by the agency it purports to
cooperate with. As a result, the promulgation of less effective or
non-effective regulations may occur. The second general criticism is
that even if GAP regulations are independently effective, there is no
guarantee that they will continue to be followed down the road, or
even that they will be followed now.
With the exception of the very last argument, all of these cri-
tiques point to structural deficiencies in the Agreement that raise
prospective concerns. The fact that most of these consequences are
only possibilities suggests that these current issues with the LGMA
are relatively quick-fixes, correctable with simple modifications of
the Agreement terms. On the other hand, the LGMA is blessed
with two key strengths - thriftiness and speed. Thus, it seems that
while the LGMA indeed contains flaws, some of which are capable
of producing dire consequences, the easily correctable nature of
security and that both the press and consumers could misinterpret what the seal
stands for").
80. See Press Release, Cal. Dep't of Food and Agric., Leafy Greens Marketing
Agreement Sets Compliance Audit Start Date, available at http://www.cdfa.ca.
gov/egov/PressReleases/PressRelease.asp?PRnum=07-054 (last visited June 21,
2010).
81. See Cone, supra note 69; Kohnke, supra note 10, at 510.
82. See supra note 19.
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these flaws and the pre-existing virtues of the Agreement make it
worth keeping as a tool for improving food safety in leafy produce.
A. Are the Agricultural Standards (GAPs) Under the Industry Approach
Effective in Improving Food Safety?
Recall the two historical characteristics of the leafy produce in-
dustry: (1) it has not been subjected to onerous top-down mandatory
regulations," and (2) its food safety track record has been relatively
poor.' Based on these two characteristics, a glaring question in the
LGMA's GAP rulemaking process is whether an industry-driven ap-
proach can be trusted to create effective (i.e. both scientifically effec-
tive and reasonably practicable) GAPs.'
To answer this question, it is necessary to first gauge just how
industry-driven the authoritative body charged with creating rules is.
Within the LGMA, member handlers and their producers are re-
quired to abide by GAPs promulgated through a centralized proc-
ess. Under the Agreement, the Leafy Greens Advisory Board
(LGAB) releases official notice of accepted GAPs to growers and
handlers.' This rulemaking process differs substantially from that in
other agricultural industries, where required rules of Best Practices
are formed through traditional governmental rulemaking processes,
including Notice and Comment periods, and are subjected to mini-
mum procedural and decision-making requirements," such as those
83. See supra notes 25-27.
84. See supra notes 40-42.
85. Many have cited these characteristics to answer this inquiry in the negative.
See, e.g., Kohnke, supra note 10, at 512-513 (describing the responses by Senator
Florez and other consumer advocacy groups, arguing that "it was unacceptable for
the creation of GAPs to be left to the same industry that had caused twenty-two
food-borne illness outbreaks since 1995" and that the "self-regulatory approach
[was] nothing more than the 'fox [guarding] the henhouse"').
86. See LGMA, supra note 71, at Article III, Section D.
87. See, e.g., Joseph M. Pocius, The Truth and Consequence of "Standards of Identity,"
52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 337, 337 (1997) (describing proposed rulemaking action by
the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service recommendations of acceptable
meat and poultry contents revealed through inspection); See generally Denis Stearns,
Preempting Food Safety: An Examination of USDA Rulemaking and Its E. coli 0157:H7
Policy in Light of Estate of Kriefall ex rel Kriefall v. Excel Corporation, I J. FOOD L.
& POL'Y 375 (2005) (discussing USDA proposed rulemaking to characterize meat
products contaminated with E. coli bacteria as adulterated and to implement a
testing program); Margaret Glavin, Update on FSIS Initiatives, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
337, 338 (1998) (describing FSIS proposed rulemaking "that focuses on egg safety
during production, packing, processing, labeling, distribution, retail, and prepara-
tion - and seeks a rational, comprehensive, and cost-effective approach").
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contained in the Administrative Procedure Act.' Simply put, the
Board is not subjected to an APA equivalent, and may unilaterally
promulgate new GAPs without any consideration of data or input
from industry or public entities. Further, the terms of
the Agreement specify that the Board must consist of between seven
and thirteen signatory handlers." In contrast, only one board
member may represent the CDFA on behalf of the general public."
Therefore, the Board is numerically dominated by industry per-
sonnel.
The structure and enhanced rulemaking functions of the LGAB
create three prospective consequences. First, this setup severely
detracts from the "new governance" advantages to which LGMA
proponents point by inhibiting mutual sharing of knowledge and
data between industry and government, and by eliminating mean-
ingful agency review of industry practices. Second, it provides no
assurance that newly promulgated GAPs will be economically feasi-
ble for smaller farms, which historically have struggled to comply
with GAPs. Taken to the extreme, the Board's lack of concern of
practicability may create the potential for market abuse and hegem-
ony of larger producers and handlers. Finally, specific GAPs, while
scientifically supported in promoting food safety, may also contrib-
ute to several adverse environmental effects, ranging from erosion
promotion to biodiversity concerns. Although this critique is not
particularly a food safety concern, it is nonetheless a negative con-
sequence of the LGMA worth briefly exploring to examine if food
safety policy and environmental protection can coexist within the
terms of the LGMA. These effects will be explored in the following
paragraphs.
88. See, e.g., DeWaal Testimony, supra note 25, at 4 (noting the FDA's rulemak-
ing authority under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which has not been exer-
cised in the area of fresh produce food safety); see also Cindy Skrzycki, Cattlemen
Have Beef With USDA Signals on Canadian Imports, WASHINGTON POST (May 11,
2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A16232-2004May10?language
=printer (describing a dispute between ranchers and the USDA due to the agency's
allowance of Canadian beef imports without following the normal notice and com-
ment rulemaking requirements under the Act). The Act allows limited judicial
review of agency decisionmaking, including whether actions were decided on arbi-
trary bases. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
89. See LGMA, supra note 71, at Article III, Section A.
90. Id.
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1. Regulatory Cooperation or Hegemony?
From its establishment, supporters of the LGMA hailed the
Agreement as an unprecedented cooperative venture between gov-
ernment and industry.' Perhaps, on its surface, the LGMA appears
as what "new governance"' proponents envision: a system of gov-
ernmental "learning through monitoring" rather than mere en-
forcement, enhancing industry benchmarking and a free exchange
of information, thus maximizing the quality of ideas and standards
promulgated."
But this argument both underestimates the importance of wide-
spread public participation under a new governance scheme and
overestimates the CDFA's role under the LGMA. As noted above,
the LGAB is the authoritative rule-promulgating body under the
Agreement. But the Agreement's terms permit the "veiled" prom-
ulgation of rules - there is no requirement for the Board to hold
any sort of notice and comment period to collect data from either
various industry actors or members of the public. Instead, the
Board may unilaterally set GAP standards without traditional proce-
91. See Press Release, Western Growers Association, Western Growers Board
Takes Action to Require Mandatory Food Safety Practices (Oct. 30, 2006), available
at http://www.wga.com/public/active/siteBuilder/templateNewsReleasePopup.
php?id=70.
92. The "New Governance" movement has become a trendy position in recent
years. The basic premise of new governance theory is that traditional command-
and-control model of state enforcement of its regulations suffers from both uncer-
tainty in changing market landscapes and inefficiency at adapting to these changes.
As a result, regulations become outdated and subject to both low levels of compli-
ance and legitimacy of agency actions. See Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance
in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEx. L. REv. 819 (2008) (book review). In-
stead, new governance proponents suggest a greater cooperative effort between
agency and industry, implementing mechanisms for shared data collection and
information gathering, mutual investments in industry-assisting technology, and the
exchange of best practice benchmarks, leading to optimal public participation and
maximization of efficiency. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Con-
stitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998).
93. Solomon, supra note 92, at 823 ("The kinds of regulation encompassed in
the term new governance tend to be less prescriptive, less top-down, and more fo-
cused on learning through monitoring than compliance with fixed rule...[N]ew
governance mechanisms share emphasis on regulation through 'centrally coordi-
nated local problem solving.' Both in defining the problem to be addressed and
devising solutions, new governance forms emphasize provisionality and revisability
in light of experience. The public agency acts to help local actors learn from one
another about best practices...").
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dural or reviewing requirements.' Thus, the LGMA's enhancement
of a Board's rule-setting power represents an even more centralized,
top-down, and potentially arbitrary method of rule creation than
under a typical agency regime.
An opposite indication may be gleaned from the LGMA's pro-
vision requiring Board decisions to be approved by the CDFA. Offi-
cially, the Secretary of Food and Agriculture's approval signifies that
promulgated GAPs will be enforced via CDFA audits." But all that
is required to promulgate a new standard pending CDFA approval is
the majority support of the Board." While a rule pending agency
approval may seem insignificant, in fact, the ability of the industry
actors of the Board to advance GAP rules to the desk of the Secre-
tary without an effort to gather or review data and public input in-
hibits meaningful agency oversight of the decisions of the Board."
For example, assume that the Board wished to promulgate a
GAP rule requiring installation of a newly invented water microbe
meter in all water reserves. Also assume that the vast majority of
94. See LGMA, supra note 71, at Article III, Section F. No language in the LGMA
terms suggests the sort of rulemaking procedures described at supra note 87.
95. See id. at Article III, Section D.
96. See id. at Article III, Section F(2).
97. New governance theory depends upon the ability of state agencies to both
collect and distribute shared information to relevant industry entities. For instance,
Grainne de B6rca has written extensively on the new governance experience in the
European Union. The EU has adopted "Open Methods of Coordination" in several
substantive areas, even including the establishment of fundamental rights. For
instance, the EU Council adopted a directive to implement principles of equal
treatment to member states, but left states to incorporate such policies in a patently
new governance fashion - via "the monitoring of workplace practices, collective
agreements, [and] research or exchange of experiences and good practices." Simi-
lar practices have been used for improving health care systems. The result was
improvement of administrative efficiency and governmental enlightenment to im-
proving benchmarking and oversight functions. Thus, state agencies actively sought
data in order to monitor effectively, rather than hoping for data to seek them.
Grtinne de Bfirca, EU Race Discrimination Law: A Hybrid Model?, in LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 97, 99-101 (GrAinne de Bi6rca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2006). This illustrates that viable cooperative efforts must still pit governmen-
tal agencies as the ultimate manager and distributor of data. The state's "monitor-
ing" function (which the LGMA uses) relies upon collection of data to be able to
assess the conduct it is overseeing. But the LGMA does not place agencies in a
position to centrally dictate the terms of information collections. Not only does it
subject agencies to a numerical minority within the body which initial creates rules,
but places the power of the purse with the industry-dominated Board. See LGMA, supra
note 71, at Article III, Section D(12) (granting the Board the function of disbursing
funds to the CDFA). Thus, the agency is at the Board's mercy to facilitate informa-
tion gathering sessions - a result thoroughly in conflict with the benefits of a new
governance arrangement.
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LGAB members voted in favor of the rule, but without holding an
information-gathering session or without allowing public comment.
Because of the majority vote, the rule advances to the Secretary for
approval. But without any statistical data on the efficacy of the mi-
crobe meter, the Secretary cannot effectively challenge the sugges-
tion of the Board.
The rate of CDFA approval of Board-proposed standards indi-
cates such a trend of blind approval - the CDFA has yet to reject any
action of the Board thus far." Although this overlap could be
chalked up to genuine concurrence between the two entities, the
underlying systemic deficiency detailed above nonetheless provides
a reasonable alternative explanation.
Thus, the strength in numbers of industry actors within the
Board allows for the suppression of information gathering mecha-
nisms, such as mandatory notice and comment periods, depriving
both the agency representative of the Board and the Secretary of the
resources necessary for dissent, and necessitating a practice of rub-
ber-stamping by the "overseeing" agency."
These characteristics make it more apparent that the Board
structure of the LGMA is not as cooperative as it initially seemed.
Yet, the lack of external, APA-like requirements in the LGAB's deci-
sion-making process may allow for the arbitrary exercise of the
Board's top-down power to create rules, though not necessarily in
line with the independent effectiveness of those rules adopted.
98. See Sally Greenberg, Senior Counsel, Consumers Union, Comments to the
FDA at the Public Meeting on Regulatory Options: Safety of Fresh Fruits and Vege-
tables (Apr. 13, 2007), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/
0413FDACommentsFreshProduce.pdf; Elisa Odabashian, Director, West Coast
Office, Consumers Union, Comments to California Senate Select Committee on
Food-Borne Illness at the Public Informational Hearing on the California Depart-
ment of Food and Agriculture's California Leafy Green Marketing Agreement (Feb.
28, 2007), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/200 7/02/004283
print.html (noting that the practice of the CDFA was to simply "take the advice of
the industry on the best practices").
99. Such a concern is echoed by consumer watchdog organizations. See, e.g.,
Odabashian, supra note 98 ("We are seriously concerned that the industry appears
to intend to create its Best Practices standards behind closed doors, that it will be
overseen by a Board made up almost exclusively of industry representatives, and
that enforcement will amount to a simple rubber stamp by the California Depart-
ment of Food and Agriculture (CDFA). Under state and federal law, standards are
almost always put forward for Notice and Comment, so that the entire public has
an opportunity to give input..This has the beneficial effect of getting input from a
wide range of sources and experts, some of whom may have been previously un-
known to the drafters of the standard.").
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2. LGMA Board Structure and Practicability Concerns
Recall the definition of "effectiveness" provided above - that
GAPs are scientifically effective and reasonably practicable. After
all, even the most scientifically-supported GAP rules are ineffective
at improving food safety when they are only economically imple-
mentable in a marginal number of facilities. The concern, then, is
that inadequate representation of either a public agency or smaller
farms on the Board reduces consideration of feasibility of compli-
ance with GAPs imposed on (particularly smaller) growers and han-
dlers, thereby compromising the overall effectiveness of GAPs in
terms of practicability.
Skepticism of an approach charging a select group of large
firms with the task of determining the economic abilities of smaller
firms is justified. To see this, compare the GAP rulemaking process
under the LGMA with the process in the pre-2006 fresh produce
industry. As explained earlier, under the old framework, industry
associations such as the WGA and the IFPA created and released
guidance documents providing voluntary suggestions for improving
agricultural practices." State and federal agencies reviewed these
documents with a healthy dose of deference and typically adopted
the guidelines verbatim, without conducting independent informa-
tion-gathering mechanisms."0 ' The pre-2006 framework, therefore,
was largely industry-driven. But under this old framework, rates of
GAP compliance among small firms were both substantially less than
large firms and relatively abysmal." While several factors arguably
may account for this disparity,"O it nonetheless provides some base-
line evidence that an industry-driven regime tends to cater to the
100. See supra note 29.
101. To see this, note the similarity between IFPA GUIDELINES, supra note 29, and
FDA GUIDE, supra note 29.
102. See Center for Science in the Public Interest, supra note 40.
103. The lone premise of poor historical compliance rates generally concentrated
among smaller farms does not necessarily mean that the GAPs promulgated under
the pre-2006 framework were impracticable. For instance, smaller farms may have
withheld GAP compliance in order to maximize profits and better compete with
increasingly large firms. But see ELANOR STARMER, FOOD AND WATER WATCH, &
MARIE KULICK, INST. FOR AGRIc. & TRADE PoLIcY, BRIDGING THE GAPs: STRATEGIES
TO IMPROVE PRODUCE SAFETY, PRESERVE FARM DIVERSITY AND STRENGTHEN LOCAL
FOOD SYSTEMS 5 (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.iatp.org/iatp/publications.cfm?accountlD=258&reflD=106746 (stating
that a "weakness of the LGMA is that it cannot be easily adopted by small and mid-
sized farms," and noting that small-farm voices were not considered until very late
stages in the LGMA development process).
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most influential (i.e. largest) firms, implementing rules (voluntary or
not) which are clearly not universally attainable.
Under the LGMA, industry associations, now in the form of the
LGAB, again dictate GAP promulgation and minimally leave the
door open to marginal approval by the CDFA. In other words, the
regulatory landscape has changed little. Without affirmative rules
constraining the maximum and minimum number of Board mem-
bers from large, midsized, and small firms, there will always be a
theoretical possibility that the smaller firms will be unable to meet
the demands of GAPs promulgated by a large firm-dominated
Board.
Both empirical and qualitative evidence of impracticability is
surfacing. A survey of a representative sample leafy produce farms"
indicated that large farms' reported the lowest amount of food
safety costs in response to compliance with the GAPs of the
LGMA." Small farms, on the other hand, reported substantially
higher food safety costs per acre, including installation of fencing
and irrigation renovation.' Further, larger farms reported a far
higher rate of employment of food safety specialists to advise them
on compliance with GAPs Small farms, however, reported a neg-
ligible rate of employing such specialists.I" The report concluded
104. Shermain D. Hardesty & Yoko Kusunose, Growers' Compliance Costs for the
Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement and Other Food Safety Programs, UC SMALL FARM
PROGRAM RESEARCH BRIEF (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.sfc.ucdavis.edu/
docs/leafygreens.pdf.
105. Id. The survey classified farms according to average annual revenue, but
slightly altered the USDA definitions of "small" farms (under $250,000 annual
revenue) by essentially creating five size designations - very small farms (under
$250,000 annual revenue), small farms (between $250,000 and $500,000), mid-sized
farms (between $500,000 and $1 million), large farms ($1 million to $10 million),
and very large farms (over $10 million). Nearly 80% of farms represented in the
survey were large or very large farms. In addition, the survey found that farm reve-
nue closely correlated with farm acreage, and that most growers for LGMA han-
dlers were fairly specialized in leafy produce (rather than cultivating multiple
crops). Id.
106. Id. at 9-10. In 2007, very large farms reported an average of $33.22 seasonal
food safety costs per acre, as compared to $38.57 for small and mid-sized farms. A
more telling indicator of disparate effects of the LGMA, very large farms reported
average modification costs (costs to comply with GAPs) of $8.29 per acre, as com-
pared with $14.82 per acre for small and mid-sized farms.
107. Id.
108. Id. Very large farms reported food safety specialist costs four times higher
than small and mid-sized farms. In 2006, small and mid-sized farms did not report
any costs (indicating that few, if any, retained food safety specialists).
109. Shermain D. Hardesty & Yoko Kusunose, Growers' Compliance Costs for the
Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement and Other Food Safety Programs, UC SMALL FARM
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that smaller farms are particularly vulnerable because of an inability
to pass these costs on to grocers and other handlers."o These statis-
tics thus provide further evidence that the GAPs promulgated, while
certainly comprehensive, are simply not practicable for all firms.
For more qualitative evidence of the possible infeasibility of
GAPs promulgated by a Board dominated by large industry actors,
consider the statements of critique filed by small farms. For in-
stance, the Community Alliance with Family Farmers (CAFF) issued
a Comment of opposition of the LGMA to the USDA, indicating
that a lack of small-scale farm representation on the Board led to the
creation of GAPs which are infeasible for small farmers and organic
growers."' Instead, the CAFF urged a "more practical... approach
to food safety that diverse, traditional farmers of all sizes could im-
plement.""... The position of small, family farm establishments pro-
vides a clear indication that the lack of diverse representation on the
standard-promulgating Board amounts to the creation of impractical
GAPs.
While a lack of representation of small firms within the LGAB
may impede consideration of feasibility of GAP compliance by the
smallest farms, the setup is also a recipe for rampant market abuse.
If a select group of large firms decide to promulgate GAPs which
impose prohibitive costs of compliance on smaller farms, these mar-
ginal establishments will effectively be forced out of the LGMA."' If
consumer demand is sufficiently tied to safety concerns, the lack of
PROGRAM RESEARCH BRIEF (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.sfc.ucdavis.
edu/docs/leafygreens.pdf.
110. Id. at 11 ("It seems unlikely that growers have been able to obtain higher
prices in order to cover part or all of their increased food safety compliance
costs..the highly consolidated grocery sector often pays below perfectly competitive
prices..Our results indicate that growers with revenues over $10 million benefit
from significant economies of size in complying with the LGMA and other food
safety provisions; therefore they have the greatest capacity to absorb these costs.
Operations with sales between $1 million and $10 million appear to be the most
vulnerable, but operations with sales under $1 million could also incur high com-
pliance costs. Furthermore, the owners/managers of these small operations do not
have the personnel-neither the food safety specialists nor the management teams-
to whom they can delegate the effort of reviewing food safety regulations and com-
pleting administrative activities").
111. Community Alliance with Family Farmers, Comment on Proposed Federal
Rules for Leafy Greens (Nov. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.caff.org/policy/documents/ USDAComments_44.pdf.
112. Id.
113. Id. The Comment notes that under the LGMA, "food safety rules [are] con-
trolled by..handlers and processors and will unnecessarily drive many.. traditional
leafy green growers out of the business."
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LGMA certification could spell doom for smaller firms. Indeed
small farms have repeatedly expressed this concern."' In other
words, an authoritative Board composed solely of large firm repre-
sentatives (as it is currently constituted) could engage in a tactic of
"predatory standardizing," temporarily imposing overly-onerous
GAP rules with the intent of driving smaller firms out of business.
LGMA supporters may counter on two grounds. First, they
may argue that the composition of the Board is ultimately set by the
CDFA, and thus, there is no default guarantee that the Board will
only be comprised of large firm representatives. While the argu-
ment is theoretically correct (the Secretary of the CDFA must con-
firm Board appointments), it is particularly noteworthy that no rep-
resentative of a small or mid-sized farm has ever been appointed to
the LGAB."' Therefore, while placing the duties of Board appoint-
ment with an independent agency seems to be a procedurally inde-
pendent method of filling the LGAB, the absence of concrete Board
composition rules has created a strong de facto preference for large
firm representatives."'
A second possible argument which could be made in defense of
the LGMA is that concerns of future market abuse and impractica-
bility of GAPs are purely speculative. The argument goes that the
near universal participation rates of firms"' indicates that the GAPs
promulgated thus far have not been overly onerous, and that no
market abuse has been observed. Again, the argument is theoreti-
cally correct. But reliance on a current snapshot of the LGMA,
without any concern for future LGMA participation within the con-
text of dynamic factors which play into an individual firm's decision
on whether to remain in the LGMA, is misguided. Necessarily, an
ideal strategy contains such a prospective viewpoint. As all firms
(but especially small firms) seem to engage in some cost-benefit
analysis weighing whether LGMA certification is worth the extra
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. 1 am hesitant to offer a mechanism explaining why large farm representatives
have dominated the composition of the Board because there is, frankly, little dis-
cussion of the CDFA's appointment decisions available. Nonetheless, a possible
account stems from the same rationale provided in the preceding section - because
the Board is granted the ability to advance a decision directly to the Secretary with-
out any consideration requirements. The agency is then left without the necessary
time or information to effectively challenge the decision of the Board.
117. See Kohnke, supra note 10, at 510.
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costs of GAP compliance,"' concerns of practicability must arise
when (1) the force of consumer demand can constantly change, and
(2) the industry's history indicates a lack of attention to economic
feasibility of suggested GAPs."' Thus, while LGMA proponents are
correct in asserting that the pitfalls mentioned above are only poten-
tial issues, a strategy that eliminates even prospective problems
should be pursued.
3. Environmental Concerns
A number of conservation and environmental advocacy groups
have criticized the LGMA for fostering a farm environment that is
too sterile, beyond what science seems to suggest as the necessary
means to eliminate E. coli and other pathogenic contamination.x1o
As a result, biodiversity and wildlife conservation efforts suffer at
the hands of overreaching GAPs.
The primary tension between conservationists and LGMA pro-
ponents has been the imposition of "super metrics" - stringent
standards attempting to rid farming areas of any wildlife. 2 ' As a
118. See generally Hardesty & Kusunose, supra note 104 (indicating that it is
unlikely growers are able to reflect the costs of compliance in the price of their
crops, because the grocery sector typically pays below-market prices. Thus, large
farms are most able to absorb compliance costs, whereas small farms are far more
vulnerable. Further, reduced profit margin discourages smaller establishments
from retaining food safety specialists, impairing their ability to comprehend guide-
lines or complete administrative activities.); see also Conservation Concerns Regarding
a Proposed National Leafy Green Marketing Agreement, WILD FARM ALLIANCE,
http://wildfarmalliance.org/Press%20Room/press_ room_ NationalLGMA.htm
(noting that compliance expenses will most likely be reflected in profit margin
rather than market price, and that "not many farmers could make ends meet and
comply with the LGMA at this rate").
119. The poor compliance rates of voluntary GAPs under the pre-LGMA regime
among small farms, discussed at supra notes 40-41, illustrates inattention to attain-
ing universal attainment of GAPs.
120. See, e.g., WILD FARM ALLIANCE, supra note 118; Elly Hopper, Of Mice and Men,
TERRAIN MAGAZINE, Spring 2009, available at http://ecologycenter.org/terrain/
spring-2009/of-mice-and-men/; Len Richardson, Sterile Farming Adds to Food Risk,
CALIFORNIA FARMER, Jan. 2009, available at http://magissues.farmprogress.com/
CLF/CF01Jan09/clf012.pdf; Growers Pushed Too Far in Efforts to Provide Safe Food,
RODALE INST., http://www.rodaleinstitute.org/20080619/n2 (last visited Sept. 19,
2010).
121. See WILD FARM ALLIANCE, supra note 118. It should be noted that the LGMA
does not officially impose super metrics - usually, the most stringent wildlife-
eliminating standards are imposed by handlers. Nonetheless, the LGMA affirms
these standards by both misapplication of Agreement standards by CDFA auditors
(see supra note 90) and by not imposing a cap on super metric stringency by inde-
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result, farmers are compelled to tear down any potential habitats on
or adjacent to farms, eliminating all natural vegetation and creating
farms which have "carefully plowed, unplanted rows stretching
straight for acres, framed by razed edges and ditches doused with
herbicide."'2 2 Indeed, a survey of 181 growers found that nearly 50%
had been instructed to discourage the presence of wildlife on or
near farms, and that most complied.'2
The effect has been the mass removal of all vegetation, includ-
ing filter strips, hedgerows, grassy waterways, and windbreaks, creat-
ing large and empty buffer zones between farms and wildlife.'" But
most environmental agencies have recommended keeping native
vegetation along farm boundaries, as it reduces erosion and im-
proves water quality by acting as a filter or barrier to farm wastes.
Despite these benefits, the survey indicated that nearly all farmers
nonetheless removed boundary vegetation to deter wild animals. 2 1
The auditing of these GAPs also place organic farmers in a lose-
lose situation. Under the USDA's National Organic Program,'2 par-
ticipants must maintain or improve the natural resources of the op-
eration, including soil, water, wetlands, and wildlife.'"2 Some organic
farmers have faced difficulties when undergoing LGMA audits due
to non-compliance.'"2  Yet, de-certification could spell disaster for
such establishments due to the inability to sell organic crops to han-
dlers.
Some organizations have even attacked the scientific effective-
ness of GAPs and super metrics at improving food safety, claiming
that the vegetation-eliminating practices make contamination more
likely. For instance, vegetation is seen as a filter not only to prevent
the outbound motion of excess farming substances, but also to pre-
pendent handlers. Practically speaking, limiting the buying requirements of han-
dlers is unfeasible due to the proprietary nature of such metrics.
122. See Hopper, supra note 120.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (noting that hedgerows and filter strips can "catch irrigation runoff and
help filter the water before it re-enters the ecosystem").
126. Id.
127. 7 C.F.R. § 205 (2010). The Program creates a certification program for
growers wishing to call their products "organic." Under the Program, participants
are subjected to various audits and record-keeping requirements.
128. See 7 C.F.R. § 205.200 (2010).
129. See WILD FARM ALLIANCE, supra note 118 ("Several organic farmers told WFA




vent the inbound spread of waterborne pathogens through rain.'o
Others see vegetation as a barrier to pathogenic dust created by cat-
tle areas.'
The fundamental question to be asked is whether there exists a
polar tension between food safety and environmental interests.
LGMA advocates usually contend that the presence of any wild ani-
mals near farms increases the risk of pathogenic transmission.12 In
other words, it is argued that destruction of natural surrounding
habitats is a necessary evil. On the other hand, while some conser-
vationists dispute this claim,' there are distinctly few efforts made
by environmental advocates to reconcile these seemingly opposing
interests. For now, it seems that the relationship between food
safety and conservation is all but a zero-sum game.
B. Does the LGMA Go Far Enough to Compel Compliance of GAPs?
Even assuming that the agricultural standards promulgated by
industry forces are (and will continue to be) independently effective
at improving food safety, a second question to be asked is whether
the LGMA sufficiently ensures that such practices are continuously
enforced or followed?
Two particular characteristics of the Agreement prompt this
question. First, the non-mandatory entry into the LGMA makes it
theoretically possible for producers to either avoid or opt out of the
marketing agreement, removing themselves from the scope of GAP
standards. Thus, there is no guarantee that if consumer concerns
wane, a number of firms will not gradually opt out of the LGMA.
Second, the penalties for non-compliance are far less stringent
than under alternative approaches, such as under Senator Florez's
Plan.'" This not only may provide an insufficient incentive for indi-
vidual firms to comply with GAP guidelines, but also removes any
concrete incentive the CDFA might have in thoroughly performing
130. Id. ("[G]rasses and wetlands have the ability to filter up to 99% of E. coli
during rain events.").
131. Id.
132. See Hopper, supra note 120 (quoting Scott Horsfall, CEO of the LGMA, stat-
ing that "There is a certain amount of scientific evidence that wildlife can be a car-
rier of E. coli..ts]o they are definitely one of the risk factors.").
133. See, e.g., WILD FARM ALLIANCE, supra note 118 (critiquing the inclusion of
deer and rodents as high risk animals).
134. See S.B. 200, 201, supra notes 44 and 46 (authorizing both civil and criminal
penalties for non-compliance).
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its auditing duties. These considerations will be expanded upon in
the following paragraphs.
1. Can Consumer Demand Substitute For Compulsory Regulation?
Throughout early press releases, WGA and other industry asso-
ciations repeatedly represented the LGMA and the array of GAPs
under the plan as "mandatory."' However, there are several dis-
tinctions between the so-called "mandatory" guidelines of the
LGMA and the requirements typically imposed under a primarily
governmental approach. The most glaring is that produce firms are
under no obligation to enter the Agreement. Nor is there an obliga-
tion of already-participating firms to remain within the LGMA. Un-
der a traditional governmental regulatory plan, firms cannot choose
to avoid periodic inspections, nor can they decide to ignore GAP or
HACCP guidelines.'" These two characteristics make it quite clear
that the LGMA's provisions are not as legally "mandatory" as repre-
sented.
Instead of requiring universal GAP compliance by all firms, re-
gardless of entry into a marketing agreement, LGMA relies upon
market forces, such as consumer demand, to compel producers to
enter the program and in turn comply with Agreement GAPs."'
This is perhaps most evident based on the LGMA's specific targeting
of handlers. Because growers must typically sell their crops to han-
dlers (namely, grocers and processors), the Agreement effectively
shifts the pressures of consumer demand onto handlers to purchase
from growers which are in compliance with GAP guidelines. But
recall that retail establishments, such as supermarkets, are exempt
135. See Press Release, Western Growers Association, Western Growers Board
Takes Action to Require Mandatory Food Safety Practices (Oct. 30, 2006), available
at http-://www.wga.com/public/active/siteBuilder/templateNewsReleasePopup.php?
id=70.
136. Senator Florez's proposal included penalties for non-compliance by any
grower. Supra note 64:
113365.8. (a) Any person who negligently or intentionally violates any
state law or regulation, including any quarantine regulation, by importing
any produce or other article, which by virtue of being pest infested or dis-
ease infected, causes an infestation or infection of a pest, animal, or dis-
ease, or causes an existing infestation to spread beyond any quarantine
boundaries..is liable civilly in a sum not to exceed twenty-five thousand
dollars($25,000) for each act that constitutes a violation of the law or regu-
lation.
137. See supra note 73.
298 [VOL. 6:267
PRODUCE EXCEPTIONALISM
from the definition of "handlers."'" Thus, grocers are unaffected by
the LGMA.
Instead, responding to consumer concerns and the threat of
lost business, many supermarkets and processors have independ-
ently imposed stringent super metrics on their suppliers (i.e. grow-
ers)." Indeed, the institution of such stringent standards does not
appear to be motivated by a scientific effort to improve food safety,
but rather, an effort to allay consumer concerns and maximize
sales.uo Although a marginal amount of growers' costs of compli-
ance with both LGMA GAPs and handler super metrics are reflected
in the price of crops, the relative market power advantages handlers
have over growers typically equates to significantly under-market
prices for large handlers such as supermarket chains,"' thus shifting
the ultimate burden of food safety costs back onto growers.
When consumer concern and demand for the safest products
are at a peak, arrangements such as the LGMA tend to be effective
at compelling the vast majority of handlers and growers to comply
with the terms of the agreement."' The previously cited statistic of
LGMA firms accounting for 90 percent of leafy produce output in
California is strong evidence of this effectiveness."' The question,
though, is whether a possible drop in consumer concern for food
safety will lead to the relaxation of super metrics imposed by han-
138. LGMA, supra note 71, at Article II, Section A(6) ("'Handler' means any per-
son who handles, processes, ships or distributes leafy green product for market
whether as owner, agent, employee, broker or otherwise. This definition does not
include a retailer.").
139. See Hardesty & Kusunose, supra note 104. Although specific super metrics
have been released by some handlers (such as Walmart and Publix), they usually are
considered a trade secret. The general trend is that imposition of super metrics by
handlers is on the rise. Id.
140. Id. (noting that the increasing stringency of super metrics resembles an
"arms race," and usually do not have a strong scientific basis).
141. See, e.g., Hardesty & Kusunose, supra note 104; WILD FARM ALLIANCE, supra
note 118 ("[compliance expenses] will not be passed onto the consumer but will
come out of the [farmer's] net profit.").
142. See, e.g., Brunke et al., supra note 73 (analyzing the use of a collective market-
ing order setting inspection and other quality assurance standards within the Cali-
fornia pistachio industry, and finding that in the wake of food safety crises, "collec-
tive action is likely to be a helpful tool to ensure a safe product and increase bene-
fits to producers and consumers"). This, however, assumes that there is adequate
consumer awareness of the certification process and seal. See Florez, supra note 73
("[M]ost Californians are so accustomed to buying leafy greens without a sticker
they would never know something was missing.").
143. See Cone, supra note 69; Kohnke, supra note 10, at 510.
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dlers, or an exodus of handlers from the LGMA to save the marginal
increases in crop costs from grower compliance.
Simply put, the evidence does not provide a clear answer. On
the one hand, because handlers possess greater market power and
most of the costs of compliance are weathered by growers them-
selves,"' it would appear that handlers have little incentive to reduce
the standards which their suppliers must follow. In addition, recent
historical trends have shown that market power disparity between
processors or grocers and growers has been increasing."' Thus, it
would appear that the LGMA's future membership should remain
steady.
However, other historical trends make this conclusion at least
somewhat questionable. In the pre-2006 era, when consumer con-
cern for produce food safety was relatively low,' 6 the imposition of
such stringent super metrics by grocers and processors was rare."'
Yet, for much of the late 90s and early 2000s, these entities still held
considerable market power advantages over growers."' This would
indicate that there is some correlation between consumer concern
and stringency of super metrics imposed, and less correlation be-
tween market power disparity and the types of metric standards im-
posed by handlers.
Thus, whether or not a possible drop in consumer concern will
lead to less participation in the LGMA is uncertain. But, as I suggest
below, the addition of a "retainer" provision would eliminate any
uncertainty at minimal cost to most participants. With such a modi-
fication, a resolution to the above question is unnecessary.
Another concern is that the voluntary nature of entry into the
LGMA is currently allowing a few growers (the 10 percent of out-
144. See Hardesty & Kusunose, supra note 104, at 11.
145. See, e.g., National Farmers Union, Farm Crisis, EU Subsidies, and Agribusiness
Market Power, AG OBSERVATORY, (Feb. 17, 2000), http://www.agobservatory.org/
library.cfm?filename=farm crisiseu subsidiesand-agribusiness mark.htm ("The
farmers' decreasing share [of profit] is a direct result of processors' and retailers'
increasing market power.").
146. Compare Press Release, Harris Interactive, supra note 21, with Jean C. Buzby
& Richard C. Ready, Do Consumers Trust Food-Safety Information?, FOOD REVIEW,
Jan.-Apr. 1996, at 46, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/foodre-
view/jan1996/fjan96h.pdf.
147. See Steve Gilman, Food Safety Hits the Fan: Regulatory Action, Inaction, and
Over-reaction and the Effects on Small Scale Growers, NORTHEAST ORGANIC FARMING
ASSOCIATION, http://www.nofa.org/policy/leafygreens.php (last visited Sept. 14,
2010) (noting that super metrics generally began to be imposed in response to the
2006 outbreak).
148. See National Farmers Union, supra note 145.
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casts) to avoid any worry of complying with GAPs."' Some attribute
this 10 percent to express exceptions in the LGMA's definition of
"handlers," which exempts restaurants and independent grocers."
There have been reports of some non-compliant growers operating
relatively successful businesses by selling crops to these LGMA-
exempt firms.' Therefore, a handler otherwise operating one of
the exempt establishments allows an outlet for a non-compliant
grower to sell its crops, placing such items in the market for con-
sumption. And while 10 percent of handlers seems insignificant,
recall that a single contaminated leaf may cause a multi-state out-
break.'" For this reason, nearly universal compliance is insufficient.
2. Sufficiency of LGMA Penalties
An even deeper problem with the LGMA is the relatively weak
sanctions imposed upon a finding of non-compliance, creating two
concerns.
The first concern is that the lack of monetary sanctions reduces
any incentive for the CDFA to inspect as thoroughly as it might oth-
erwise. As noted earlier, the maximum penalty for GAP violation is
revocation of a handler's right to represent produce as grown in
compliance with GAPs. The theory is, therefore, that because the
CDFA does not benefit from finding instances of non-compliance,
the agency may not be sufficiently compelled to thoroughly conduct
audits to maximize the number of violations it finds per search. In
other words, the imposition of fines acts as a type of "commission"
for the agency, giving financial incentive for more stringent inspec-
tions.' The lack of fines under the LGMA, therefore, may lead to a
practice of lenient enforcement of GAPs by the CDFA.
149. See Cone, supra note 69; Kohnke, supra note 10, at 510.
150. See Hardesty & Kusunose, supra note 104 (stating that the small number of
non-compliant farms is likely due to the ability to still sell to grocers and restau-
rants).
151. See Tracy Frisch, The Coming Battle Over Food Safety, THE VALLEY TABLE, Dec.
2009 - Feb. 2010, available at http://valleytable.com/article.php?article=002
+Features%2Ffhe+coming+battle+over+food+safety (providing an account of an
organic farmer who stopped dealing with the grocer Wegmans to avoid having to
comply with GAPs. Nonetheless, the farmer still has been able to sell crops directly
to consumers and restaurants and independent grocers which don't impose super
metrics.).
152. See supra note 45.
153. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16-17 (1974) ("[D]ifferent methods of
improving the quality of enforcement [exist]. One discourages malfeasance by
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It should be noted, however, that based on the percentage of
firms with at least one minor violation, LGMA facility audit reports
do not conclusively indicate a pattern of lax enforcement. In the
2007-08 annual report, approximately 42 percent of facilities in-
spected by the CDFA required corrective action." On the other
hand, the absolute percentage of checkpoint compliance (compli-
ance with individual GAPs) is suspiciously high, at 99.25 percent.'
The lowest category of checkpoint compliance, water use (requiring
periodic self-testing and inspection of irrigation supply), still re-
ported over 98 percent compliance.'" After all, if nearly half of all
facilities had been found in violation of GAPs requiring corrective
action, even an apathetic mind would wonder whether those viola-
tions constituted the tip of the iceberg. What makes these astro-
nomical compliance rates even more suspicious is that the majority
of instances of non- compliance involved procedural deficiencies,
such as insufficient recordkeeping and documentation of soil and
water self-tests. 5
But despite the astronomical reported rates of GAP compli-
ance, contamination of produce has not been eliminated since en-
actment of the Agreement. In 2007, Metz Fresh,'" a member of the
LGMA, issued a massive recall of bagged spinach due to salmonella
contamination."' In addition, Metz Fresh had never been de-
certified or even issued a notice of corrective action by the CDFA."
The continuation of outbreaks provides some evidence that the cur-
rent compliance rate of GAPs is likely not as high as is represented.
And although there is essentially no way to verify the accuracy of the
raising the salaries of public enforcers, whereas the other encourages results by
paying enforcers for performance, or on a piece-rate basis.").
154. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 78, at 5.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 6-7.
158. Metz Fresh LLC, headquartered in King City, CA (in the heart of the Salinas
Valley), is one of the largest spinach producers in the world. Cary Blake, Food Safety
Produce Leaders Want Level Playing Field Nationwide, WESTERN FARM PRESS (Dec. 15,
2007, 12:00 AM), http://westernfarmpress.com/mag/farming-food-safety-produce/.
159. Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, Spinach Recall Renews
Debate Over Produce Safety, CENTER FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL'Y (Aug. 31,
2007), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/fs/food-disease/news/aug3l07
spinach-jw.html. Metz Fresh recalled over 8,000 cartons of bagged spinach. Com-
pany representatives stated, however, that most of the recalled spinach never
reached consumers. Id.




CDFA's numbers, incentivizing more stringent auditing practices by
the CDFA may nonetheless help eliminate prospective concerns of
lax enforcement.
A secondary concern is that even if de-certification is seen as a
significant penalty for growers and handlers which buy from non-
compliant growers, the LGMA allows for a number of occurrences
of non-compliance before any de-certification action is imposed. As
discussed earlier, only "repeated or flagrant violations" (i.e. viola-
tions posing a significant risk to food safety) result in de-
certification."' But to constitute a "repeated" violation, a grower
must commit multiple "major deviations" (violations "inhibiting the
maintenance of food safety but not necessarily resulting in unsafe
product").' Further, it takes multiple "minor infractions" (practices
not necessarily increasing the risk of foodborne illness) to equal a
single "minor deviation."' In other words, growers are given sub-
stantial leeway before the threat of de-certification looms - working
up the chain of violations, it takes dozens of minor infractions to
constitute a single flagrant violation. Even when de-certification
occurs, it is usually limited to two weeks - a relatively marginal pe-
riod of time.'
In short, the schedule of penalties is so forgiving under the
LGMA that only the most blatant patterns of non-compliance are
sanctioned, allowing less blatant violations that still may adversely
affect food safety.
C. Redeeming Qualities of the LGMA
While the above discussion points to a number of potential and
current flaws of the LGMA, in reality, the LGMA advances perhaps
the two most important virtues of a regulatory program - low state
161. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 78, at 6.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 6. In 2007-08, the CDFA found five flagrant violations. The only sanc-
tion imposed was temporary decertification for two weeks. Each of the decertified
firms was recertified after the violations were corrected. Of 45 less severe "major
deviations" found, 37 were due to recordkeeping deficiencies. However, accumula-
tion of three major deviations constitutes a single flagrant violation. Further, mul-
tiple "minor deviations" (practices which did not necessarily increase the risk of
foodborne illness) within one year constitutes a major deviation. Finally, multiple
"minor infractions" within a year constitutes a minor deviation. Theoretically,
therefore, a firm could be sanctioned with a minor deviation during each inspec-
tion throughout the year, and, at worst, lose certification for two weeks. Id.
164. Id. at 6-7.
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costs and expediency. These redeeming qualities provide strong
support for retaining, in some form, marketing agreements such as
the LGMA as a tool for the improvement of food safety.
1. Industry's Assumption of Enforcement Costs
Even if the CDFA's auditing process may not be particularly
thorough in practice, it is noteworthy that the entire auditing proc-
ess costs the state essentially nothing. The LGMA assesses per-
carton fees on its participants,"' and approximately half of these
funds are funneled to the CDFA for inspection duties. In other
words, the collective fee paid by handlers operates as an investment
of sorts - handlers voluntarily fund governmental oversight pro-
grams with the expectation that such oversight will reap future
benefits primarily in the form of increased consumer demand (and,
in turn, greater revenue). Such a setup is immensely important for
states such as California, which have sustained massive budgetary
deficits in recent years." The setup of the LGMA is thus laudable in
that it pays governmental institutions for mobilizing demand, creat-
ing a win-win situation for both the state and industry, with minimal
public expenditures.
2. Time and Flexibility Advantages
In an area such as food safety, where an outbreak can occur
without warning, the ability to change standards quickly in response
to external forces is important.m However, under traditional agency
165. See LGMA, supra note 71, at Article IX, Section B ("Assessment shall not
exceed five cents per carton along with annual assessment.").
166. See, e.g., Kristin Kloberdanz, The Great California Fiscal Earthquake, TIME
MAGAZINE (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,
1870299,00.html.
167. See Stearns, supra note 87, at 391-392 (describing the regulatory response
after the 1993 Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak in 1993, discussed at supra note 4, as
"prompt and significant," including a unilateral declaration by the USDA that E.
coli 0157:H7 constituted an adulterant under the Federal Meat Inspection Act, as
opposed to rulemaking); Joseph A. Levitt, CFSAN's Program Priorities: From Food
Safety to Food Security, 58 FooD & DRUG L.J. 19, 21 (2003) ("Despite our best efforts,
we cannot expect to prevent every foodborne illness outbreak. We should expect,
however, that when an outbreak does occur, federal, state, and local authorities
work together to identify the problem, perform traceback investigations, and re-
move the product or products from the market as quickly as possible.. Indeed,
faster outbreak response is one of the most substantial improvements in the food
safety system over the past five years.").
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operations, procedural constraints, including notice and comment
periods and consideration requirements, slow down the process of
rule promulgation.'" Under the LGMA, new rules may be formed
on the basis of a vote and a signature." Assuming an equally-
composed Board and a well-informed Secretary, the LGMA's setup
is ideal within the food safety context, as it allows for the rapid crea-
tion of rules in times of crisis while harnessing the in-house industry
experience of LGMA and CDFA actors. In other words, the setup,
operating under these structural assumptions, avoids the typical
"stickiness" of the agency rulemaking process, minimizing the time
necessary to advance industry standards.
VI. ADJUSTING THE LGMA TO HARNESS THE ADVANTAGES OF
MARKETING AGREEMENTS AND BETTER ENSURE FOOD SAFETY
Because of the importance of these strengths, full-fledged de-
struction of the LGMA is neither necessary nor desirable. Instead,
the following discussion intends to establish that the deficiencies
described above can be addressed by relatively marginal structural
changes in the LGMA, while still retaining the benefits of low public
costs and efficient standard promulgation.
168. See Kohnke, supra note 10, at 515 (detailing the LGMA-sponsor Western
Growers' argument that "unlike an inflexible piece of legislation, the quality of the
GAPs could be constantly improved upon under an industry-driven approach..it
can reflect the latest science, the latest data and the latest trends... A law is very
difficult to change."); Stearns, supra note 87, at 392-394 (characterizing the FSIS'
prompt declaration of E. coli as an adulterant, as opposed to following traditional
rulemaking procedures as unexpected, and subsequently challenged by the meat
industry on the ground that the declaration was "not promulgated through appro-
priate rulemaking procedures"); M. Elizabeth Magill, Congressional Control Over
Agency Rulemaking: The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act's Hammer Provisions, 50
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 149, 156 (1995) (stating that within the context of promulgating
labeling standards under the NLEA, "regulatory delay is a source of great frustra-
tion for Congress..Such delay is in part attributable to the increasing burdens
placed on agency rulemaking (some of them by Congress), the sheer number of
tasks assigned to agencies in statutes, and the enormous complexity entailed in
contemporary rulemaking.").
169. LGMA, supra note 71, Article III, Section F(2) and Article III, Section D(2)
("To recommend to the Department rules and regulations relating to [the LGMA].")
(emphasis added).
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A. Correcting the Lack of Meaningful Agency Review
and Practicability Concerns
As discussed in part IV, the numerical and financial domination
of the LGAB by industry actors enables the body to create rules
pending only Secretary approval. Because of this domination, the
lone agency voice on the Board may be insufficient to call for notice
and comment periods or other information-gathering techniques
when necessary to make a reasoned decision. While this inability
gives rise to the virtue of expediency, it still may preclude the possi-
bility of data gathering even when time is not of the essence.
Adding composition requirements of the Board into the terms
of the LGMA would help eliminate this potential. For instance, re-
quiring an increased presence of public Board members (i.e. those
representing public agencies) may allow agency voices to effectively
call for more information-gathering sessions when the agency is un-
der-informed on a particular proposed rule. The arrangement
would help improve the ability of the CDFA to meaningfully assess
the merits of the Board's proposals. At the same time, it would
avoid the cumbersome procedural constraints typically imposed on
agencies, as it can gather data only when it is deemed necessary.
A related concern articulated earlier is that under the LGMA,
the rulemaking Board could be dominated by representatives from
large firms, which may not be concerned with the economic con-
straints or the ability of small firms to comply with GAP guidelines.
Further, the possibility of such one-sided composition could lead to
predatory practices to drive smaller firms out of business.
Again, the corrective measure here is simple addition of Board
composition constraints. In addition to increasing the number of
public members, requiring reasonably representative Board mem-
bership based on firm size would help put small firm concerns on
the map. A possible Board arrangement would continue the ap-
pointment power of the CDFA secretary, but require at least one
seat to be allocated to a representative of a small firm. This would
provide at least some representation to smaller firms to express
their concerns with newly-proposed rules. And because of the in-
creased role of the agency within the Board, a lone voice may be
enough to precipitate further deliberation.
While the effectiveness of these proposals has yet to be ob-
served within the specific context of the LGMA, structural changes
to similar rulemaking boards in other areas have produced mean-
ingful results. For instance, the National Labor Relations Board, an
authoritative rulemaking body charged with the investigation and
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combat of unfair labor practices, is composed of members ap-
pointed by the President. In the 1950s and 60s, the general practice
of appointing members was to further the diversity of the board to
create a balanced mix of business, labor, and state members.'" Un-
der this setup, compromise between labor and business flourished,
as both productivity and wages increased."' However, the Board-
appointment practice changed in the 1980s, and appointed mem-
bers were most often associated with big business."' This change in
Board composition lead to continued weak growth in worker pro-
ductivity and significant decreases in the compensation of high
school graduates."' The example of the NLRB and its historical ap-
pointment practices thus provides some indication that regulations
altering the standards for board appointment can affect the progress
of the entire program.
B. Preventing Regression in LGMA Participation
The addition of a penalty clause under the LGMA could ensure
that in the event of waning consumer concern for food safety, indi-
vidual firms will continue to participate in the Agreement and abide
by GAP guidelines. As the LGMA is a contractual agreement be-
tween handlers, the CDFA, and the LGAB, the addition of a penalty
clause, imposing a monetary schedule of forfeitures, may discourage
the occurrence of LGMA dropouts. For instance, by adding a clause
requiring participation in the contract for a set number of years,
fees for the Agreement may be collected up front. If a firm defects,
it automatically forfeits any amount paid towards the Agreement. In
addition, extra fees could be assessed on such firms. Imposing
monetary penalties may help discourage a decline in LGMA partici-
pation.
On the other hand, expanding consumer knowledge of the sig-
nificance of LGMA participation presents an alternative and market-
based approach to intrinsically enticing firms to remain in the
LGMA. Since the LGMA's focus on handlers affirms that the pro-
gram relies heavily on market forces such as consumer demand to
170. See Frank Levy & Peter Temin, Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century
America 20 (MIT INDUST. PERFORMANCE CTR., Working Paper No. 07-002, 2007)
(noting that under the Truman administration, appointment of NLRB Board mem-
bers was diverse and equally balanced between business and labor representatives).
171. Id. at 33.
172. Id. at 39.
173. Id.
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spur participation, expanding consumer awareness enhances the
market-based deterrent effect of LGMA regression. A statewide
public awareness campaign has begun, but is still largely limited to
only internet media channels. Expanding the campaign to a more
mainstream television campaign might help in improving consumer
awareness, strengthening the incentive for firms to remain in the
LGMA in the long-term.
C. Enhancing Enforcement
As the LGMA represents the public enforcement of largely pri-
vately created rules, the CDFA is not engaged in the enforcement of
self-created rules. Because of this disconnect, it is important to pro-
vide incentives for the agency to vigorously enforce promulgated
rules by allowing the agency to impose fines on non-compliant
firms. Implementing a schedule of monetary penalties creates two
basic effects. First, it may encourage firms to make greater efforts
to assure compliance, in order to avoid the financial losses incurred
from penalty."' Second, it may encourage CDFA auditors to con-
duct more stringent inspections, as the agency gains from finding
more instances of non-compliance.
VII. CONCLUSION
Created in response to one of the largest food illness outbreaks
in recent history, the LGMA represents a novel effort to allocate
regulatory responsibility among industry and state. Indeed, the ap-
proach effectively harnesses the virtues of low public costs and effi-
cient regulation creation on the fly. However, these positives may
not be fully realized due to structural deficiencies in the terms of the
Agreement. The diminished role of the state agency, increasing the
chances of future promulgation of administratively arbitrary regula-
tions and impracticable standards for smaller growers, inhibits the
incorporation of evolving food safety principles into growing prac-
tices. Left unchecked, the numerical domination of the board by
large firms, without the presence of offsetting agency or small firm
voices, creates the propensity for rampant market abuse, incentivizes
174. See JEAN M. RAWSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB10037: MEAT AND POULTRY
INSPECTION ISSUES (2000), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSre-
ports/Agriculture/ag-30.cfm (noting that the USDA recognized that the ability to
impose civil fines would serve as an "effective deterrent" for violations).
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a predatory rulemaking process, and may lead to the disposal of
environmental concerns in growing processes.
While it is unclear whether the voluntary nature of entry into
the Agreement has effectively harnessed consumer demand in com-
pelling universal membership, the lack of a "retainer" provision,
binding signatory handlers to the terms of the Agreement for a
minimum time period, allows for the gradual waning of membership
when consumer concern for produce safety declines, as has been
observed in the previously voluntary regulatory framework for leafy
produce. Finally, the Agreement's failure to impose sufficiently de-
terrent penalties further minimizes the LGMA's ability to induce
substantive changes in growing practices, while simultaneously re-
moving incentives for governmental agencies to conduct stringent
audits.
But while the consequences of these deficiencies are substantial,
they are neither creating obvious dilemmas today, nor are they par-
ticularly difficult to correct. With the appropriate modification of
the LGMA's terms, the current budgetary crises many states are fac-
ing make national implementation of such a program both a viable
and advantageous solution. A simple modification of the Agree-
ment's terms to enhance the representativeness and governmental
oversight of the Board, and to create a schedule of penalties for
noncompliance, will help ensure that the LGMA reflects a new, co-
operative effort at improving food safety - rather than a mere vari-
ant of the unsuccessful pre-outbreak framework.
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UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE: HEALTH
CARE REFORM, PREEMPTION, LABELING CLAIMS
AND UNPAID INTERNS: THE LATEST BATTLES
IN FOOD LAW
A. Bryan Endres,* Nicholas R. Johnson~ & Michaela N. Tarr
This edition of the Food Law Update explores four legal issues
arising in the first half of 2010 reflective of the diverse nature of the
food law specialist. As the national debate surrounding the merits
of health care reform dominated the legislative agenda, this article
first will discuss the food labeling rules embedded within section
4205 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.'
The authors then analyze the preemptive reach of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Meat Inspection Act with respect to
three separate California statutes regarding animal welfare stan-
dards, retail labels on meat packages and state-based mislabeling
claims for "natural" products. Section three further discusses litiga-
tion concerning allegedly misleading label claims of health benefits,
nutritional composition, natural foods and Country-of-Origin. The
final section of this Update explores an increasingly important legal
issue common in the local foods/small scale production content-
the use of unpaid "interns" as labor and potential changes in regula-
tory oversight.
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*** Ph.D. Candidate, Michigan State University; J.D., University of Michigan,
2009. The author would like to thank Michigan State University College of Law for
their research support.
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As in previous editions of this update, necessity dictates that
not every change is included; rather, the authors have limited their
analysis to significant changes within the broader context of food
production, distribution, and retail. The intent behind this series of
updates is to provide a starting point for scholars, practitioners,
food scientists, and policymakers dedicated to understanding the
shaping of food law in modem society. Tracing the development of
food law through these updates also builds an important historical
context for the overall development of the discipline.
I. HEALTH CARE REFORM AND FOOD LAW: Do WE REALLY WANT TO
KNow How MANY CALORIES ARE IN A HARDEE'S THICKBURGER@?
One Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty. That's the num-
ber of calories in a Hardee's 2/3 pound Monster Thickburger@.' Of
course, a consumer confronted with this staggering number could
opt for the Original Thickburger@, which, at a mere 860 calories,
seems positively healthful by comparison.' And a one-calorie Diet
Coke, of course.' But do consumers really want to know how many
calories are in their fast food? Apparently there is a compelling
health rationale,' and thus the much-maligned health care reform
law included a little-known provision mandating the nutrition label-
ing of chain restaurant standard menu items such as the Thick-
burger@.' This represents one of the first forays by the federal gov-
ernment into nutrition labeling in the food away from home sector.
Previous federal nutrition labeling requirements exempted food
sold at restaurants,' and only recently have state and local govern-
2. See Nutrition Information, HARDEES.cOM, http://www.hardees.com/system/
pdf menus/9/original/HardeesNutritionals_5.20.10.pdf 1285096241 (last visited
Dec. 20, 2010).
3. Id.
4. See Calories in Diet Coke, CALORIECOuNT.ABOuT.coM, http://
caloriecount.about.com/calories-coca-cola-diet-coke-i98053 (last visited Nov. 22,
2010).
5. See Disclosure of Nutrient Content Information for Standard Menu Items
Offered for Sale at Chain Restaurants or Similar Retail Food Establishments and for
Articles of Food Sold From Vending Machines, 75 Fed. Reg. 39,026 (July 7, 2010)
(stating that "nutritional information through menu labeling would provide Ameri-
cans the opportunity to exercise personal responsibility and make informed choices
about their diets" and citing studies that providing nutrition information assists
customers in making healthier eating decisions at restaurants).
6. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H) (2006).
7. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(A)(1) (2006) (exempting restaurants from the gen-
eral nutrition labeling requirements).
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ments, on an ad hoc basis, required restaurants to provide some
form of nutritional information on their menus.' For example, as
of May 2008, New York City requires calorie displays on menus of
chain restaurants with over 15 locations nationwide.' California en-
acted a similar bill with state-wide implementation effective January
1, 2011.
The amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act require
chain restaurants, defined as a restaurant with twenty or more loca-
tions operating under the same name and offering substantially the
same menu items, to disclose the number of calories and a state-
ment indicating the suggested daily caloric intake." The calorie dis-
closure must be on the printed menu and menu board (including a
drive-through menu board). In addition, restaurants must provide
customers, upon request, printed information regarding calories,
total fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, sodium, total carbohydrates,
complex carbohydrates, sugars, fiber, and total protein"-in sum, the
nutrition information generally required on packaged food prod-
ucts." A similar rule applies to individuals owning or operating
twenty or more vending machines." In this case, the vending ma-
chine operator must provide a sign in close proximity to the selec-
tion button for each item that discloses the caloric content.
On July 7, 2010, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) so-
licited comments to help guide the development of implementing
regulations. 7 The agency specifically requested information on cur-
8. See generally, CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, COMPARISON OF
MENU LABELING POLICIES, available at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/comparison
of mlpolicies_6-9.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2010).
9. 24 RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 81.50. For a more thorough discussion
of the New York City regulation and accompanying legal challenges to the menu
labeling requirements, see A. Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update, Consumer
Protections and Access to Information rBST, BPA, the ADA and Color Additives, 4 J.
FOOD L. & POL'Y 263, 291-293 (2008).
10. See S.B. 1420 (Cal. 2008) (codified at section 114094 of the California Health
and Safety Code).




14. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1)(C) and (D) (2006).
. 15. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119, 573 (2010) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(q)(5)(H)(viii).
16. Id.
17. See Disclosure of Nutrient Content Information for Standard Menu Items
Offered for Sale at Chain Restaurants or Similar Retail Food Establishments and for
Articles of Food Sold From Vending Machines, 75 Fed. Reg. 39,026 (July 7, 2010).
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rent menu board labeling practices, methodologies for considera-
tions related to condiments and custom orders, and any other fac-
tors deemed relevant by the public. Although this action repre-
sents a potentially controversial first step into greater federal over-
sight of nutrition in the restaurant industry, the FDA noted that due
to the proliferation of state and local menu board labeling require-
ments, several stakeholders sought a national approach to ensure
uniformity and flexibility in the provision of additional nutrition
information. Of course, the final FDA rules, due no later than
March 23, 2011, will determine if these stakeholders get what they
bargained for, and it remains to be seen whether calorie disclosures
will entice consumers to switch from the Thickburger@ to more
modest offerings.
II. CALIFORNIA PREEMPTION ACTIONS
In several respects, California is the prototypical laboratory for
the exploration of alternative regulatory regimes." Most notably,
the Clean Air Act provides a mechanism for California to establish
vehicle emissions standards beyond the federal minimum.' Within
the food context, California was among the early leaders in estab-
lishing production standards for organic foods.' Not surprisingly,
California is a leader in developing novel animal welfare and label-
ing requirements. Likewise, it is not surprising that a host of litiga-
18. Id. at 39,027-28.
19. Public Law 111-148 requires the agency to issue proposed regulations im-
plementing the restaurant labeling rules no later than March 23, 2011. Id. at
39,027.
20. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("One of federalism's chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by
allowing for the possibility that 'a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country.'") (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 282 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
21. See California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of
Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California's 2009 and
Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehi-
cles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006) (gener-
ally prohibiting states from implementing emission controls standards); id. at §
7543(b)(1) (providing a waiver provision that allows states adopt emissions control
standards if certain criteria are met).
22. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 26569.13 (1979) (repealed 1990). See also A.
Bryan Endres, An Awkward Adolescence in the Organics Industry: Coming to Terms with
Big Organics and Other Legal Challenges for the Industry's Next Ten Years, 12 DRAKE J.
AGRic. L. 17, 19 (2007) (discussing early state organic certification laws).
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tion follows passage of these new production requirements. The
following section discusses two key preemption decisions in the fed-
eral and state courts of appeal regarding slaughter of "downer"
animals and point-of-sale labels on meat products. Within the con-
text of preemption, this section further analyzes a third federal dis-
trict court case exploring the interplay between the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and misbranding claims brought under
California law.
A. California Animal Rights Law Survives Preemption Challenge
before the Ninth Circuit
A major piece of California legislation aimed at the humane
treatment of non-ambulatory or "downer"" animals at slaughter-
houses has, for the most part, survived a preemption challenge by
meat industry groups. In March, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held in National Meat Association v. Brown" that the Federal
Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) does not preempt certain provisions of
the California Penal Code that prescribed criminal penalties for
stockyards and slaughterhouses that receive and process non-
"downer" animals for slaughter.
The case comes on the heels of considerable controversy. In
2008, the Humane Society of the United States released a video of
non-ambulatory cows at California slaughterhouses being kicked,
electrocuted, and dragged with chains, as well as other flagrant
abuse.2 ' The video triggered the largest beef recall in United States
history." In response, the California legislature amended §599f of
its penal code to (1) prohibit slaughterhouses and stockyards from
buying, selling, receiving, or processing non-ambulatory animals; (2)
prohibit slaughterhouses and stockyards from butchering, process-
ing, or selling meat from non-ambulatory animals for human con-
sumption, and (3) prohibit slaughterhouses from holding non-
ambulatory animals without taking "immediate action to humanely
euthanize the animal."2 In response to video footage showing im-
mobile cows being rammed with bulldozers and blasted through the
nostrils with high-pressure water hoses, the amendments also stipu-
23. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f(j) (West 2010) (defining "non-ambulatory" as
being "unable to stand and walk without assistance").
24. 599 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2010).
25. Id. at 1096.
26. Id.
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f(c) (West 2010). See also Brown, 599 F.3d at 1096.
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lated humane handling methods for moving non-ambulatory ani-
mals."
Shortly before the Act's newly amended provisions were to take
effect, the National Meat Association (NMA) filed suit in federal
district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.' The district
court held that the FMIA preempted the California law and entered
a preliminary injunction; the State of California, along with the
Humane Society and several other animal rights organizations, filed
an interlocutory appeal."
On appeal, the NMA argued that FMIA's specific provisions
dealing with non-ambulatory animals preempted California's new
law. Specifically, 21 U.S.C. § 603(a) requires federal inspection of all
animals capable of being sold into interstate commerce as meat for
human consumption.3 ' Federal regulations require that any animals
identified as non-ambulatory during these inspections be classified
as "U.S. Suspect" and held for further examination;32 if further in-
spection reveals certain diseases, then the animal must be disposed
of.33 If, however, the animal passes this second-level inspection, it
may be slaughtered and distributed for human consumption." The
FMIA contains a general preemption provision prohibiting states
from prescribing additional or differing requirements "with respect
to premises, facilities, and operations of any establishment at which
inspection is provided."'
Focusing carefully on the express preemption clause of the
FMIA, the Court of Appeals rejected NMA's arguments. It reasoned
that while the clause preempted laws that dealt with "premises, fa-
cilities, and operations" of slaughterhouses, the California provi-
sions simply regulated the types of animals that can and cannot be
slaughtered in California slaughterhouses." As the California provi-
sions "[do not] require any additional or different inspections than
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f(e) (West 2010) ("[A] non-ambulatory animal may
not be dragged at any time, or pushed with equipment at any time, but shall be
moved with a sling or on a stoneboat or other sled-like or wheeled conveyance.").
29. Brown, 599 F.3d at 1096.
30. Id. at 1097.
31. Id.
32. 9 C.F.R. § 309.2(b) (2010). See also Brown, 599 F.3d at 1097.
33. 9 C.F.R. §§ 309.4-309.18. See also Brown, 599 F.3d at 1097.
34. 9 C.F.R. § 309.2. See also Brown, 599 F.3d at 1097-98.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2006). See also Brown, 599 F.3d at 1098.
36. Brown, 599 F.3d at 1098. See also Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551
(7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the FMIA does not preempt state law banning horse
slaughter); Empacadora de Carnes de Fresillo v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2007)
(same).
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does the FMIA, [it] is thus not a regulation of the 'premises, facili-
ties, and operations' of slaughterhouses." On the issue of implied
conflicts preemption, the court noted that it is not impossible to
comply with both sets of regulations at once because the FMIA does
not require that non-ambulatory animals be slaughtered for human
consumption.' Instead, said the court, the FMIA's inspection pro-
cedures apply if an animal is to be slaughtered for human consump-
tion; the question of whether certain animals should be slaughtered
"is up to the states.""
While the bulk of the California provisions survived a preemp-
tion analysis, the court suggested in dicta that the humane handling
provision of the California law would not survive a preemption chal-
lenge because it prescribed "additional" or "different" requirements
that would be in conflict with federal law (in particular, the federal
law allows the dragging of unconscious non-ambulatory animals,
whereas the state law does not)."0 But because the district court had
failed to make the requisite findings of likelihood of irreparable in-
jury and balance of the equities needed to justify a preliminary in-
junction, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order in
its entirety."
The Brown decision has broader significance within the context
of the continuing controversy surrounding California's recent push
for more robust animal welfare laws. In 2008, California voters
passed the Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act - popularly
known as Proposition 2 - which prohibits the confinement of cer-
tain animals (including chickens, veal calves, and sows) in ways that
do not allow the animals to extend their limbs or otherwise roam
freely about.2 Though the new provisions are not scheduled to take
effect until 2015, considerable confusion already exists as to prohib-
ited activities and enforcement methodologies. In July 2010, ani-
37. Brown, 599 F.3d at 1099.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1099-1100.
40. Id. at 1101.
41. Id.
42. Prop 2 Wins in California!, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (Nov. 5, 2008),
http://aldf.org/article.php?id=757; Text of Proposed Laws, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE,
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-
proposed-laws.pdf#prop2 (last visited Dec. 20, 2010).
43. One of the largest California egg producers, J.S. West, recently spent $3.2
million upgrading to larger, air-conditioned chicken cages furnished with such
luxuries as hen-style nail files. J.S. West company president Eric Benson told the
Wall Street Journal in August that the cages "go way beyond" Proposition 2 require-
ments. Jean Guerrero, Cracking California's Egg Rules, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2010),
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mal rights activists and California legislators united behind a new
law, pushed through the California Assembly as A.B. 1437, which
bans all out-of-state eggs that do not comply with Proposition 2 re-
quirements." So despite the recent partial victory for animal rights
activists in Brown, litigation over animal welfare will surely continue:
The protectionist language in A.B. 1437 leaves the law susceptible to
a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge, and the National Meat As-
sociation will likely continue to pursue its challenge of the California
Penal Code's humane handling methods, using the Ninth Circuit's
dicta as substantial leverage.
B. FMIA Preemption of State Point-of-Sale Warnings on Meat Products
In a case decided in late 2009, a California state court of ap-
peals examined the terms "label" and "labeling" as used in the Fed-
eral Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and concluded that the federal law
preempts state law requirements pertaining to "point-of-sale" warn-
ings on meat products.
The case, American Meat Institute v. Leeman," involved imple-
mentation of the California Safe Drinking Water and Toxic En-
forcement Act of 1986 (commonly known as Proposition 65) and
the FMIA's meat labeling requirements. Proposition 65 requires the
state to maintain a list of all chemicals known to cause cancer or
reproductive toxicity and requires retailers to warn consumers about
products sold in their stores that contain such chemicals." One of
the ways a retailer may give warning is via "point-of-sale" notices -
that is, signs or advertisements placed on or near the display case or
shelf where a product is offered for sale but not actually placed onto
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703908704575433881581660408
.html. Nonetheless, the move drew criticism from the Humane Society, which has
consistently maintained that the only way to comply with Proposition 2 require-
ments is to raise chickens in cage-free environments. Id. Association of California
Egg Farmers Executive Director Debbie Murdock, whose organization has called for
clearer standards, summed up her position on the law for the Wall Street Journal:
"'Who knows what the law states.'" Id.
44. Jim Miller, Bill Would Apply Caged Hen Rules To Out-Of-State Eggs, THE PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (May 11, 2009), http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/PE
NewsLocal_S-eggsll.4644e80.html; Press Release, Humane Society of the United
States, Governor Schwarzenegger Signs Landmark Egg Bill Into Law (July 6, 2010),
available at http-://www.humanesociety.org/news/press-releases/2010/0 7/abl437_
passage_070610.htmL
45. 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759, 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), review denied, No. S179937
2010 WL 1088008 (Cal. 2010).
46. Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 763.
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the packaging itself." To be in compliance with Proposition 65 re-
quirements, the point-of-sale sign must clearly state that the particu-
lar meat product on display contains a chemical known to the state
to cause cancer and/or cause birth defects or other reproductive
harm.
At the federal level, the USDA has implemented a detailed
regulatory scheme for meat labeling. 9 These regulations provide
generally that "no final labeling shall be used on any product unless
the sketch labeling of such final labeling has been submitted for ap-
proval" to the applicable regulatory agency.50 Furthermore, the
FMIA contains an express preemption clause that prohibits states
from enacting "marking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient re-
quirements in addition to, or different than" those contained in the
FMIA.' The FMIA also defines "labeling" as "all labels and other
written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or its con-
tainer or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article." Accord-
ingly, the plaintiffs argued that point-of-sale warnings constituted
"labeling" under the FMIA because they constitute "written, printed
or graphic matter" that accompany the meat to which it relates." The
trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and the
appeals court affirmed, holding that the FMIA expressly preempted
Proposition 65's labeling requirements as applied to meat prod-
ucts.
On appeal, the central question for the court was whether warn-
ings that accompany meat products constitute "labeling" within the
scope of the FMIA. Because the FMIA does not define specifically
the word "accompany," the court turned to U.S. Supreme Court
precedent for its analysis. In Kordel v. United States,"5 the Court in-
terpreted the word "labeling" within the context of the FDCA.
Critically, the Court held that certain material "accompanies" a
product - and therefore constitutes "product labeling" - if the mate-
47. Id. at 763-64.
48. Id. at 764. See also People ex. rel. Lundgren v. Cotter & Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
368, 372 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) ("[A] merchant can comply with Proposition 65 by
posting a sign stating that the products are known to the state to cause cancer
and/or are reproductively toxic.").
49. See 9 C.F.R. §§ 317.1-317.400 (2010); Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 765.
50. 9 C.F.R. § 317.4(a); Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 765.
51. 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2006). See also Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 765.
52. 21 U.S.C. § 601(p). See also Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 775-76.
53. Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 776.
54. Id. at 767, 785.
55. 335 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1948).
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rial "supplements or explains [the product]...No physical attachment
one to the other is necessary."5 6 The Court further held that mate-
rial constitutes "labeling" if it is "designed for use in the distribution
and sale" of the product."
The Leeman court expressly adopted the Kordel Court's defini-
tion of "labeling" for purposes of its FMIA analysis, noting that
Congress had defined the word "labeling" in the FMIA by borrow-
ing the FDCA's definition of that word (as interpreted by Kordel)."
With that work done, the Leeman court's express preemption analy-
sis is straightforward: It concludes that the purpose of Proposition
65 warnings was to communicate to consumers that this particular
piece of meat contains carcinogens or reproductive toxins, and that
point-of-sale warning signs containing this product-specific informa-
tion, though not physically attached to the product, necessarily will
"supplement or explain the meat offered for sale" and will be used
"in the distribution and sale" of the product.55  Accordingly, the
court held that the point-of-sale warnings constituted "labeling"
within the meaning of the FMIA preemption clause.
Though decided by a state court, the Leeman case nonetheless
deserves an extended mention in this Update because of the court's
comprehensive search for the meaning of the terms "label" and "la-
beling" as used in the FMIA. In addition to examining the USDA's
own interpretation of the terms in various policy memorandums
and informal guidance, the court reviewed caselaw interpreting the
terms as used in statutes with similar wording - namely, the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act. This thorough search for meaning may
well guide other courts (including federal ones) in future labeling
litigation.
C. FDCA Does Not Preempt State Law-Based Mislabeling Claims
A California federal district court ruled in June 2010 that the
express preemption provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) did not preempt suits brought under state law
for false or misleading product labels. In Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural
Beverage Co."-a class action suit brought on behalf of consumers
56. Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 778 (quoting Korde 335 U.S. at 350).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 781-82.
59. Id. at 784-85.
60. 268 F.R.D. 365 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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allegedly deceived by the packaging and labeling on Blue Sky bever-
age cans-the plaintiffs argued the labels implied that the soda was
canned in New Mexico, when in fact it was not." The plaintiffs al-
leged violations of the California Business and Professional Code
and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, as well as common law
claims of fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.' The defendants
argued that the FDCA preempted the claims.
On the issue of express preemption, the Chavez court noted
that although the FDCA includes a preemption clause (codified at
21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)) that lists certain provisions expressly preempt-
ing state law, the relevant section addressing "false or misleading
labeling" was not among them." The crux of the defendants' im-
plied preemption analysis revolved around § 337(a) of the FDCA,
which provides that only the federal government and the States (and
not private citizens) may bring civil enforcement proceedings for
violations of the FDCA.' The defendants argued that this provision
effectively committed enforcement to the FDA, to the exclusion of
state consumer law claims; the defendants also argued that such
claims would stymie the purpose of the FDCA (ostensibly, consistent
enforcement of food labeling requirements)." The Chavez court
brushed off these arguments, holding that the lack of an FDCA ex-
press preemption clause addressing false and misleading labeling
demonstrated that Congress had no "clear and manifest" intent to
occupy the entire field of food labeling." The court also cited to the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Wyeth v. Levine," in which the
Court stated that while Congress enacted the FDCA "to bolster con-
sumer protection against harmful products," it did not provide a
federal cause of action for consumers injured by those products be-
cause it determined that "widely available state rights of action pro-
vided appropriate relief for injured consumers."'
In holding that the FDCA does not preempt state law remedies
for false and misleading packaging claims, the Chavez court falls in
line with several other district courts in California that have recently
61. Id. at 368.
62. Id. at 369.
63. Id. at 370.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2006); Chavez, 268 F.R.D. at 371.
65. Chavez, 268 F.R.D. at 371-73.
66. Id. at 372.
67. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
68. Chavez, 268 F.R.D. at 373 (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199).
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held that the FDCA does not preempt state claims for allegedly false
and misleading "natural" labels."
III. OTHER LABELING ACTIONS
According to a nationwide study published by the FDA in
March 2010, more than 50% of consumers read the food label on a
product the first time they purchase it." The FDA study also found
that 56% of those surveyed believe that "only some" or "none" of
the nutrient claims found on food labels (e.g., "low fat" or "high in
fiber") are accurate."
However, consumers are not the only ones casting a critical eye
toward health-related food labels. In February 2010, the FDA issued
warning letters to 17 companies." Though these warning letters
specifically targeted certain health claims (for example, 0 g trans fat
claims, or nutrient content claims on food or beverages marketed to
children under the age of 2), the FDA also issued an open letter to
the food industry indicating that the agency would step up general
enforcement of labeling violations." Parallel consumer lawsuits
against some of the companies singled out by the FDA (as discussed
below) have already commenced.
This consumer skepticism and heightened agency attention may
be, at least in part, what is driving the recent spate of lawsuits alleg-
ing that food manufacturers are misleading the public as to the pur-
ported health benefits of their products. This section of the Update
divides the discussion of these labeling claims into four separate
sections: false health claims, mislabeled and misbranded products,
69. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Con-Agra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (N.D. Cal.
2009); Wright v. General Mills, No. 08CV1532, 2009 WL 3247148 (S.D. Cal. Sept.
30, 2009); Hitt v. Arizona Bev. Co., No. 08CV809, 2009 WL 449190 (S.D. Cal. Feb.
4, 2009).
70. Conrad J. Choiniere & Amy Lando, 2008 Health and Diet Survey, U.S. FOOD
AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/
ConsumerResearch/ucml93895#HEALTHATTITUDES (last visited Nov. 18,
2010).
71. Id.
72. Warning Letters, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 3, 2010),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ucm202859.htm. See also Brad
Dorfman and Susan Heavey, U.S. Warns Nestle, Others For Misleading Food Claims,
REUTERS, Mar. 3, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN03386
5520100303?pageNumber-l
73. Open Letter from Margaret Hamburg, Comm'r of Food and Drugs, U.S.
Food and Drug Admin., to Industry (Mar. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ucm202733.htm.
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"natural" products litigation, and country-of-origin labeling (COOL)
actions.
A. False Health Claims Litigation
1. Yo-Plus Probiotic Yogurt
Fitzpatrick v. General Mills,' which challenges the health claims
made as to Yoplait Yo-Plus yogurt, is a typical example of the health
claims litigation now pending in courtrooms across the country.
In July 2007, General Mills began selling Yoplait Yo-Plus yogurt,
which is a version of its regular yogurt supplemented with probiotic
bacteria and vitamins that purportedly promote digestive tract
health.7 ' General Mills subsequently launched a marketing blitz that
touted the "key benefit of digestive health" offered by Yo-Plus yo-
gurt.' Marketing tactics included a multimedia advertising cam-
paign, promotional materials sent to health professionals, and
health claims on Yo-Plus packaging. The marketing emphasized
regular consumption of the probiotic yogurt as essential to health.
Indeed, up until September 2008 Yo-Plus containers contained a
statement that implored consumers to "[e]at Yo-Plus every day to
help maintain a balance of good-for-you bacteria in your digestive
system and regulate digestive health."7
In August 2009, Florida consumer Julie Fitzpatrick filed a puta-
tive class action in Florida federal district court alleging that she had
been deceived by General Mills' health claims on Yo-Plus yogurt.
The suit, which alleges violations of the Florida Deceptive and Un-
fair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) and a common law claim for
breach of express warranty, states that the plaintiff ate Yo-Plus yo-
gurt over a 12-month period, but that her digestive tract health re-
mained the same "before, during and after" eating the yogurt.
In early January, the district court certified a class of "all per-
sons who purchased Yo-Plus in the state of Florida to obtain its
claimed digestive health benefit."' The court held that issues com-
mon to the class of potentially thousands of members predominated
74. 263 F.R.D. 687 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
75. Id. at 690.
76. Id. at 691.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Fitzpatick, 263 F.R.D. at 692.
80. Id. at 698.
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over individual issues, with the main one being whether the Yo-Plus
marketing campaign was deceptive and misleading. As the court put
it:
General Mills cannot evade the unmistakable fact that the objective -
and realization - of its marketing campaign was to present Yo-Plus to
Florida consumers as a product that . . . aids in the promotion of diges-
tive health. The Court is not persuaded that the bulk of Florida con-
sumers made the decision to purchase Yo-Plus, which is priced signifi-
cantly higher than regular Yoplait yogurt, for reasons unrelated to its
purported digestive health benefits. Indeed, the most obvious reason
why consumers would buy Yo-Plus is that it promises something extra,
and that something extra is a digestive health benefit."'
As of this writing, an interlocutory appeal by General Mills is pend-
ing with the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Spurred on by the successful class certification in Fitzpatrick,
other plaintiffs have subsequently filed copycat suits that rely upon
similar consumer protection statutes and/or common law fraud
actions. In addition to the Florida action, cases are pending in Cali-
fornia,' New Jersey," and Ohio.' In June 2010, the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) denied a request to transfer and
consolidate the cases, finding that they all involve statewide class
claims that "will likely not overlap significantly."' The MDL panel
noted that "[b]ecause all plaintiffs are represented by mostly com-
mon counsel and General Mills is the sole defendant, the parties
have every ability to cooperate and minimize the possibilities of du-
plicative discovery and/or inconsistent pretrial rulings."'
The outcome of the Yo-Plus class action litigation may be influ-
enced by The Dannon Company's recent agreement with the Fed-
eral Trade Commission to refrain from making certain health claims
about its Activia brand yogurt after the FTC ruled that Dannon did
not have adequate scientific evidence to support its claims." As part
of the settlement, Dannon agreed to clarify that consumers must eat
three servings a day of Activia (which Dannon markets as a competi-
tor to Yo-Plus) to gain the digestive benefits the company claims the
81. Id. at 697.
82. Johnson v. General Mills, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-00061 (C.D. Cal. filedJan. 14, 2010).
83. Amin v. General Mills, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00305 (D.N.J. filedJan. 19, 2010).
84. Brock v. General Mills, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00060 (N.D. Ohio filedJan. 12, 2010).
85. In Re General Mills, Inc., Yoplus Yogurt Prod. Mktg. and Sales Practices
Litig, 716 F.Supp. 2d 1371 (J.P.M.L. 2010).
86. Id.
87. Timothy Williams, Dannon Settles With F. T. C. Over Some Health Claims, N.Y.
TIMEs (Dec. 16, 2010), at B6.
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yogurt can provide.' The FTC action follows a September 2009
class action settlement in which Dannon agreed to change the mar-
keting and labeling of its Activia products and pay $35 million to
reimburse consumers deceived by the company's claims."
2. Omega-3 Fatty Acids
Two separate lawsuits have challenged statements made by food
companies regarding the health benefits of omega-3 fatty acids.
One of these cases, Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc.,' targets a company
that was the subject of the FDA warning letter action mentioned
above. In February, the FDA sent a warning letter to Diamond
Foods advising the company that the claims it was making about
omega-3 on its shelled walnut packaging were false and misleading;"
in March, the Zeisel putative class action suit was filed. The com-
plaint alleges that Diamond Foods' claims linking consumption of
the omega-3 fatty acids contained in walnuts to improved heart
health and a lower risk of heart disease are false and misleading, and
therefore violate the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act. 9
In September, the case survived a motion to dismiss on grounds that
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempted the state
claims; in doing so, the court cited to the Chavez decision discussed
above."
An earlier-filed state court suit, Aust v. NW Natural Prods., Inc.,"
makes similar claims against a maker of omega-3-enriched gummy
fish. That suit follows on the heels of a 2009 Federal Trade Com-
mission letter that warned the defendant that its labels might be vio-
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Complaint, Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc., No. 10-cv-01192, 2010 WL
1459053 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
91. Warning Letter from Roberta Wagner, Dir., Office of Compliance, Ctr. For
Food Safety, FDA, to Michael Mendes, President, Diamond Foods, Inc. (Feb. 22,
2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/Warning
Letters/ucm202825.htm.
92. Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc., No. 10-cv-01192, at 1-2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3,
2010) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss), available at
http://wrww.foodliabilitylaw.com/uploads/file/Zeisel.pdf The Complaint also alleged
unlawful and fraudulent business practices, false advertising, and unjust enrich-
ment. Id.
93. Id. at 4. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text (discussing the Chavez
case).
94. No. 2:2010cv00496 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County, filed Mar. 23, 2010).
2010] 325
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
lating federal false advertising laws.' As of this writing, the Aust case
is pending in King County Superior Court in Washington State.
B. Allegations of Misleading Nutritional Claims
In addition to health claims cases, recent lawsuits have targeted
companies who have allegedly misled consumers as to the nutri-
tional content of their products, with varying success. In May 2010,
a federal district court in California dismissed a putative class action
against Unilever, the maker of "I Can't Believe It's Not Butter
Spread," which claimed that the company deceived consumers by
labeling its butter substitute as being "made with a blend of nutri-
tious oils" despite containing partially hydrogenated vegetable oil -
a artificial substance that the plaintiffs argued "has no nutritional
value and is known to cause a number of health problems."' The
decision, Rosen v. Unilever United States, Inc., held that while the
plaintiffs' state law claims survived a preemption challenge under
the federal Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, they did not sur-
vive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." The
court held that the plaintiffs failed to plead with any particularity
both the major premise (that "all constituent oils [in the spread]
must be nutritious in order for the blend to be nutritious") and the
minor premise ("that partially hydrogenated oil is not nutritious")
upon which the suit was based."
Pending litigation filed in early 2010 has also taken aim at mis-
leading fat content claims. In February, plaintiffs represented by the
same attorney filed two separate putative class action lawsuits
against Kellogg Co. and Quaker Oats in California federal district
courts, alleging that the two companies misrepresented the trans fat
content of some of their baked goods. The complaint in Chacanaca
v. Quaker Oats Co. alleges that Quaker Oats advertised its Chewy
Granola Bars as containing zero grams of trans fat when in fact they
contained levels of the artificial fat that made the products "danger-
ous and unfit for human consumption. " The complaints allege vio-
95. Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Adver. Practices, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, to Robert E. Armstrong (Oct. 30, 2009), available at http-//
www.ftc.gov/os/closings/091030northwestclosingletter.pdf.
96. Rosen v. Unilever United States, Inc., No. 09-02563, 2010 WL 4807100, at *1
(N.D. Cal. 2010).
97. Id. at *4
98. Id. at *5-6.
99. Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., No. 10-0502, 2010 WL 4055954 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
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lations of various California consumer protection statutes, as well as
common law unfair competition claims.'" Another suit,
Higginbotham v. Kellogg Co.,' makes similar allegations against Kel-
logg's NutriGrain bars and several brands of cookies."
Consumer plaintiffs have also targeted foods advertised and la-
beled as "low in sodium" or generally "healthy." In March 2010, a
complaint filed in New Jersey federal district court alleged that
Campbell's Soup Co. misrepresented the salt and fat content in its
"Less Sodium" and "Healthy Request" soup brands. The complaint
in Smajlaj v. Campbell Soup Co. claims that the company's "25% Less
Sodium" tomato soup contains 480 mg of sodium per serving - ex-
actly the same amount as the company's regular tomato soup." 3
And it claims that Campbell's advertises its "Healthy Request" soup
line as being "low in fat and cholesterol" when in fact certain varie-
ties of that soup contain more grams of fat per serving than the regu-
lar soup line." The complaint alleges violations of the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act, as well as claims for breach of express war-
ranty and unjust enrichment."o
C. Natural Foods Litigation
1. High Fructose Corn Syrup
A New Jersey district court has taken a potentially significant
step toward resolution of the ongoing and seemingly never-ending
litigation battle over whether drinks containing high fructose corn
syrup (HFCS) may include an "all natural" label. Coyle v. Hornell
100. Id.
101. Complaint at 15-17, Higginbotham v. Kellogg Co., No. 10-CV-255 (S.D.Cal.
Feb. 1, 2010).
102. In addition to the suits against Kellogg and Quaker Oats, a New York resi-
dent filed a similar labeling claim in California federal district court in March
against Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, a company that had previously been targeted by
the FDA in its warning letter actions the month before. However, that suit was
dismissed in August after the court held that the plaintiff did not have standing to
bring the claim under California consumer protection laws. Carrea v. Dreyer's
Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. C 10-01044 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010) (order granting
plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and granting defendant's motion to dismiss).
103. Complaint at 2, Smajlaj v. Campbell Soup Co., No. 1:33-av-00001 (D.N.J.
filed Mar. 12, 2010), available at http://classactionlawsuitsinthenews.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/03/Campbell-Tomato-Soup-Class-Action-Complaint.pdf.
104. Id. at 7-8.
105. Id. at 9-10.
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Brewing Co., '" is the latest in a series of cases filed in federal court
that have challenged "all natural" product labels on Snapple bever-
ages and Arizona Iced Tea." The plaintiffs in these cases allege that
"the complicated process used to create HFCS does not occur in
nature and that the molecules in HFCS were not extracted from
natural sources, but instead were created through enzymatically
catalyzed chemical reactions in factories" and therefore cannot be
considered "natural" ingredients.'"
In 1993, the FDA solicited comments from the public on the is-
sue, but ultimately declined to initiate rulemaking procedures to
establish a definition for the term "natural."'" Instead, it decided to
maintain its informal policy of defining a "natural" product as one
in which "nothing artificial or synthetic (including all color additives
regardless of source) has been included in, or has been added to, a
food that would not normally be expected in the food.""' Since that
time, the FDA has taken a case-by-case approach to the certification
of particular ingredients as "natural," and has implemented only one
regulation addressing the issue."' In 2009, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that the FDA's informal guidance on the term
"natural" was insufficient to accord the definition the weight of fed-
eral law and therefore did not preempt state law mislabeling
claims."
That preemption ruling by the Third Circuit allowed cases like
Coyle - which are based primarily on state consumer protection stat-
utes and common law fraud claims - to continue. In Coyle, however,
the defendants asked the district court to dismiss the action pursu-
106. No. 08-02797, 2010 WL 2539386 (D.N.J. 2010).
107. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d. Cir. 2009) (holding that
FDA's guidance on the term "natural" did not carry the force of federal law and
therefore did not preempt state claims under consumer protection statutes and the
common law); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742, 2010 WL
3119452 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying plaintiffs' motion to certify a class without ad-
dressing preemption issues); Covington v. Hornell Brewing Co., et al., No. 08-21894
(S.D. Fla. June 6, 2010) (order dismissing case with prejudice) (dismissing putative
class action suit); Von Koenig v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1066
(E.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that FDA's guidance on the term "natural" did not carry
the force of federal law and therefore did not preempt state claims under consumer
protection statutes and the common law).
108. Von Koenig 713 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
109. Coyle, 2010 WL 2539386 at *2.
110. Id. at *2.
111. Id. at *3.
112. Holk, 575 F.3d at 341-42. See also Von Koenig 713 F. Supp. 2d at 1076 (ac-
cepting as persuasive the Holk court's preemption ruling for purposes of an analysis
of the safe harbor exception to California consumer protection laws).
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ant to the abstention doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which is ap-
plicable when "an action that is otherwise within the court's jurisdic-
tion raises some issue of fact that falls within the expertise and ex-
perience of an administrative agency."" The court agreed, noting
that the case satisfied each of the four factors typically used in de-
termining whether the doctrine applies."' First, categorizing HFCS
as a "natural" ingredient involved "technical or policy considera-
tions" within the FDA's particular area of expertise, and the ques-
tion was appropriately within the FDA's discretion."' Second, and
more critically, the court worried that any determination it made as
to the status of HFCS as a "natural" ingredient could be inconsistent
with rulings made by other district courts in the course of other cur-
rently pending HFCS litigation."' The court therefore referred the
question of HFCS as a "natural" ingredient to the FDA and stayed
the action for six months pending a determination.
And so the HFCS saga will continue for now. The administra-
tive review process that the Coyle court used to send its question to
the FDA is discretionary; it directs the FDA Commissioner to "insti-
tute a proceeding to determine whether to issue, amend, or revoke a
regulation or order, or take or refrain from taking any other form of
administrative action..""' The Coyle court, recognizing this, reserved
the right to extend the time period if the FDA indicated it would
resolve the issue, or to terminate the stay and answer the question
itself if the FDA were to decline the referral."'
113. Coyle at *3 (citing Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993)).
114. The factors are:
(1) whether the question at issue is within the conventional expertise of
judges or whether it involves technical or policy considerations within the
agency's particular area of expertise;
(2) whether the question at issue is particularly within the agency's discre-
tion;
(3) whether there exists a substantial danger of inconsistent rulings;
(4) whether a prior application to the agency has been made. Id.
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id. at *4.
117. 21 C.F.R. § 10.25 (2010). See also Coyle at *4, FN 6.
118. Coyle at *5. As this article went to press, the Coyle court lifted the stay and
allowed the case to proceed after the FDA formally notified the court that it would
not provide guidance on the term "natural." Coyle v. Hornell Brewing Co., No. 08-
2797 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2010). More recently, two other federal district courts have
dismissed with prejudice "all natural" claims against Snapple Beverage Corporation.
See Holk v. Cadbury Schweppes Americas Beverages, No. 07-3018 (D.J.N. Nov. 23,
2010); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07-8742 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2011).
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2. Other "Natural" Products
After two years of litigation, Tyson Foods has reached a settle-
ment in a lawsuit which claimed that the company had falsely la-
beled its chickens as "raised without antibiotics."".. The proposed
settlement, filed in January 2010, sets aside $5 million for a multi-
tiered plaintiff class: up to $50 in recovery for consumers who can
provide a receipt of purchase, up to $10 in recovery for plaintiffs
who can estimate how much they spent, and a $5 coupon for those
who simply claim to have purchased the mislabeled chickens.'o A
company spokesperson said that Tyson believes it "acted appropri-
ately" with regard to its "Raised Without Antibiotics" labeling initia-
tive, but felt it prudent to "resolve this legal matter and move on."'
D. Country-of-Origin Labeling
There have been several significant developments in county-of-
origin labeling (COOL) litigation since the Spring 2009 Update -
the most significant of which is a Washington federal district court's
rejection in February 2010 of a challenge to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's final COOL regulations. In Easterday Ranches v. USDA,
a beef processing company that frequently imports Canadian cattle
into the U.S. for slaughter argued that the USDA's COOL rules
impermissibly conflicted with prior country-of-origin rules issued by
the Treasury Department.'2 ' The district court disagreed, holding
119. In Re Tyson Foods Inc., Chicken Raised Without Antibiotics Consumer
Litig., No. RDB-08-1982 (D. Md. May 11, 2010) (memorandum opinion and order
granting settlement).
120. Ben Nuckols, Settlement Over Tyson's No-Antibiotics Claim Offered, TULSA
WORLD, Jan. 15, 2010, http-//www.tulsaworld.com/business/article.aspx?subjectid=
47&articleid=20100115_47 E6_BALTIM861949&rss Ink=5.
121. Id.
122. See A. Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update: Pasteurized Almonds and
Country of Origin Labeling, 5 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 111 (2009).
123. No. cv-08-5067-RHW, 2010 WL 457432 (E.D. Wash. 2010). The Food, Con-
servation and Energy Act of 2008 Pub. L. No. 110-234, 132 Stat. 923 (2008) [here-
inafter 2008 Farm Bill], represented a change in country-of-origin labeling require-
ments with respect to cattle imported into the United States for immediate slaugh-
ter. Prior to the 2008 Farm Bill, COOL labeling was regulated by U.S. Treasury
rules, which allowed cattle born and/or raised in Canada or Mexico but exported
to the U.S. for slaughter to be labeled exclusively as products of the United States.
19 C.F.R. § 102.11(a)(3) (2010); 19 C.F.R. § 102.20; see also Easterday Ranches, 2010
WL 457432 at *1. However, the 2008 Farm Bill's COOL provisions require such
cattle to be labeled first as a product of the country in which they were born and/or
raised, and then as a product of the United States. Food, Conservation, and Energy
330 [VOL. 6:311
UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE
that the COOL regulations mandated by the 2008 Farm Bill,12 1
rather than implicitly repealing or conflicting with the Treasury
marking rules,'2 1 "merely [provide] for the labeling of a particular set
of commodities that were previously free from any COOL require-
ments."126
On the consumer action front, plaintiffs seeking to certify a
class action lawsuit against a pet food maker that allegedly misrepre-
sented the country of origin of its products were handed a defeat by
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in January 2010. The
plaintiffs in Kennedy v. Natural Balance Pet Foods claimed that dog
and cat food products made by the defendant were mislabeled be-
cause they contained "Made in the USA" labels despite containing
ingredients sourced from China.' The district court denied class
certification and dismissed the action; the court of appeals, in an
unpublished opinion, agreed that the plaintiffs had failed to meet
the commonality and typicality requirements of FRCP 23(a), but also
held that the district court should have remanded the action to state
court rather than dismissing it.'"
Despite the Ninth Circuit's holding in Kennedy, country-of-
origin labeling on pet food will likely continue to be a litigated issue,
especially in the wake of the melamine-tainted pet food scare in
2007 that killed more than 4,000 cats and dogs and led to the largest
pet food recall in history.'"2 The melamine - a non-edible chemical
used to make plastics and fertilizers - was traced back to China-
sourced wheat gluten imported by the U.S. company ChemNutra.
In February, a magistrate judge in Kansas City, Missouri sentenced
the owners of ChemNutra, Stephen S. Miller and Sally Qing Miller,
Act § 11002 (2008) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1638a(a)(2)(C)(2006)); see also Easterday
Ranches, 2010 WL 457432 at *1; Endres, supra note 122, at 115.
124. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act § 11002 (2008).
125. 19 C.F.R. § 102.11.
126. Easterday Ranches, 2010 WL 457432 at *2.
127. Kennedy v. Natural Balance Pet Foods, No. 08-56378 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpub-
lished opinion).
128. Id. at 2-4.
129. See Lisa Wade McCormick, Chemnutra Owners Sentenced for Melamine-Tainted
Pet Food, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM (Feb. 6, 2010), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/
newsO4/2010/02/chinese formula22.html. See also A. Bryan Endres, United States
Food Law Update: Labeling Controversies, Biotechnology Litigation, and the Safety of
Imported Food, 3. J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 253, 278-80 (2007) (discussing the melamine-
tainted pet food outbreak).
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to three years' probation for their role in the incident."0 The judge
also ordered the Millers and ChemNutra to pay a total of $30,000 in
fines.' The Millers had previously pled guilty to two strict-liability
misdemeanor violations of the FDCA: one count of selling adulter-
ated food and one count of selling misbranded food."' In addition
to the criminal penalties, the Millers and ChemNutra had previously
reached a $24 million civil settlement with owners of pets affected
by the tainted food."3
E. Labeling for the Discerning Consumer: Profit Margin
or Litigation Trap
The tie that binds all of these health claims and mislabeling ac-
tions together is, of course, the desire to stand out in a crowded
food marketplace. Food companies know that consumers increas-
ingly demand healthier foods (Wal-Mart's recent pledge to purchase
more locally grown, sustainable produce is just one example of this
trend);"' they also know that they must differentiate their own
products from the crowded market of "healthy" product choices.
The desire to be different can be generalized across the food prod-
ucts industry: even the marketing of pet food as being "Made in the
USA" is strategically aimed at consumers who would rather not see
Fido's Tender Vittles become a victim of outsourcing and globaliza-
tion. But it is also a matter of profit. A fundamental premise un-
derlying the Yo-Plus, Campbell's Soup, and HFCS beverage litiga-
tion is that the defendant companies allegedly duped consumers
into paying higher prices for "healthy" products that were allegedly
not any healthier than the company's regular product offerings.
Given the relative ease with which a product can be branded and
sold using consistent, easily appealing messaging - for example,
"Healthy Request" soup or yogurt with "good-for-you bacteria" - it is
not surprising to see push back by regulators and consumers seeking
substantiation. So long as the push for healthy food and product
differentiation continues, likely so too will accompanying litigation.
130. Sentencing for Chemnutra Over Misdemeanor Violations in Melamine Litigation,
FIERcEBIOTEcH.cOM (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.fiercebiotech.com/press-releases/
sentencing-chemnutra-over-misdemeanor-violations-melamine-litigation.
131. McCormick, supra note 129.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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IV. UNPAID FARM INTERNS: BALANCING THE NEED OF EDUCATION
WITH EMPLOYEE PROTECTION
On March 22, 2010, Washington State Governor Chris Gre-
goire signed into law a bill establishing a pilot program for unpaid
internships on small farms.' The bill is the Washington State legis-
lature's means of addressing the need for beginning farmer training,
while also protecting farm laborers from potential exploitation. For
many years, internships have been a means for beginning farmers to
learn sustainable or organic practices.' In theory, the farmer pro-
vides education and experience that would otherwise be unavailable
to the intern.' Some farms, however, may use the intern more for
grunt work than to provide mentorship,'" a problematic situation
that may create an unfair advantage and compromise wages and
worker protections in the industry as a whole.'" Regardless of how
the farmer and intern perceive the relationship, farmers who take
on unpaid interns may liable for costly labor law violations due to
varying applicability of state and federal labor laws.'o
The use of interns on farms has been garnering attention for
several reasons. First, the practice has been on the rise in recent
years as the local food movement increases demand for products
from small farms and more people from non-farming backgrounds
begin to pursue farming as a career (and experiential education to
135. See Farm Internship Program, 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 1084 (codified at
WASH. REv. CODE §§ 49.12.465, 50.04.237, 51.16.235) (expires Dec. 31, 2011).
136. Organizations such as the National Sustainable Agricultural Information
Service have maintained databases to connect interns to farmers since 1989. Sus-
tainable Farming Internships and Apprenticeships, NAT'L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. INFO.
SERV., http://attra.ncat.org/attra-pub/internships/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
137. DOUG JONES, INTERNSHIPS IN SUSTAINABLE FARMING: A HANDBOOK FOR
FARMERS 2 (Sarah IJohnston ed., 1999).
138. Leslie Cole, Nurturing the Next Crop of Farmers, OREGONLIVE.COM (July 27,
2010, 12:00 AM), http-//www.oregonlive.com/foodday/index.ssf/2010/07/nurt-
uring-the-nextscrop-of far.html.
139. Rob Rogers, Organic Farmers Probed by State Over Free Labor, MARINIJ.COM
(July 3, 2010, 9:21 PM), http://www.marinij.com/ci 15437591?IADID.
140. See, e.g., The Fair Labor Standards Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), (e) (2006) (defin-
ing employer and employee); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1182.11 (West 2010) (establishing
minimum wage for all industries); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 652.210 (West 2010) (de-
fining employer and employee). But see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-203(3)(F) (2009)
(exempting any "individual employed by an agricultural employer who did not use
more than five hundred (500) man-days of agricultural labor in any calendar quar-
ter of the preceding calendar year" from the definition of employee).
2010] 333
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
facilitate the transition)."' There are limited numbers of formal edu-
cational programs that offer instruction on operating a profitable,
sustainable farm."' These programs may also be problematic to the
extent that would-be farmers borrow money for tuition, thus starting
their careers with a debt load that could act as a barrier to acquiring
land and equipment. For the time being, this means interning on a
farm is a desirable means of obtaining necessary experience.
Second, with the economic downturn, the use of unpaid intern-
ships in all sectors has been on the rise,"' and the U.S. Department
of Labor (DOL) recently issued employer guidelines that clarify
when an internship may be unpaid."' Although there is an exception
for some agricultural work,"' this clarification may have alerted state
labor departments to potential violations and generated enforce-
ment actions in California"' and Oregon."'
If the current trend of rising interest in local foods and farming
as a profession continue, issues of obtaining on-farm experiential
education will also continue to rise. Although the shortage of train-
141. See Kim Severson, Many Summer Internships are Going Organic, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/dining/24interns.html?
scp=1&sq=many%20summer%20internships%20are%20going&st-cse ("Katherine L.
Adam, who runs the National Sustainable Agriculture Information Service, ... said
1,400 farms sought interns this year, almost triple the number two years ago. The
number of small farms, which attract the new agrarians and can use the cheap,
enthusiastic help, has grown sharply since 2003, according to the [D]epartment [of
Agriculture].").
142. For a listing of for-credit sustainable agricultural programs, see Farming For
Credit Directory, RODALE INSTITUTE, http://www.rodaleinstitute.org/ffc_directory
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010). The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
also publishes a directory that identifies universities and organizations providing
education and training. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING
OPPORTUNITIES IN SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE (19th ed. 2009), available at
http-//www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/pubs/edtr/EDTR2009.pdf. The directory lists op-
portunities for training and research to support sustainable agriculture in addition
to information on training in actual farming. Id.
143. Steven Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES, April 2,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/business/03intern.html?scp=l&sq=
the%20unpaid%20intern,%201egal&st=cse.
144. WAGE AND HOUR Div., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET # 71: INTERNSHIP
PROGRAMS UNDER THE FEDERAL FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2010), available at
http-//www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf. Note, however, Federal
courts may not apply all six factors. See Mathew H. Nelson, Internships and Federal
Law: Are Interns Employees?, 36 EMP. REL. L.J. 42 (2010).
145. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (2006); 29 C.F.R. Part 780 (2010). Discussed in
more detail infra.
146. See Rogers, supra note 139.
147. See Cole, supra note 138.
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ing opportunities for beginning farmers especially is acute in labor-
intensive sustainable systems, it presents a concern for all agricul-
ture as the farming population ages."' In some states, such as Cali-
fornia, unpaid internships are illegal because all employers must pay
workers minimum wage"' and overtime;" they also must invest in
workers' compensation insurance.m' However, there is a provision
for offsetting pay with the costs of room and board-a typical con-
sideration offered to interns."' Other states, such as Illinois' and
Arkansas,' allow agricultural exemptions to the minimum wage
similar to those found in the Fair Labor Standards Act.'5 Although
general advice to always pay minimum wage is useful in guarding
against legal liability,"' such counsel does not account for the variety
of legal rules that may apply and fails to provide farmers with in-
formation on how to navigate the conflicts between their own per-
ceived need (unpaid labor) and desire (pass on knowledge) and the
constraints of the law. State agencies should, at minimum, provide
information on the parameters of state rules.' Ideally, however,
states should consider farm internship laws such as Washington's,
which proactively seek to address the concerns of the various stake-
holders.
Washington's farm internship law requires farmers earning less
than $250,000 to apply for a certificate from the Washington De-
partment of Labor (WA-DOL), demonstrating they have a training
or educational curriculum in place, and have a written agreement
outlining the terms of the internships that is signed by the intern
and filed with WA-DOL." The law is advantageous because it pro-
148. MARY AHEARN & DoRis NEWTON, EcoN. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., BEGINNING FARMERS AND RANCHERS 17 (May, 2009), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/EIB53/EIB53.pdf.
149. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1182.11 (2010).
150. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1815 (2010).
151. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3700 (2010).
152. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1182.13 (2010).
153. ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/3(d)(2) (2010).
154. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-4-203(3)(H) (2010).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2006).
156. For instance, see Neil Hamilton's advice to treat interns as employees by
tracking hours and paying minimum wages. Reggie Knox, The Farm Intern Conun-
drum, CALIFORNIA FARM FUTURES, Spring, 2010, at 3, available at
http://califomiafarmlink.org/pdfs/spring_2010.pdf.
157. For instance, the Oregon Department of Agriculture provides information
on their website on complying with labor law in employing interns. Or. Dep't of
Agric., Farm Internships in Oregon, OREGON.GOV, http://www.oregon.gov/ODA/
farmjinternships.shtml (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
158. Farm Internship Program, 2010 WASH. SESs. LAws 1084, supra note 135.
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vides oversight of internships by the DOL, while also enabling and
mandating education. Furthermore, it is a pilot program requiring
the WA-DOL to submit an outcomes report to the legislature in De-
cember, 2011." The data from this report may be useful to other
states considering authorizing farm internship programs.
However, Washington law has a shortcoming in that it fails to
integrate the minimum wage requirements and exemptions estab-
lished by federal law, which could result in inadvertent non-
compliance. Under federal law, employers must pay minimum wage
unless exempt;' an agricultural employer is exempt from minimum
wage requirements if he or she employed agricultural workers for
fewer than 500 man days per quarter in the preceding year.' Be-
cause the Washington law imposes different standards than federal
law (i.e., less than $250,000 in sales vs. 500 man days per quarter),
farmers who follow the Washington program's requirements may
nonetheless be in violation of federal law.
Nonetheless, this legislation is a valuable first step towards ad-
dressing a serious barrier to development of regional food systems.
Even as formal programs increase, on-farm training likely will always
remain an important learning opportunity, and many formal educa-
tional programs require an internship. Therefore, future legislation
needs to address how to balance the training requirements for be-
ginning farmers against demands of fairness and calls for employee
wage and working condition protections.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Consumer demand for a healthier and more transparent food
system continues to expand thereby raising a variety of legal issues
from employment of unpaid interns to work on small-scale farms for
experiential learning purposes to increased complexity and sophisti-
cation in both required and voluntary labeling claims on products.
Federal chain restaurant menu labeling requirements, litigation sur-
rounding false health claims, and other allegations of mislabeling
demonstrate the intensity of shifting food preferences and stake-
holder's struggles to balance consumer demand and market posi-
tioning within legal limits. Finally, an important development to
track, in light of multiple courts upholding the California animal
welfare and labeling laws, discussed above, will be the willingness of
159. Id.
160. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006).
161. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6)(a) (2006).
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other states to experiment with a wide variety of food labeling
and/or production requirements to satisfy their constituent's social,
environmental and economic preferences. Although an exciting
development from the consumer perspective, the resulting patch-
work of rules created via the legal laboratory know as California and
other states with strong consumer-protection laws could place a sig-
nificant burden on firms with multi-state operations seeking to push
the creative limits of food labels.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This EU Food Law Update will focus on the recent develop-
ments in the areas of genetically modified organisms, novel foods,
feed safety, transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, salmonella
and food borne diseases, food additives, organic farming, food con-
tact materials, and labeling.
II. GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS
On July 13, 2010, the Commission issued a Communication
proposing that Member States be able to allow, restrict, or ban the
cultivation of genetically modified organisms in their entire territory
or in part of their territory.' Up until now, Member States wanting
to forbid the cultivation of GMOs could do so based on the safe-
guard clause of article 23 of Directive 2001/18/EC or based on the
emergency measures laid out in article 34 of Regulation (EC) No
1829/2003. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), however,
has not always deemed this ban scientifically justified. Because the
Commission feels that the reasons for wanting to ban the cultivation
of GMOs are diverse (e.g., national policies, biodiversity, nature
conservation objectives, etc.), they should be taken into account. As
a result, the Commission suggests that Member States should be
able to set conditions under which GMO cultivation could be
banned. These conditions would be in addition to those already set
* Emilie H. Leibovitch is a US-licensed attorney working on EU/
US/international food law issues in her law firm in Brussels, Belgium. She also
teaches American Civil Procedure and International Arbitration at the University of
Metz, France.
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at European level, and would have to respect the principles of non-
discrimination between national and non-national products and of
the free circulation of goods. The Commission submitted a proposal
to the European Parliament and the Council, and discussions are
thus now at their beginning stages.
On July 28, 2010, the European Commission issued six deci-
sions authorizing the import of six genetically modified maize lines:
two from Monsanto (MON88017xMON810, MON89034xNK603),2
two from Pioneer (1507x59122, 59122x1507xNK603),' and two from
Syngenta (Bt11xGA21, Btl1). 4 These six GMOs can be used as food,
food ingredients, feed, and "products other than food and feed con-
taining or consisting of [these maize lines] for the same uses as any
other maize with the exception of cultivation."'
In May 2010, several environmental associations expressed an
intention to file a complaint to the European Court of Justice
against the European Commission over the latter's decision to au-
thorize the genetically modified potato Amflora for cultivation in
the European Union.' According to the associations, the Commis-
sion violated the Directive on the deliberate release into the envi-
ronment of genetically modified organisms,' which prohibits to
some extent the approval of genetically modified plants that contain
antibiotic-resistance markers. The Commission had reached this de-
cision following confirmation of EFSA's previous finding that "ac-
cording to information currently available, adverse effects on human
health and the environment resulting from the transfer of the two
antibiotic resistance marker genes, nptlI and aadA, from GM plants
to bacteria, associated with use of GM plants, are unlikely."' In Sep-
tember 2010, Austria and Luxembourg indicated their intention to
join the associations in the lawsuit.
2. Commission Decision 2010/429, 2010 0.J. (L 201) 46 (EU); Commission
Decision 2010/420, 2010 0.J. (L 197) 15 (EU).
3. Commission Decision 2010/432, 2010 0.J. (L 202) 11 (EU); Commission
Decision 2010/428, 2010 0.J. (L 201) 41 (EU).
4. Commission Decision 2010/426, 2010 0.J. (L 199) 36 (EU); Commission
Decision 2010/419, 2010 0.J. (L 197) 11 (EU).
5. See supra notes 2-4.
6. Environmental Associations: Lawsuit Against Amflora in the European
Court of Justice, GMO COMPAss (May 11, 2010), available at http://www.gmo-
compass.org/eng/news/511 .euenvironmentalassociationslawsuitjagainst amflora.
html.
7. Council and Parliament Directive 2001/18, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1 (EC).
8. Press Release, European Food Safety Comm'n, EFSA Evaluates Antibiotic
Resistance Marker Genes in GM Plants (June 11, 2009), available at
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa-locale-I 1786207538121211902569389.htm.
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III. NOVEL FOODS
Following the March issuance of the Council Common Position
on the Commission Proposal for a Regulation on Novel Foods,' the
Parliament's Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Commit-
tee had MEP Kartika Liotard (the Netherlands) prepare a draft re-
port. The Council and the Parliament share the view that clones and
their offspring should not be regulated by the Novel Foods Regula-
tion, but the Council is afraid that not having them regulated in a
legal text, such as the Novel Foods Regulation for now, would gen-
erate legal uncertainties. The Parliament vehemently opposes the
inclusion of cloning in this Regulation because it sees this as open-
ing the door to a sentiment of tolerance over cloning, which could
in turn yield its future presence on the EU market. The Parliament
would rather have a separate law on cloning, while the Council
would prefer to include cloning in the Novel Foods Regulation and
have the Commission issue a report on the matter within a year of
the Regulation's adoption and make a legislative proposal should it
be needed. In its Common Position, the Council agreed to include
food from the first generation of clones' offspring in the definition
of novel food; this means that these food products would be subject
to the marketing authorization procedure prior to being placed on
the market. It is worth noting that the Council and the Commission
are not in total agreement either. The Commission does not agree
with the Council's position because it opposes the inclusion of food
from clones' offspring within the scope of the Novel Foods Regula-
tion.'o The current definition of novel food includes all foods de-
rived from animals obtained by new reproductive techniques (such
as cloning), but not the food derived from animals obtained by con-
ventional reproductive techniques. The Commission thus does not
see a proper justification for the inclusion of food from clones' off-
spring since they are obtained through conventional breeding tech-
9. Position of the Council at first reading with a view to the adoption of a Regu-
lation of the European Parliament and of the Council on novel foods, 11261/2/09
REV 2, 2008/0002 (COD), Mar. 5, 2010, available at http://register.con-
silium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st11/st1 1261-re02.en09.pdf.
10. Commission Communication to the European Parliament concerning the position of
the Council on the adoption of a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on novels foods, amending Commission Regulation (EC) No 1331/2008 and repealing
Regulation (EC) No 258/97 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1852/2001, COM
(2010) 124 final (Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=COM:2010:0124:FIN:EN:PDF.
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niques." The Commission therefore suggests maintaining "the legal
status quo for the food produced with new breeding techniques
such as cloning and to prepare the foreseen report by the end of the
year."2
With respect to nanotechnologies, the Parliament had re-
quested a legal definition of nanomaterials and their mandatory la-
beling. The Council, in its Common Position, indicated that the la-
beling should be set on a case-by-case basis in the authorization deci-
sion, but included a definition of "engineered nanomaterials."
In July 2010, the Parliament adopted a position in Second
Reading." The Parliament wants to exclude foods derived from
cloned animals and their offspring from the scope of the Regulation
and wants the Commission to issue a legislative proposal on foods
derived from cloned animals and their descendants within six
months before the application of the Regulation. Given the incom-
patibility between the positions of the Parliament and the Council,
the Novel Foods Regulation is now going to leave the process of co-
decision and go through conciliation. The conciliation is a negotia-
tion process in the form of a three-way discussion between represen-
tatives of the Council, representatives of the European Parliament,
and the Commissioner of the unit responsible for the proposal. The
participants then report to their group. With the Commission play-
ing a role of mediator, the parties try to draft a compromise - also
called a joint text - which then must be submitted to each branch
for approval according to each branch's rules: the Council's delega-
tion must approve the joint text by a qualified majority while the
Parliament's delegation can approve the joint text only by a simple
majority." Parties must approve a joint text within six weeks of the
first meeting of the Conciliation Committee, with a possibility to
extend that time period to eight weeks." Once the joint text is ap-
proved, the Parliament and the Council sign it, the text is published
in the Official Journal, and the procedure ends. Should one of the
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 July 2010 on the Council
position at first reading for adopting a regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on novel foods, amending Regulation (EC) No 1331/2008 and re-
pealing Regulation (EC) No 258/97 and Commission Regulation (EC) No
1852/2001, July 7, 2010, available at http-://www.europarl.europa.eu/
oeil/filejsp?id=5583302.
14. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C
115) 47, 174-175.
15. Id., art. 294(10) at 174.
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institutions fail to give approval within the six- (or eight-) week time
limit, the act is deemed not to have been adopted, and the proce-
dure ends.
IV. FEED SAFETY
In March 2010, Commission Regulation (EU) No 242/2010
creating the catalogue of feed materials was published." This cata-
logue was requested by Article 24 of Regulation (EC) No 767/2009
on the placing on the market and the use of feed; feed producers
are to list their feed materials in a common catalogue to provide
information to feed users." This Catalogue will then be updated
regularly. In addition to that, article 24(6) provides that "[t]he per-
son who, for the first time [as of September 1, 2010] places on the
market a feed material that is not listed in the Catalogue shall im-
mediately notify its use [in an Internet register set up and managed
by the representatives of the European feed business sectors]."" This
register was created on September 1, 2010.20 This is meant to satisfy
the transparency principle and to make the information on the
composition of new feed materials readily available to customers.
V. TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
On July 16, 2010, the Commission published a Communication
to the European Parliament and the Council on the TSE Road Map
2, which is a strategy paper on Transmissible Spongiform Encepha-
lopathies for 2010-2015.21 This document follows the first TSE Road
Map issued in 2005," and identifies six areas where changes could
be made with respect to the present TSE measures.
16. Id., art. 294(13)-(14) at 175.
17. Commission Regulation 242/2010, 2010 Oj. (L 77) 17 (EU).
18. Council Regulation 767/2009, art. 24, 2009 O.J. (L 229) 1, 13 (EC).
19. Id., art. 24(6) at 14.
20. Press Release, European Feed Mfr. Fed'n, Information to Feed Material
Suppliers (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://www.fefac.org/file.pdfFilelD=30926.
21. Commission Communication on the TSE Road Map 2: A Strategy Paper on Trans-
missible Spongiform Encephalopathies for 2010-2015, COM (2010) 384 final (July 16,
2010), available at http-//www.fsai.ie/uploadedfiles/legislation/FSAI_- Legis-
lation/2010/07-jul20 10/EUCommunication TSE.pdf.
22. Commission Communication on the TSE Roadmap, COM (2005) 322 final (July
15, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/tse-bse/dg
sanco en.htm.
23. Press Release, Europa, Following Achievements of 1st Roadmap, Commis-
sion Outlines Future Steps Regarding BSE/TSE in the TSE Roadmap 2 (July 16,
2010]1 343
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
The TSE Road Map 2 suggests that the European list of Speci-
fied Risk Materials be aligned with the international standards of the
World Organization for Animal Health (Specified Risk Materials are
tissues of ruminant animals that may contain BSE infectivity).4 The
document also recommends that a tolerance level of processed ani-
mal proteins be set. Processed animal proteins are defined as "ani-
mal proteins derived from animal by-products and which have been
treated so as to render them suitable for direct use as feed material
or for any other use in feedingstuffs, including pet food, or for use
in organic fertilisers or soil improvers; however, it does not include
blood products, milk, milk-based products, colostrum, gelatine, hy-
drolysed proteins and dicalcium phosphate, eggs and eggproducts,
tricalcium phosphate and collagen."2 Moreover, it calls for the re-
moval of provisions that ban the use of certain processed animal
proteins for non-ruminants (pigs, poultry and fish) without, how-
ever, removing the prohibition on intra-species recycling. Other
proposals are to increase the testing age limits to improve monitor-
ing, and to make scrapie eradication measures in line with the latest
scientific information (and thus adapt the measures if scientific data
confirms the noncontagious character of atypical scrapie)." It also
encourages the testing of live animals, should ante-mortem tests be-
come available, and stopping the systematic cohort culling of cattle
as long as they test BSE-negative before entering the food chain,
since no animals have tested BSE-positive in 2009.
This document will serve as a basis for discussions for the
Council, the Parliament and other stakeholders on how the EU
should address TSE within the next five years. Potential proposals
may emerge as a result of these discussions.
VI. SALMONELLA AND FOODBORNE DISEASES
On April 29, 2010, a Commission Regulation was published in
the Official Journal." Commission Regulation (EU) No 365/2010
2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference
=IP/10/957&format=HTML&aged=0&Ianguage=EN&guiLanguage=en.
24. See Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the TSE Roadmap 2, SEC
(2010) 899 final (July 16, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/
biosafety/tsebse/docs/CSWD RoadMapTSE-DTS-en.pdf.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Commission Regulation 365/2010, 2010 0.J. (L 107) 9 (EU).
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amends Commission Regulation (EC) No 2073/2005 of 15 Novem-
ber 2005 on microbiological criteria for foodstuffs29 with respect to
enterobacteriaceae in pasteurized milk and other pasteurized liquid
dairy products, and listeria monocytogenes in food grade salt. This
regulation changes the analytical reference method for enterobacte-
riaceae in pasteurized milk and other pasteurized liquid dairy prod-
ucts, and food grade salt was added in the list of ready-to-eat foods
for which it is not required to undertake regular testing for listeria.'
VII. FOOD ADDITIVES
In May 2010, the European Parliament vetoed the European
Commission's proposal to authorize thrombin, also called "meat
glue," as a food additive." Members of the European Parliament
were of the opinion that the larger surface area of meat and the cold
bonding process that is used to reconstitute meat products create a
risk of bacterial infection.2 Currently, Member States can decide to
authorize thrombin as a processing aid in food products. However,
additives are regulated at an EU level and additives can only be used
if they benefit consumers and do not mislead them." Here, the Par-
liament felt that since thrombin permits separate pieces of meat to
bind to produce a single meat product, the risk of misleading con-
sumers was clear.' The Parliament was also not convinced by the
prohibition against the use of thrombin in meat products served in
restaurants or other public establishments serving food, saying that
such a prohibition would still not prevent some establishments from
using thrombin and thus did not provide adequate protection
against the misleading of consumers."
29. Commission Regulation 2073/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 338) 1 (EC).
30. Commission Regulation 365/2010, supra note 26, at 12.
31. See Resolution of 19 May 2010 on the Draft Commission Directive Amending
the Annexes to European Parliament and Council Directive 95/2/EC on Food
Additives Other Than Colours and Sweeteners and Repealing Decision
2004/374/EC, EUR. PARL. Doc. P7LTA (2010) 0182 (2010), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do? pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-
TA-2010-0182+0+DOC+XML+V//EN&language=EN [hereinafter EP Resolution
on thrombin]; Press Release, European Parliament, MEPs Veto "meat glue" Au-





34. EP Resolution on thrombin, supra note 31.
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VIII. ORGANIC FARMING
On July 1, 2010, the obligation to display the new EU "Euro-
leaf' organic logo on prepackaged food produced within the Euro-
pean Union came into force."' When displayed on processed prod-
ucts, the logo certifies that at least 95% of the agricultural ingredi-
ents are organic.' The logo is accompanied with the code number of
the control body and the place where the agricultural raw materials
that compose the product were farmed." For the place of farming,
operators have a choice between "EU Agriculture" (for agricultural
raw material farmed in the EU), "non-EU Agriculture" (for agricul-
tural raw material farmed in third countries), and "EU/non-EU Ag-
riculture" (for products where part of the agricultural raw materials
has been farmed in the EU and part of it was farmed in a third coun-
try).' A two-year transition period was put in place.
On that same day, the new rules on organic aquaculture pro-
duction of fish, shellfish and seaweed came into force.' The Regula-
tion sets EU-wide criteria for production and stocking." It specifi-
cally requires the separation of organic and non-organic production
units.4 Specific stocking densities are set for particular species. It
also specifies that organic feed and fish meal coming from sustain-
able fisheries should be used for feeding purposes. The countries
that are the most active producers of foodstuffs coming from or-
ganic aquaculture are the UK, Ireland, Hungary, Greece and
France." The top species produced in such a way is salmon."
36. Logo and Labeling, EUROPA.EU, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/organic/
consumer-confidence/logo-labelling-en (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
37. European Comm'n on Agric. and Rural Dev., Questions & Answers,
ORGANIcFARMING.EU (Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/
organic/files/eu-policy/logo/FAQ_ogoen.pdf; see also Logo and Labeling,
EUROPA.EU, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/organic/consumer-confidence/logo-
labelling-en (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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IX. FOOD CONTACT MATERIALS
Commission Directive 2002/72/EC of 6 August 2002 relating
to plastic materials and articles intending to come into contact with
foodstuffs allows bisphenol A to be used in food contact materials in
the European Union." The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)
is working on an extensive opinion on bisphenol A. The full opinion
is expected to be adopted in September 2010.17 Bisphenol A has
been subject to scientific analysis for several years now. Back in
2006, EFSA set a Tolerable Daily Intake of 0.05 milligram/kg body
weight, an estimate of the quantity of bisphenol A that can be con-
sumed over a lifetime without any noticeable risk." A 2008 opinion
confirmed this level after conducting a study on the difference be-
tween infants and adults in the ability to eliminate bisphenol A from
their body." Following a study published in the Journal of the Amer-
ica Medical Association in September 2008,"o the European Commis-
sion asked EFSA to evaluate the study's conclusion that there was a
link between raised levels of urinary bisphenol A and increased oc-
currences of serious medical conditions such as cardiovascular dis-
eases and diabetes." EFSA found that the study did not sufficiently
prove such a link and the Agency decided not to question its estab-
lished Tolerable Daily Intake." Between October 2009 and March
2010, following a study commissioned by the American Chemistry
Council undertaken as a result of the introduction of a Canadian
law aimed at banning the use of bisphenol A in baby feeding bottles,
the Commission asked EFSA to evaluate the importance of this
46. Commission Directive 2002/72, 2002 O.J. (L 220) 18 (EC).
47. See Letter from Catherine Geslain-Landelle, Exec. Dir., European Food
Safety Auth., to Paola Testori Coggi, Dir. Gen., Health and Consumer Prot. Direc-
torate Gen., European Comm'n (July 8, 2010), available at http://
registerofquestions.efsa.europa.eu/roqFrontend/questionLoader?question=EFSA-
Q-2009-00864.
48. Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Food Additives, Flavourings, Processing Aids and
Materials in Contact with Food on a Request From the Commission Related to 2,2-BIS(4-
HYDROXYPHENYL)PROPANE (Bisphenol A), 428 THE EFSAJ. 1, 46 (2006).
49. Scientific Opinion of the Panel on Food Additives, Flavourings, Processing
aids and Materials in Contact with Food (AFC) on a Request From the Commission
on the Toxicokinetics of Bisphenol A, 759 THE EFSAJ. 1, 1-10 (2008).
50. lain A. Lang et al., Association of Urinary Bisphenol A Concentration With Medi-
cal Disorders and Laboratory Abnormalities in Adults, 300(11) J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1303,
1303-1310 (2008).
51. Scientific Opinion on Bisphenol A: Evaluation of a Study Investigating its Neurode-
velopmental Toxicity, Review of Recent Scientific Literature on its Toxicity and Advice on
the Danish Risk Assessment of Bisphenol A, 8(9) THE EFSAJ. 1829 (2010).
52. Id.
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study and to look at any other new relevant scientific evidence."
Since March 2010, EFSA has been in the process of drafting its opin-
ion on bisphenol A. The drafting process has taken longer than ex-
pected because EFSA was reviewing more than 800 publications.
EFSA finally released its opinion on September 23, 2010.' The
Panel concluded that they could not identify any new evidence that
could lead them to a revision of the current Tolerable Daily Intake
set by EFSA in 2006 and confirmed in 2008." Because the panel
recognized that some studies report an adverse effect on animals
exposed to bisphenol A, the Panel will reconsider its conclusion
should new data become available in the future that could indicate
potential adverse effects on humans."
X. LABELING
Following the June vote of the European Parliament on the
Commission Proposal for a Regulation on the provision of food in-
formation to consumers, it is now the Council's turn to express its
opinion on the piece of legislation as voted by the Parliament in a
Common Position. At the time of publication, this position has not
been released yet. Member States hold monthly meetings on this
text, with the current Presidency of the Council (Belgium) making
proposals.
XI. MISCELLANEOUS
In September 2010, the United Kingdom's Food Standards
Agency, the UK governmental body whose mission is to protect the
public's health and consumer interests in relation to food, under-
went changes in terms of responsibilities for food labeling." The
responsibilities for food labeling were divided up between three de-
partments.' The FSA will keep its responsibility for the food safety
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expert scientific advice on the food safety aspects of date marking, as-
sessment and labeling of ingredients/foods with food safety implica-
tions, food safety aspects of organic food and of foods controlled by
compositional standards, treatments and conditions of use with food
safety implications, GM and novel foods (including use of nanotechnol-
ogy), animal feed, including Codex Intergovernmental Task Force on
Animal Feeding, food safety incidents, including misleading labeling and
food fraud with possible food safety implications, EU General Food Law
regulation, including traceability of food and feed, [and] Codex Com-
mittees on Food Hygiene, Methods of Analysis and Sampling, Food Ad-
ditives, Contaminants in Foods.59
The Department of Health will take over the nutritional labeling
policy, such as "nutrition related aspects of the EU food information
regulation, front of pack labeling, food for particular nutritional
uses, infant formula and follow on formula, health and nutrition
claims, food supplements, calorie information in catering establish-
ments, [and] Codex Committee on Nutrition and Foods for Special
Dietary Uses." The Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs will oversee labeling relating to aspects other than food
safety and nutrition, providing
[the] general lead on food labeling legislation and relevant EU negotia-
tions, lead on the EU Food Information proposal, country of origin la-
beling, food composition standards and labeling such as fruit juice and
fruit nectars, jams and bottled water, technical advice on compositional
standards for food without specific legislation, such as soft drinks and
cereal products, fish labeling, use of marketing terms e.g. natural, fresh,
clear labeling, vegan and vegetarian labeling, food authenticity program,
Codex Committees for: Food Labeling, Processed Fruits and Vegetables,
Fresh Fruits and Vegetables, Fats and Oils, Fish and Fishery Products,
Europe, General Principles, [and] lead on Codex Alimentarius Commis-
sion, General Principles and Coordinating Committee for Europe."
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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